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NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form. An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

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SDS Deputies Demand Resignations of Leaders

AU2006134494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16 Jun 94 p 2

[Report by Miroslava Belcheva: "Union of Democratic Forces Parliamentary Group Demanded Resignations of Three of Its Leaders"]

[Text] Public demands were made for the resignations of Filip Dimitrov, Svobodka Stefanova, and Edvin Sugarev from the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group, following a meeting of the group, the scandalous proceedings of which leaked out at the trolleybus stop near the National Assembly. Sugarev justified himself, casting the blame on the group, which in his view was committing suicide. In a shocking interview given to a Sofia newspaper, Svobodka Stefanova made defamatory statements against Stefan Savov, Georgi Petrov, Mikhail Nedelchev, and Vesela Rasheeva, accusing them of plotting to discredit others and making offensive generalizations about their past and standard of education. Edvin Sugarev emotionally defended her. This prompted Petrov and Rasheeva yesterday to demand the expulsion of Stefanova and Sugarev from the SDS parliamentary group. In the lobbies of parliament, Stefan Savov asked Georgi Petrov to withdraw his own resignation.

However, the issue did not come to a vote at the meeting. Aleksandur Yordanov appealed for personal disputes to be settled, even by expulsion if necessary.

According to Rasheeva, the SDS will not disintegrate just now, but the sharp decline in its image makes it pointless to "stand together."

SDS Deputy Romil Popov declared that it was high time for Filip Dimitrov to resign. He angrily stated that Dimitrov was to blame for everything. He allowed people like Ludzhev and Michkovski to leave the coalition, handed over the power held by the SDS without the parliamentary group deciding to do this, provoked splits in the SDS member parties, and even permitted his own cronies like Vasil Mikhaylov and Edvin Sugarev to spread slanders. Popov said that for a year now he had been campaigning to remove Filip Dimitrov from the SDS leadership. He claimed that two-thirds of the SDS deputies agreed with him, including Zlatka Ruseva, Vesela Rasheeva, and most of the deputies from the United Christian Democratic Center, the RDP [Radical Democratic Party], and the DP [Democratic Party].

The SDS parliamentary group does not have the powers to decide on my resignation, F. Dimitrov explained with a smile. Under the SDS regulations, Dimitrov said, he can only be removed from his post if five of the SDS member parties raise the issue in the National Coordinating Council and 10 of the 15 parties then vote against the incumbent leader. If it so decides, the SDS parliamentary group can only decide to remove certain deputies from its ranks, but this does not affect their powers in the National Coordinating Council.

Trade Minister Admits Former BCP Membership

AU2106074994 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Kiril Tsochev, deputy prime minister and minister of trade, by Boyka Bashlieva, in Sofia on 15 June: "I Do Not Expect To Work Miracles, But Welcome the Challenge"]

[Text] [Bashlieva] Mr. Tsochev, minutes after the result of the vote was announced, Stefan Savov [leader of parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces] declared that you were a Communist. Would you characterize yourself as one?

[Tsochev] When on 16 May Professor Berov invited me and I was asked to stand for the post of trade minister, the first question that I asked was who was proposing me. The prime minister answered that I was his candidate and that he had agreed my candidature mainly with professionals in the field of foreign trade.

[Bashlieva] Do you know the identities of these professionals?

[Tsochev] They were not named, but Prof. Berov said that many of the people whom he had consulted had given, though it is embarrassing for me to say so, a positive assessment of my work. The condition that I set was that I do not want any political force to stand behind me, making me its hostage in the government of experts that I believe this government represents.

[Bashlieva] Did the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] set any conditions for supporting you?

[Tsochev] Certainly not. Our conversation was correct, in terms of finding out who I was—where I had worked, what sort of job I had done, and they were pleased to receive a negative reply to the question whether I had been in the state security system. Was I a member of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]? Yes, until 1990, since when I have been nonparty.

[Bashlieva] How do you explain that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] parliamentary group did not invite you to meet them?

[Tsochev] Many of the BSP's economists do not know me.

[Bashlieva] Why did you accept Prof. Berov's invitation to join his team?

[Tsochev] I find this an interesting challenge. The know-how that I have acquired in 20 years work in state government and two years in the private sector gives me grounds to want to try to do something for Bulgaria. I would not like to sound immodest, but I come from private business and am materially secure, although unfortunately I will have to put my company into deep freeze while I serve as a minister.

[Bashlieva] Is life easier in private business?

[Tsochev] Yes, but my zodiac sign is Aries, so I am the kind of man who seeks a challenge.

[Bashlieva] You mentioned that you do not expect to work miracles. Nevertheless, what ambitions do you have as you accept your ministerial post?

[Tsochev] I have a few ideas, but first of all want to see what has been done so far in the trade sector. I will meet Mr. Karabashev [former trade minister] today.

[Bashlieva] Are you prepared to make any assessment of what he has achieved?

[Tsochev] I do not think I am entitled to do so.

[Bashlieva] Do you have any impressions about the team with which Mr. Karabashev worked, and are you considering making any changes to it?

[Tsochev] So far I have not met the team, but I will be meeting everyone. At this stage I do not intend to dismiss or appoint anyone. However, this does not mean that anyone who commits a professional gaffe will not go.

[Bashlieva] What are your initial ideas?

[Tsochev] They relate mainly to the foreign trade sector—stimulating exports, protecting domestic production, and making it possible for us to recover our positions in foreign markets. In a week's time my team and I will announce a two-stage program—for the next three months and until the end of the year.

[Bashlieva] Can you say anything more specific?

[Tsochev] One man does not make a team. Please let me first hear what the people with whom I am to work have to say.

Possibility of Zhelev Vetoes Examined

AU2106074694 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 16 Jun 94 p 7

[Commentary by Tatyana Vasileva: "Zhelev Considers Second Term in Office""]

[Text] The veto that President Zhelev is expected to impose on the laws on the judiciary and mass privatization may once again put him one step in front.

The personification of the amendments to the Judiciary System Act as "anti-Tatarchev" and "anti-Grigorov," as well as the personification of the reaction to them, may prove harmful; the laws at least should not be used as a means of obtaining personal revenge. However, it will certainly open the hearts of the people at 134 Rakovski Street [headquarters of Union of Democratic Forces, SDS] to the head of state whom they rejected more than a year ago. If, after lengthy consultations with all the parties concerned, Dr. Zhelev nonetheless decides to return the law to parliament for further drafting in the plenary hall, this will undoubtedly also make him a hero in the eyes of Europe, where people already believe that our judiciary is being recommunized.

Stopping the mass privatization act will also increase the president's rating abroad. Foreign investors are staying away from Bulgaria not only because, as a Balkan country, we are considered to be a high risk, but also due to the model for privatization that we have now been arguing over for three months. Although winning a few points abroad, Dr. Zhelev will nevertheless attract the wrath of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. The Socialists are already wondering whom to blame because their increasingly impoverished electorate has nothing to gain from taking part in the mass privatization.

It will be a veritable feat of aerobatics if the head of state finds another form of veto that will allow him to make up with the SDS without provoking an almighty quarrel with the BSP, and at the same time avoid damaging his image abroad. This would certainly mean that, after almost four years in the supreme office, Dr. Zhelev refuses to walk any longer along the edge of the precipice and is looking to win the soft, velvety caresses of the electorate.

If the president acts to set people's minds at rest, in contrast to the political storm that everyone expects, this may be interpreted as meaning that the head of state is already thinking about a second term.

Kozloduy Plant Operating at 'Reduced Capacity'

AU2006095794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Report by correspondent Veselin Angelov from Kozloduy]

[Text] [Announcer] After speedily completed repairs, the No. 1 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was put back into service. But, as our correspondent Veselin Angelov reports, the nuclear plant is operating at reduced capacity at the moment.

[Angelov] The reduced operating capacity was made necessary by the fall in electricity consumption throughout the country. In fact, only three of the six generating units are in operation at Kozloduy at the moment: These are Units No. 1 and No. 2, each producing 420 megawatts, and the 1,000-megawatt No. 6 Unit. The remaining reactors are shut down for planned maintenance or for reloading with fresh nuclear fuel. The period of their shutdown is being utilized to introduce some new technical features, connected with improving safety of operation. This is a continuous process, prompted by the constant improvements in international standards and the requirements of the World Association of Nuclear Operators.

Commentary on 'Sobriety' of U.S. Foreign Policy

AU2106081394 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 18 Jun 94 p 6

[Commentary by Petr Dudek: "Sobriety Above All"]

[Text] When U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff tactfully pointed out to journalists last May that, in foreign policy, the United States will continue to pursue only those aims that it can manage—and that have economic significance for Washington—many politicians on both sides of the Atlantic feigned great surprise. Commentaries and statements repudiating the surprisingly "resigned" and "isolationist" drift of U.S. foreign policy began to appear. At the same time, Tarnoff had only conceded something that was as plain "as the nose on his face." Perhaps he came up with his formulations a little soon. However, with the passing of a year, we can only acknowledge his good intentions.

The number-three in the U.S. Department of State underlined his view of future U.S. international policy yesterday and the day before yesterday in Prague. The stabilizing Czech economic situation suits the U.S. side. Tarnoff referred with satisfaction to the higher U.S. investment in the Czech Republic (roughly 30 percent of the overall volume of foreign imports). Viewed through Washington's eyes, the Czech basin [ceska kotlina] is a region that it does not have to take care of systematically because its inhabitants, within the framework of their potential, are taking care of it themselves.

Unfortunately, the issues that affect the fate of countries like the Czech Republic, issues that these countries cannot deal with on their own, will not wither away in this fashion. The security vacuum in which the Central European countries have found themselves following the collapse of the Soviet empire can only be filled under the given circumstances by membership in NATO. If, however, Moscow decides to put off the moment when its former satellites are accepted into NATO, no one in today's world other than Washington can influence its willfulness. Will it do so?

Tarnoff left this question, which must have come up in his talks with Czech politicians, only half answered. Yet he spoke extensively and optimistically, as was to be expected, about the Partnership for Peace, project and, in an interview with journalists, he rejected tactfully but decisively the criticism that has recently been leveled at this unbinding program in the United States.

The Czech Republic is far from being a state that would not let the key officials in the U.S. Department of State sleep peacefully. Visiting it, therefore, is not something that would "get hot" for U.S. diplomats. Tarnoff himself called off at the last moment in the spring his announced and carefully planned visit to Prague.

It is impossible to be surprised at the calm unconcern with which Washington dubs us self-supporting. Other countries, threatening to explode, merit U.S. attention more. North Korea is the most noticeable example. Even here, however, Washington is limiting itself only to what it can manage—and it seems that it can manage little.

Peter Tarnoff, who held talks in Asian countries last week, in reply to a question from LIDOVE NOVINY on whether Washington will be willing and able to prevent Pyongyang from producing more nuclear bombs, was quick to recall the success of the conciliatory mission by former President Carter. In return for Kim Il-song's allowing two international inspectors to remain in the DPRK, the United States will suspend its attempt to introduce sanctions. A meager victory—but in the spirit of the sobriety formulated by Tarnoff. Rather than dispatching the Army to force Kim into obedience, it is worthwhile for Washington to send Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang. The fact that the North Korean regime cannot be trusted and that the two inspectors will not prevent the production of further nuclear bombs in the DPRK has somehow been left aside.

Article Assesses Damage Caused by Soviet Troops

AU2106112094 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by "(vrs)": "The Damage Caused by the Soviet Army Will Cost Quite a Lot"]

[Text] Prague—The state will provide more than 140 million korunas [Kc] this year to clear up the damage caused by the former Soviet Army. This works out at Kc14 for each citizen.

First and foremost, it is essential to clean up the underground waters and the parcels of land contaminated by fuel and to dispose of the unexploded munitions the Soviets left behind. "The source of the damage, which is deemed to be Russia, has not spent anything on rectification, and it is not envisaged that anything will be spent," said Jaroslav Ruzicka, an Environment Ministry expert.

Clearing up the damage left behind by the former Soviet Army has already cost almost Kc400 million in the years 1991-93; this is roughly one-fifth of what, according to estimates, will have to be spent as a whole.

Ruzicka said that a lot of unnecessary damage was done to the environment because the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Republic was very sudden. "In Germany, the Russians' withdrawal has been staggered over a period of several years, and so it is under greater control," he said. Ruzicka commented, however, that the damage caused by the Czech Army is, to say the least, the same.

Russian Debt-Repayment Agreement Signed

LD2006201294 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Czech Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Rudlovcak has signed a Czech-Russian intergovernmental agreement in Moscow. The agreement concerns the Russian debt to the Czech Republic in the amount of $3.5 billion that Russia should repay by 2003. The Czech Republic will receive $52 million this year, $101 million next year, and $301.9 million in 1996.

Czechs, Slovaks Fail To Settle Financial Claims

LD2006172494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] According to Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan, the Slovak Government will try to settle property differences with the Czech Republic before this year's Slovak parliamentary elections, which should take place in October. This was stated by the Slovak foreign minister during his visit today in Prague. More from Marika Taborska.

[Taborska] The present Slovak Government is interested in settling the remaining open questions in Czech-Slovak relations. However, according to Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan, it is doubtful there will be enough time to settle the issue conclusively because of the fall parliamentary elections. Eduard Kukan talked with his Czech counterpart, Josef Zieleniec, about the current state of bilateral relations—in particular, as they relate to the division of former federal property and to international agreements. Zieleniec was asked what was achieved in discussing the biggest Czech claim resulting from the balance of accounts of the former State Bank of Czechoslovakia. He said:

[Begin Zieleniec recording] This problem is very old, and finding a solution to it is difficult. The key lies in the Czech National Bank's claim vis-a-vis the National Bank of the Slovak Republic. The claim amounts to about 24 billion korunas [Kc]. On the other hand, there are two separate claims to gold. One is linked to the so-called Slovak gold, which is symbolic and was a Slovak national collection, and the second resulted from the division.

However, I wish to say that these are two disproportionate claims. On the one hand, there is the claim of Kc24 billion and, on the other, the gold claim whose overall value is well under Kc1 billion. The gold is a highly visible, symbolic claim, but, from the viewpoint of the balance of mutual claims, it is not as important as the claim of the Czech National Bank vis-a-vis the National Bank of the Slovak Republic. For the time being, this question is frozen because we are dealing here mainly with the Slovak acknowledgement that this claim is justified. The question of repayments is one thing, but an acknowledgment of a claim is of key importance. [end recording]

Analysis of Economic Trends in Jan-Apr 94

AU2006133494 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 15 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Antonin Jilecek of the Czech Statistical Office: "Economic Development From January to April 1994"]

[Text] Industrial output was 1.2 percent lower in April than in April 1993. The volume of industrial output during the first four months of the year was 0.7 percent lower compared with the same period last year; this figure was 3 percent in organizations with 25 and more employees. According to estimates, output in smaller organizations was higher in April and has been since the beginning of the year, by almost one-quarter. The production of goods was higher, in particular, in the paper and printing industry and in publishing activity, by 15.4 percent; in oil refining, by 9.3 percent; and in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, by 3.3 percent.

Construction output was 0.3 percent higher in April; it was 6.5 percent higher for the first four months of the year compared with the same period of 1993. During the first four months, output rose by 11.4 percent in organizations with fewer than 25 employees and among individual businessmen.

The number of employees in enterprises with 25 and more employees in industry was 5.5 percent lower during the first four months compared with the same period last year; this figure was 1.4 percent higher in construction. The average monthly wage during the aforementioned period rose to 6,185 korunas [Kc] (by 13.7 percent) in industry and to Kc6,787 (by 13.5 percent) in construction.

The volume of cargo traffic declined in April in all types of traffic compared with last April. Compared with the January-to-April period last year, during the first four months of this year, 3.2 percent more goods were conveyed by public road haulage; 15.1 percent fewer goods were conveyed by railroad; and 25.2 percent fewer goods were conveyed by river.

During the first four months of 1994, sales of slaughter cattle fell by 9 percent, of slaughter hogs by 4.4 percent, of slaughter poultry by 27.6 percent, of milk by 6.6 percent, and of eggs by 4.8 percent compared with the same period last year.

Consumer prices went up by 0.4 percent in April compared with March; at the same time, the prices of foodstuffs, nonfoodstuffs, and services increased by the same percentage, while prices in public catering rose by 0.6 percent.

The number of unplaced job seekers declined further in April to 171,900 and was 13,400 lower than at the end of last year.

Retail sales in the January-to-April period amounted to Kc131 billion and were 15.2 percent higher than during the same period last year. Expressed in physical volume, they increased by 6.5 percent.

The overall volume of exports during the first four months amounted to Kc117 billion in franco prices and was 6.5 percent lower than in the January-to-April period last year. The decline in exports to Slovakia by Kc7.5 billion—that is, by 27.9 percent—had a decisive influence on the reduction in exports. Imports amounted to Kc118.5 billion and were 10.9 percent more than last year; at the same time, imports from Slovakia fell by 7.1 percent. So, the balance of trade ended with a deficit of Kc1.5 billion. With the exception of the countries of the former Soviet Union (a deficit of Kc10.1 billion), there was a surplus with all territories.

Sabol on Cooperation Within Arms Industry

AU2106075394 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 16 Jun 94 p 4

[Interview with Andrej Sabol, state secretary at the Czech Ministry of Defense, by Oldrich Zabojnik; place and date not given: "Arms Companies Have Something To Build On"]

[Text] [Zabojnik] How do you view the possibility of cooperation between the arms companies in a situation where these enterprises have begun to compete, to a certain extent, in both republics?

[Sabol] The arms industry of the former Czechoslovakia was organized as a whole. After the federation was partitioned, the situation changed, but, nevertheless, what sense would it make to buy something expensive in third countries that we ourselves can make more cheaply at home? A solution would be to agree on mutually advantageous economic opportunities. In both the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, there is interest in arms production because arms, as an important source of funds for the state coffers, do sell and will sell in the world.

[Zabojnik] As a result of conversion, production was completely phased out in the Slovak Republic. Will there not be problems in reviving production?

[Sabol] The arms industry of the Slovak Republic is now working at 8 percent of its capacity. We do not want the industry to produce as much as before. However, we can produce in order to meet the needs of our armies and the armies of countries with similar equipment that needs to be renewed. The modernization of equipment produced in the arms factories of the former federation, the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact countries could become the second and a larger component of our common interests. Each of these countries can carry out this modernization using its own capacities, but full modernization is not quite possible in that way. Purchasing expensive technology from Western arms manufacturers may also be involved. There also is a third possibility: We may reach agreement, and everyone, according to his possibilities, will help to meet our common needs. Now, the final problem is: To what extent are we really able to revive and develop cooperation?

[Zabojnik] What did you learn at the recent IDET '94 arms fair in Brno? It was possible to compare the products from both republics there.

[Sabol] I saw both the Czech and jthe Slovak versions of the modernized tank, and I spoke with experts from both countries. If we agreed upon joint technological steps, it would certainly lead to even better results and mutual benefit. Other countries do not give up their own arms production, either. For example, Switzerland is developing arms production that is more expensive than possible purchases abroad. When I asked why they were taking this course of action, they said: We keep the know-how at home, the arms industry means the constant development of technologies, and we provide jobs for our own people. This is also a way for us, I believe.

[Zabojnik] The Slovak version of the modernized T-72 tank has met with a positive response from foreign experts. How are you satisfied?

[Sabol] Some details can still be improved on ours as well as the Czech version. Jointly, we could get even further. I do not imagine that the Czech side is thinking only about its own army, but also wants, like ourselves, to assert itself abroad. This means jobs for people at home and making our presence felt in the world. We are also aware of the financial problems in some countries that want to modernize economically but rationally. This presents great opportunities to the producers in both countries.

Poll Shows Shifts in Voter Patterns

AU2106102194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 16 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by "rk"]

[Text] The latest public opinion survey carried out by the FOCUS agency in May 1994 produced some interesting results regarding the more detailed and specific aspects of individual political entities and personalities.

While the list of trustworthy politicians is still topped by the "evergreens" (Michal Kovac, Jozef Moravcik, and Vladimir Meciar), it is interesting that precisely Michal Kovac and Jozef Moravcik, as well as Brigita Schmognerova, have become acceptable to broader sections of the population. It is precisely the acceptability of the sympathizers of parties other than his own that markedly distinguishes the present prime minister from his predecessor (sympathizers of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] make up 74 percent of those who trust Vladimir Meciar, while Democratic Union [DU] voters represent only about 20 percent of those who trust Jozef Moravcik). Similarly, whereas the popularity of Peter Weiss within the ranks of his own party is declining, he is becoming more acceptable to the supporters of other parties. According to the FOCUS survey, of all party leaders, Ludovit Cernak, Jan Slota, and Peter Hagyari enjoy the least sympathies in their own parties.

The FOCUS survey was also aimed at ascertaining shifts in the voters' base since the 1992 elections. The slightest shift has been ascertained among Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] voters—56 percent of those who had voted for these two parties in 1992 would also vote for them in 1994. Approximately half of the original voters have remained loyal to the HZDS and the Democratic Party [DS] (which ran in the 1992 elections as the DS-Civic Democratic Party of Slovakia), while 40 percent of those who had voted for the Civic Democratic Union [ODU] in 1992 would today vote for DU. Another interesting finding concerns the structure of supporters of individual political parties. Men, citizens with only basic education, and citizens over 55 slightly prevail among HZDS supporters. Citizens working in the private sector are underrepresented among them. As much as 92 percent of HZDS supporters are determined to participate in the elections. If they were to choose a second party, HZDS supporters would opt for the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], while they feel an aversion for the KDH. The typical SDL voter is over 45 or 55, and citizens without religious affiliation are overrepresented among them. A total of 90 percent of SDL voters are determined to participate in the elections. Other parties acceptable to SDL supporters are the ZRS and the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia [SDSS], while they have an aversion to the HZDS and the KDH. The most typical KDH supporters are over 55 or 60, with only basic education. Some 88 percent of them are Catholics, and 91 percent would participate in the elections if they were held today. As other acceptable parties, KDH supporters name, above all, DU and the DS. They have an aversion to the HZDS, while their aversion to the SDL is declining. DU would be voted for by a disproportionate number of women and citizens under age 44. Supporters with university education are also overrepresented among them. Sympathies for DU grow with the size of the community of residence. If they were to cast a second vote, DU voters would give it to the National Democratic Party [NDS] or the KDH, while they feel aversion for the HZDS.

When asked about their motives to vote for a particular party, respondents cited four reasons predominantly: sympathy and trust, the assertion of group interests, the political parties' programs, and the political parties' personalities. The following motives are important for the supporters of individual political entities: sympathy and personalities for HZDS supporters, Christian character of the movement and sympathy for KDH supporters, the assertion of workers' interests and social emphasis in the party program for ZRS supporters, and sympathy and personalities for DU supporters (the personality of Jozef Moravcik is an even bigger motive for DU supporters than the personality of Vladimir Meciar is for HZDS supporters).

Cost, Range of New Howitzers, Rocket Launcher

AU2106111594 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 17 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Marian Dudinsky: "The Zuzana Howitzer Is Selling Like Hotcakes; World Hit of Slovak Arms Industry Presented at Jelsava"]

[Excerpts] A major festivity took place at the 3d Artillery Brigade at Jelsava the day before yesterday. Three "generals" of the present Slovak Army were presented to the public there, two of whom are women! The first is ZUZANA [Slovak form of "Susanne"], the second DANA, and the third is Rocket Launcher—Model 70. It is self-evident that we are talking about arms systems in our Army's arsenal, among which "Sue," a self-propelled cannon howitzer, is the absolute hit. A lot of praise has been heaped on it at all international exhibitions at which it has been presented lately.

The 155-mm caliber, the very caliber that is also used by NATO armies, and the range of 40 kilometers, a distance for which air reconnaissance is required, place this weapon among the leading ranks in the world at present. This is also confirmed by the preliminary price of 30 million korunas [Sk], or $1 million (for potential foreign customers), per unit. Of course, this price is based on the assumption that we will be able to produce at least 100 pieces a year and that production starts immediately! Waiting in this area means waiting for bankruptcy. India alone has shown interest in 400 of these howitzers.... And other interested parties are legion.

The second "general" is ZUZANA's predecessor, a 152-mm self-propelled cannon howitzer, model 77, code named "DANA." Its range is "only" 20 kilometers, but, during its presentation, one's ears, though plugged, were ringing handsomely. The assertion seems to be true that it may be enough to erect 10 to 20 of these monsters at the battlefield to deafen the enemy troops. They cost about Sk10 million apiece.

The 122-mm rocket launcher, model 70, is mounted on a Tatra 813 chassis and equipped with 40 rockets (known as improved "katushas" [World War II Soviet-made rocket launchers]). Its range is also approximately 20 kilometers, but its price is a mere Sk7.5 million. However, a single shot costs up to Sk20,000! [passage omitted]

As is to be seen, Slovak arms manufacturers are beginning to recover from the woeful heritage of conversion imposed by Havel and to return to markets from which they had been pushed out by the so-called humanitarian ethics of federal policy, which pharisaically applied only to Slovakia....

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 18 June on page 3 carries a 150-word "r"-attributed report entitled "Targeted on Howitzers." According to the report, in a statement provided to SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, Colonel Tomas Svec, chief of the Public Relations Department at the Army Command of the Slovak Republic, corrected the information contained in the above report as follows: "The Zuzana self-propelled cannon howitzer is not in the arsenal of the Army of the Slovak Republic. The Army intends, however, to introduce it into its arsenal, as was also stated at Jelsava by the commander of the Army of the Slovak Republic. The information about Zuzana's price (Sk30 million) is also incorrect. This price is a very rough estimate from January 1993, when there was no experience with the development and production of such a high-quality combat system. The actual price is quite different."]

Agreements Reached in Coalition Talks

LD2006203394 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] The MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]-SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] coalition talks ended a short while ago. Organizational and personnel matters were the focus of the talks. Attila Csaszar, our staff member, sent the following report from the site:

[Csaszar] The coalition talks ended just a short time before the beginning of this program. For the time being, here are some brief notes on the results.

The MSZP, the winner of the elections, will have nine ministries in the future government, while the SZDSZ will have three: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Culture and Public Education, and the infrastructure portfolio [Ministry of Transport, Telecommunications, and Water Management]. Political state secretaries will be provided by the MSZP. Names have not yet been mentioned, according to SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Petoe.

An agreement has also been reached on which party will provide the parliamentary speaker. This post will be filled by an MSZP deputy. The three deputy speakers will be nominated by the SZDSZ, the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], and the FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party]. The FKGP will have the opportunity to delegate a deputy speaker only if it signs the six-party agreement on parliamentary matters.

A preliminary decision was taken on matters relating to parliamentary committees. The SZDSZ can delegate the chairmen of three committees—the Constitutional, Defense, and Foreign Affairs Committees. The chairmen of the other committees will be delegated by the MSZP. The opposition is still expected to make demands in this matter, however.

It was also said that in the current situation, the two sides might even sign the coalition agreements as early as Friday. It is also very likely that in accordance with earlier reports, Gyula Horn will be the prime minister.

Coalition Program on Foreign, Defense Policies

AU2006135494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Jun 94 p 3

[Report by Balazs Pocs: "No Political Cleanup Planned in the Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] The chapter of the government program on foreign and security policy and defense has been drawn up, it was announced at a news conference on 16 June at which a report was presented on the three-day work of the coalition committee of foreign affairs experts.

The negotiating delegations were led by Laszlo Kovacs for the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and Istvan Szent-Ivanyi for the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]. There are no fundamental differences between the ideas of the two parties, Kovacs said. He added that the three main directions of foreign political activities—Euratlantic integration, forming good-neighborly relations, and supporting the justified efforts of the Hungarian minorities living beyond the border—are closely related and equally important, and they need to be handled in parallel with one another.

It is especially important for Hungary to become part of the European Union [EU] as soon as possible and on the best possible conditions, Kovacs emphasized. Until membership is achieved, we have to make the most of the options provided by the Association Agreement, and we have to make use of the opportunities to develop the agreement and to amend it if necessary. However, this does not mean that the agreement will be renegotiated. He added that the talks on membership have to be started already in this parliamentary cycle, and then a referendum has to be called on the issue.

The views of the two parties differ somewhat on the issue of NATO membership. The MSZP is in favor of holding a referendum on this issue after the talks on membership are completed. Although the SZDSZ would not oppose a referendum initiated by the public, it does not consider it absolutely necessary.

Without normalizing relations with the neighboring countries, there is no chance of an improvement in the situation of Hungarians living there, and the establishment of good-neighborly relations is also important for Hungary's image and integration, Kovacs said. The document prepared by the experts committee makes special mention of Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian relations, and emphasizes the importance of the next government showing a willingness to have talks on the [bilateral] basic agreements. These agreements will have to contain a mutual renunciation of territorial demands, recognition of current borders, and obligations to respect national minority rights in accordance with the norms of the Council of Europe and the CSCE.

The two parties agreed that it is the government's constitutional, political, and moral obligation to support the interests of Hungarians living beyond the border; this includes national minority rights, the economic development of Hungarians, and their local social self-organization.

Szent-Ivanyi said that views on the Foreign Ministry's structure were not included in the committee's documents because this will be the responsibility of the party that runs this ministry. However, they agreed that it has become necessary to modernize the Foreign Ministry's structure, to reduce compartmenalization, increase the efficiency of the flow of information, and to rationalize its budget. If possible the ministry's staff has to be reduced.

Talking about personnel policy, Szent-Ivanyi said that preference will be given to professional considerations and the Foreign Ministry will not have any kind of political cleanup.

In reply to a question, Kovacs said that appointing the foreign minister or deciding whether the ministry should

belong to a single party do not fall within the competence of the experts committee. He added that, in the committee's view, the structure of the Foreign Ministry will also have to reflect the tasks resulting from the changed governmental structure.

In reply to our question, Szent-Ivanyi said that the SZDSZ is proposing the establishment of a ministry or office responsible for European affairs because, in the interest of Hungary's membership, it would be more favorable to concentrate the related issues in one hand. He added that it would be expedient also to jointly handle the issues of national minorities living over the border and within the country.

Emphasizing that this was his personal view, Kovacs said that the assignment of the ambassadors is for two to six years. It will be a task for the new foreign minister to examine which ambassadors' work is absolutely necessary and to ask them to stay on if possible.

In reaction to Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's remarks (regarding the resignation of Pal Tar, ambassador to the United States), Kovacs said that it is indeed a basic citizens' right to run in the elections on the Hungarian Democratic Forum's list, but to be an ambassador is not such a right; the two issues cannot be linked. It is doubtful that a person who had demonstrated his commitment to a foreign policy attitude based on a belief in historical mission and ideological antipathies and sympathies would be able to serve a foreign policy not based on these, Kovacs said.

Talking about defense, Imre Mecs (SZDSZ) and Gyorgy Keleti (MSZP) said that they consider it essential to maintain armed forces that could guarantee the country's security. The committee considers it necessary to continue to reduce the size of the armed forces and to draw up a long-term development plan. The draft reform plan of the armed forces has to be submitted to Parliament in 1995. The experts committee would like to see rescinded the government decree that planned to unite the Defense Ministry and the Army headquarters.

SZDSZ's Kuncze Discusses Coalition Talks

AU2106101494 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 20 Jun 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Gabor Kuncze, acting head of the parliamentary group of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Anna Dano; place and date not given]

[Text] [Dano] Why is the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] not satisfied with the coordination right that is equivalent to a veto right and the four ministerial positions offered by the Socialists?

[Kuncze] Who said this is not enough? We have mutually learned our positions and this phase in the negotiations has come to an end. It is true that our desires were far apart, but we are negotiating in order to bring them closer.

[Dano] However, it is well known—and perhaps you will not deny it either—that there are serious debates over the distribution of ministries and the appointment of ministers and state secretaries. Would you tell us what this difference of interests is about?

[Kuncze] This is as if the press were controlling politics. At the same time, all that is happening is that we have reached a point in the negotiations where we must decide how to divide up the government positions among us. This has been given a lot of publicity, which is misleading because this publicity gives the impression that this issue has elicited the biggest debates or that this issue is the most important. The creation of guarantees or the coordination in 10 committees are more important issues. It would be really unfortunate to give the voters the impression that the most important issue here is who gets what position.

[Dano] In your opinion, what other critical points can be found in the agreement?

[Kuncze] For example, if we fail to agree in the committees and the members of the main committee also fail to find a solution to the problems. Differences emerging between the committee on local government and the constitutional law committee could be such problems. There are differences of views regarding the role of the counties, but we also have differences of views on what should be done regarding the constitutional law in the coming parliamentary cycle and in what order.

[Dano] It often seemed during the negotiations that the SZDSZ would not even have adequate experts for many ministries. Perhaps this is why you are sticking so much to certain positions, and this hinders progress in the negotiations. All this is surprising—all the more so because, for the past year, the SZDSZ has been saying that it was preparing to topple the government; in other words, it was preparing for governing.

[Kuncze] This is not true. The SZDSZ has adequate experts.

[Dano] What is your opinion about the bill-package of Sarkozy's independent group of experts—namely their proposals to modify the statute and the Constitution?

(Kuncze] We have been following their activity closely, and we knew the details previously; generally, we agreed at the time and, of course, we argued about some details. It is another matter that a comparison of programs is taking place at the coalition negotiations, and the proposals meant for the parliament will emerge based on this. However, if we compare this with the activity of Sarkozy's group, we can find differences.

[Dano] These proposals almost eliminate the candidates' independence and would turn parliament into a voting machine.

[Kuncze] On the contrary. They free parliament from unessential issues. This could open up more opportunities for debate, and the essence of parliament is to hold debates there. Our parliamentary group supports the statute modifications mentioned by our negotiating delegation at the

six-party negotiations. But it is not longer worth mentioning Sarkozy's proposals because we would like the professional issues to be decided upon already in the committees. People should vote on the modifying proposals there and, after a strict control, these proposals should be submitted to the plenary session. There, people can vote in packages on proposals that most certainly enjoy the support of parliament. This would also reduce the time spent on voting.

Our parliamentary group also supports the proposals that give greater opportunity for the opposition to supervise the government, proposals that facilitate the establishment of investigation committees and set up rules regarding the ordering of days of political debate. We also support the idea that one-third of the deputies in important committees should be opposition members, because one-third of votes are needed for a proposal to make it to the plenary session. The fact that the opposition parties will receive more committee positions than their government weight will also facilitate the activity of the opposition.

[Dano] How can you guarantee a parliamentary group discipline according to the expected new statute?

[Kuncze] This is a matter of the statute of the parliamentary group. We discussed this matter last weekend. Everyone accepted that, as a government party deputy group, our parliamentary group will have to function according to new rules. There are only ideas about this now, and there is not yet a set rule regarding the absences. This rule will endeavor to make sure that there are as many people present as possible at the plenary sessions.

Post of Coalition Deputy Prime Minister Viewed

AU2106101094 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 18 Jun 94 p 13

[Interview with Peter Hack, member of the Alliance of Free Democrats delegation at the coalition talks, by Lajos Bodnar; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bodnar] You have placed great emphasis on institutional guarantees, but less has been said in public on the personal guarantees. However, one interesting aspect has been discussed, namely the position of coalition deputy prime minister. This appears to be an unusual solution and, at first sight, it reveals compromises. The question is how this political position can be fitted into the public law?

[Hack] The coalition deputy prime minister is an institution that is half-way between the current setup and, let us say, the solution in Germany, where the institution of deputy chancellor is known, and this position was, for a long time, filled by the smaller coalition partner. In terms of public law, we do not wish to establish this position of "deputy chancellor"—deputy prime minister. At the same time, in the government's statute, we wish to mention the fact that, during the operation of this government, there will be a minister within the cabinet who will have the right to agree on certain issues. I would add that his rights will not be decided by the ministry he heads, but rather by the fact that he is the person nominated by the smaller coalition partner. However, this will not be the minister who deputizes for the prime minister when he is absent. The government decree on the order of substitution can, without any problems, regulate that some other minister, rather than the interior minister—if this position is filled by the coalition deputy prime minister—should substitute for the prime minister in his absence.

[Bodnar] The disputed issues would be taken to a coalition conciliation committee in which both parties would have one vote. Do you think that this seems like a hallway to the right of veto?

[Hack] I would not put it as sharply as a right of veto. At any rate, the constraints to create consensus are included in the way of operation. Therefore, we agree on a solution that will, at one point, definitely bring the disputes to a consensus.

[Bodnar] The two parties made an important gesture to the future opposition in the distribution of the committee places. Does this have any risks, and in view of the known power structure, does it have a real stake?

[Hack] It definitely has a stake because the parties preparing for coalition offer higher positions and a bigger chance for participation to the opposition than what would be warranted by the proportion of their mandates. In my view, this is an important gesture and the majority in 1990 did not do this. It has a value and the opposition parties appear to appreciate it. I add that the six-party agreement will lay down these extra rights that will be due to the opposition only while the coalition stands. We have agreed that, in certain parliamentary committees, the proportion of opposition and government will be 50 percent each. One of these is the national security committee that was set up in proportion to the mandates in the previous cycle. We also agreed that if Parliament is to set up an investigation committee, the proportion of government and opposition in it will again be 50 percent each. [passage omitted]

KDNP Calls For Cooperation of Right Wing

AU2006122294 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 17 Jun 94 p 4

[Interview with Szilagyi Terezia Csaszar, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party, by Jezso; place and date not given]

[Text] With the approach of the local government elections, an increasing number of right-wing parties realize the need for a common political stand. However, the extent to which this process of alliance can go is still questionable. In certain circumstances, Bela Csepe, former head of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], can envisage a fusion with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. However, KDNP Deputy Chairman Laszlo Varga opposes the idea. We asked KDNP Deputy Chairman Szilagyi Terezia Csaszar first about this controversy.

[Szilagyi] The national, Christian-conservative parties will find it extremely difficult to obtain results in the local government elections separately. These parties should therefore seriously consider the possibility of having common candidates or dividing up the mandates among themselves, as the KDNP and the MDF did in 1990. I do not yet regard fusion as a current issue. In the long run, however, the right wing should also create a people's party-grouping which, in my opinion, starting from the integrating force of the KDNP, will also be able to bring the other three similar parties into a close alliance or even a political union.

[Jezso] You mentioned three parties.

[Szilagyi] In addition to the MDF and the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], I also mean here the United Smallholders Party.

[Jezso] You are the KDNP deputy chairman in charge of organizational matters. In your view, what should the organizational setup of the new KDNP be like?

[Szilagyi] We must renew the party's statute, as well as its organizational and operational rules. The party members' obligations, sphere of authority, and their calling to account are not yet clearly outlined. This is why there was no discipline in the party. I think it is useless to renew the ideological debates, because the KDNP has firm and deep spiritual and moral roots. I would like our party to become a well-organized, modern, European people's party, a party open to social issues.

[Jezso] In a recent television program, Laszlo Kover, the acting parliamentary group head of the Federation of Young Democrats, said regarding the possibility of a common stand of the four opposition parties that this should be limited to a common solution of technical issues. In his view, an opposition coalition would curtail precisely the variety of opposition possibilities and, therefore, he does not think this is a desirable way. What is your opinion?

[Szilagyi] Our party has repeatedly declared that it would like to work as a constructive opposition party. I see opportunities for the four opposition parties to create a uniform stand on specific issues. Otherwise, the opposition will have a very tough time alongside a two-thirds coalition majority.

MSZDP Looking For Left-Wing Cooperation

LD2006135694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] The Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP] wants to form a cooperation agreement before the local government elections with the Hungarian Socialist Party and the trade unions. The MSZDP's executive authorized the party's Presidium to begin discussions with other left-wing forces which accept the importance of social-democratic ideas in Hungary's political and economic life, the MSZDP's statement says.

Walesa, Ireland's Robinson Discuss Relations

LD2106083294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0729 GMT 21 Jun 94

[Text] Warsaw, 21 Jun—A conversation with President Lech Walesa started the first day of an official visit to Poland by Mary Robinson, president of Ireland. Lech Walesa, speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, and Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski welcomed Mary Robinson outside the Belweder Palace.

"Europe and the world are facing new tasks today. Since the Iron Curtain has ceased to divide us, we have to find new solutions," Lech Walesa said when greeting the Irish president. He described the relations between Poland and Ireland as good.

Mary Robinson, who is the first Irish president to visit our country, said, among other things, that her visit should contribute to making the links that already exist between Poland and Ireland even closer.

Spanish, Polish Defense Ministers Sign Accord

LD2106111894 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 21 Jun 94

[Text] Julian Garcia Vargas and Piotr Kolodziejczyk, defense ministers of the Kingdom of Spain and of Poland, signed a defense cooperation agreement today.

[Begin Vargas recording, in Spanish with passage-by-passage translation into Polish] We discussed all issues concerning military cooperation, and I think we can become partners in the European Union soon. [end recording]

[Begin Kolodziejczyk recording] This agreement sanctions the reality that has been a fact for some years now. Our close cooperation links have been in existence since 1990, with varying degrees of intensity. This agreement, unlike other standard bilateral agreements, does not contain any secret clauses. It simply constitutes a legal basis for making our cooperation more dynamic.

When it comes to our plenary talks, I would like to emphasize with great satisfaction that Minister Vargas said in a very clear and decisive way not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of the Spanish Government that Spain will forcefully support our aspirations toward integration into the West European structures, the economic and defense structures. [end recording]

Efforts To Adopt New Constitution Noted

WS2006142894 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 20 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Janusz B.Grochowski: "Struggling With the Constitution"]

[Excerpts] *Professor Janina Zakrzewska says that it is easier to say "no" than to answer a question on "how." That is probably the main reason the Third Polish Republic continues not to have a constitution.*

Five years ago, many issues seemed much simpler. Everybody knew what society was protesting against. The June elections to the contract Sejm became a plebiscite putting the screws to the authorities of the authoritarian state. Even the communists themselves, or at least some of them, spoke against the so-called real socialism, and that made it possible to get down to evolutionary changes.

"At Last in Our Own Home"

There were no major problems with making the ideological cosmetic changes to the basic law. The eagle was crowned again, and the adjective "socialist" was deleted. The idea of a lifelong friendship and military alliance with the Soviet Union was abandoned, which was made easier by the fact that the Soviet Union was just beginning to collapse. The Army was told to be apolitical, while "God, Honor, Motherland" was inscribed on its flags.

So adopting a new constitution of the Third Republic seemed like the easiest thing under the sun to do. It should be adopted as soon as one can write a fundamental law that would suit Polish needs and aspirations. But 3 May 1991 is the absolutely final deadline that cannot be violated, Professor Bronislaw Geremek used to say four years ago.

But, generally speaking, the task turned out to be much more difficult. When it came time to give some substance to concepts like "democracy," "state based on law," or "social justice" (which are favored by everybody, with virtually no exceptions), then everybody began to understand the concepts in his own way. And the longer the debate continues, the bigger the discrepancies that are emerging. [passage omitted]

President or Parliament

[Presidential Aide] Professor Lech Falandysz argues that, in the transitional period in which Poland is right now, beyond doubt the country needs a president with quite substantial powers. For the period of the crisis, the country needs a system in which a relatively strong and stabilized executive authority will be acting alongside parliament, which, however, will not have an advantage over the executive authority. By the way, that would be just a natural consequence of the decision made by the Sejm, to the effect that the head of state is elected not by the National Assembly but by citizens in popular elections.

The proposal to subordinate the chief of the Polish Army General Staff directly to the commander in chief of the Armed Forces (the president) is an attempt at imposing precisely that kind of model. Efforts to grant decision-making powers to the National Security Council [RBN], which up to now was only an advisory organ to the head of state, are also in the same tone. As a result, the RBN would become a supergovernment whose orders would be binding on other authorities, including the Council of Ministers.

It is an echo of Lech Walesa's "buffer theory." The prime minister, being responsible in front of parliament, to some degree protects the president, who reserves only the most important powers for himself, including the right to dismiss the prime minister, explains Professor Falandysz.

But the problem is that practically no major political party, including the extraparliamentary ones, is willing to agree to such a concept. Both the right wing and the left wing, both post-"Solidarity" and postcommunist parties, are in favor of a parliamentary-cabinet type of system, under which it is the Sejm that has the upper hand in issues that are most important for the state, with the government implementing the day-to-day running of the country. [passage omitted]

Local-Central Administrative Conflicts Viewed

PM2106083094 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 10 Jun 94 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Stanislaw Kalina, director of the Szczecin Voivodship Office, by correspondent Pawel Winiarski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Winiarski] It would appear that the reform of the administration system in our country has slowed down recently. On the other hand, the number of conflicts between local self-government structures and the central administration has increased. What is happening here?

[Kalina] When I was starting in my post of the Voivodship Office director, the process of decentralization of the existing range of powers and administrative competence was very rapid. Nowadays, these changes have, as it were, been suspended in a vacuum. For example, the pace of work on the pilot reform program has decelerated, as has that on the reform of the country's administrative division system. On the other hand, local self-government bodies had earlier secured a range of powers and competence of which they cannot now take full advantage because the necessary funds for the implementation of these powers have not followed in the wake of the legislation. In addition, the question of a clear and lucid division of competence between the central and local administration is also still unclear in many points. Consequently, it is not surprising that conflicts arise.

[Winiarski] Is Szczecin Voivodship particularly prone to frequent occurrences of such conflicts? Are they justified?

[Kalina] On the whole, as regards the quality of the central administration's work, we are among the national champions here, but the real criterion for assessing the work of the central administration bodies is provided by the results of conflicts brought before the Supreme Administrative Court [NSA]. In that area, we have no reason for indulging in complexes. For example, last year none of our supervisory administrative decisions against which charges were brought before the NSA by local self-government bodies were actually found questionable by that court. This does not necessarily mean that all of our other decisions were invariably correct. The NSA judged that several of our administrative decisions were incorrect. This was partly the result of the complexity of our legislation and partly the fault of individual officials handling the cases. However, the vast majority of complaints are caused by the poor knowledge of our legislation prevalent among the public and the lack of understanding of the role of central government officials. Another, partial reason is that certain organizations, particularly the trade unions, subscribe to the philosophy that, if the law is unfavorable to their causes, that is just too bad for the law.

[Winiarski] You mentioned mistakes made by central administration officials. How do these mistakes arise?

[Kalina] First of all, they arise out of the lack of thorough briefing in the disciplines of administrative law and modern administration systems. We still suffer from the lack of a cadre of well-trained experts, who would be apolitical, assured of their job security, protected from outside pressures, and given sufficient financial security in their positions. This is our greatest problem, and it can only be solved by a new parliamentary act on public service officials. At present, we have the opposite situation, with a growing number of instances of outside pressure to bring about certain administrative decisions, and with the financial situation of the public service officials worsening steadily. In this situation, it is hardly surprising that the best experts leave the sector and the most talented graduates of higher education establishments are reluctant to join our ranks.

[Winiarski] The list of complaints leveled against the central administration includes the extremely onerous and time-consuming procedure of appeals against the voivodas' decisions. It is true that cases brought before the NSA wait there for a very long time before being investigated.

[Kalina] It is indeed true. At present, the nearest extramural NSA center is situated in Poznan and serves five voivodships. Consequently, cases wait for six months or more before coming up for investigation. We want to change this state of affairs and set up an independent extramural NSA center in Szczecin. All the formal criteria for doing so have been met: We have a sufficient number of cases awaiting investigation, an adequate number of experienced and highly qualified judges, and enough academics who specialize in that branch of the law. We have also been successful in "breaking the premises barrier" in Szczecin. At present, the only dilemma we still have to face is the choice of the future seat of the Szczecin extramural NSA center from the two premises offered to us. Consequently, I believe that the first cases will be heard by the center as soon as the first quarter of next year.

[Winiarski] But does it guarantee that they will be investigated promptly?

[Kalina] Yes, and this should be advantageous not only to those bringing the charges, but also to the central administration bodies themselves, including such special administration centers as, say, customs and excise offices and the treasury police. Nothing improves the quality of work as effectively as the awareness of the existence of rapid monitoring systems capable of checking your results. In addition, the proposed bill postulating a revision of the NSA act contains provisions on the NSA control of local legislation brought in by local administration bodies. This

will in effect mark an end to the accusation leveled against us that the law set down by the voivoda is not subject to any judicial controls.

[Winiarski] Have such accusations been brought against you?

[Kalina] Certain people view relations between central and local administration as a platform for power struggles and fights for domination. But we are doomed to work together, and we must find a way of coexisting. The voivoda does not aspire to the role of a scourge or sword suspended above the doings of local self-government structures. Our proposals and suggestions extended to city and parish councils before they make their decisions in specific cases prove that we wish to avoid the need to waive them after the fact. This type of cooperation has proved successful with many local self-government structures, but we simply cannot avoid a certain area of conflict, especially in the sphere of finance. Unfortunately, the situation is such that the voivoda is unable to finance many projects because he himself has no adequate funds at his disposal. The funds come from the central budget and are strictly limited.

[Winiarski] The voivoda also has the power to coordinate the activity of special administration structures. How are relations shaping along this line?

[Kalina] They vary. For the past few years, there has been a tendency to encourage massive development of the special administration structures and multiplying the numbers of relevant institutions. Each of them is under the competence of a different institution, and, as a consequence, the voivoda is unable to coordinate the work of that sector of local administration, although he is formally obliged to do so. As a result, the decisionmaking process becomes unduly extended, the bureaucratic apparatus mushrooms, and the entire system becomes more rigid instead of more flexible. This, of course, in turn causes frequent conflicts and misunderstandings. In consequence, all the blame is heaped on us because the voivoda is the most easily accessible representative of the central administration and the government.

[Winiarski] But perhaps the whole central administration is not really so very necessary?

[Kalina] There is no state in the world capable of functioning well without its own internal administration. However, the secret is in getting the whole administrative machinery to function efficiently and to issue just decisions on the basis of the legislation in force. In turn, that legislation must be clear and lucid and the range of competence clearly set out and distributed, and the people who are involved in operating that system must be adequately qualified and trained.

PSL, SLD Debate 'Biggest Holding Company'

WS2006123694 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 20 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Jerzy Krajewski: "A Holding Company Beyond the Law; Agency Will Take Over 50 Trillion Zlotys Worth of State Wealth"]

[Text] *The minister of foreign economic cooperation, who is a member of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], is trying to put together the biggest holding company in Poland. The company will take over the state's shares in Cenzin, Ciech, and Baltona. The ownership transformations minister, who comes from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], thinks it is a scandal and amounts to using loopholes in the legal system.*

The holding company in question is the state-owned Agency for Economic Development [Agencja Rozwoju Gospodarczego], which was set up by Minister Leslaw Podkanski on 2 February 1994. Over the next few years, the agency is to assume control over several dozen State Treasury partnerships that deal primarily with foreign trade and that are currently supervised by the foreign economic cooperation minister.

From Cenzin to Baltona

The assets of these partnerships are evaluated at over 50 trillion zlotys [Z], which would make the agency the largest capital/financial holding company in Poland.

Currently, its share capital is Z4.570 trillion and includes state-owned shares in three companies registered on the Warsaw Stock Exchange: 270,000 shares of the Bank Rozwoju Eksportu [BRE], 1.080 million shares of Electrim, and 2.628 million shares of Universal.

Over the few next years, the agency is to take over the state's shares in such big companies as Cenzin (62.7 percent), Ciech (51 percent), Baltona (51 percent), Animex (34 percent), Budimex (53 percent), Polimex Cekop (51 percent), Paged (30 percent), Pol-Mot (24 percent), and Metronex, Poznan International Fairs (60 percent). So the agency will hold significant influence over the composition of the companies' governing boards.

NIK's Control

According to Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek, the establishment of the agency is a scandal: "Such institutions must be based on the legal system rather than taking advantage of loopholes in it," Kaczmarek told ZYCIE WARSZAWY. "As far as I know, the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] is examining the issue," he added.

"NIK has been examining the agency since May, within a program of controlling foreign trade centers," confirmed NIK Press Spokesman Wojciech Daniel. "Results will not be published until mid-July at the earliest."

Ambitious Plans

According to the agency's statute, its goal, among others, is to provide financing for investment projects (construction of highways, border crossings, or inland waterways), promoting Polish exports, and providing guarantees or financial reinsurance for large economic ventures.

"Company 'X' wants to bid on a modernization project for Beirut airport, which is estimated to cost $300 million. But first it has to put up collateral worth one-sixth of the

contract. Our financial potential makes it possible for us to help the company in a such a situation," explains Wieslaw Kuc, chief of the agency and a former member of the BRE governing board.

What will happen if the agency finds itself in a situation of having to pay in place of a dishonest contractor? Shares and participation in State Treasury partnerships are one of the agency's assets. The agency does not want to sell them off, but it does not rule out doing that in case it gets into trouble by, for instance, having to repay a large credit that it had guaranteed earlier. Still, Chairman Kuc sounds confident that there will be no slipups because, in granting guarantees, he will be using the same kinds of procedures as those applied by banks.

SLD-PSL Loses Control of City Councils

LD2106091494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0415 GMT 21 Jun 94

[Text] Warsaw, 21 Jun—Local government in cities has slipped out of control of the SLD-PSL [Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party] ruling coalition. But, at the same time, no one has gained a decisive victory, Adam Michnik writes in GAZETA WYBORCZA, adding that almost nowhere will the individual parties be able to manage single-handed.

Three large blocs have formed in the cities: the SLD, the Freedom Union [UW], and right-wing coalitions. Who will enter into which setups with whom, the GAZETA WYBORCZA editor wonders, expressing the view that it depends only on the UW whether it can find the best partners in the other blocs because it is only the UW that is in the position to talk to both the SLD and the right-wing parties.

Specific issues and pragmatism and, consequently, rational programs and real abilities must outweigh ideological arguments, Michnik writes in his commentary on the results of the local government elections.

SLD Estimates Tenfold Increase in Councillors

LD2006171294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1450 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 20 Jun—During a news conference on 20 June, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, said that, according to Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] estimates, the number of local councillors from that party increased tenfold after the 19 June local elections. There were 758 councillors during the previous term. The SLD won the largest number of seats (over 50 percent) in Wloclawek, Sosnowiec, and Czeladz. [passage omitted]

Szmajdzinski said that, in 29 towns where proportional elections took place, the SLD won 30 percent of the seats, which was comparable with the parliamentary election results. The SLD won 40-50 percent of seats in 10 cities, including Lodz, Zielona Gora, Bydgoszcz, Dabrowa Gornicza, Grudziadz, and Lublin.

Foreign Investors Praise 'Strategy for Poland'

WS2106081294 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Jun 94 p 25

[Article by wk: "Foreign Investors' Industrial-Commercial Chamber; 'Strategy'—Yes, but..."]

[Text] *Foreign investors are happy that the government announced an economic program covering several years. Still, they would like to get familiar with details of the program.*

Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak met with foreign investors yesterday. "We are united by a common goal—to score success in a market economy and in building democracy," said Pawlak. "Foreign investors who are members of the [industrial-commercial] chamber, as well as their Polish partners, support those political forces that guarantee the development of a market economy open to the world and based on private ownership," replied Chairman Stefan Lewandowski.

The businessmen had high praise for the government for having prepared the "Strategy for Poland," which creates the foundation for making business plans based on reliable data. Still, they asked the prime minister to provide more details.

Foreign investors asked the prime minister when the government will speed up the privatization process. "More companies may have been sold earlier, but, in general, these were sales for low prices. We are not eager to see privatization at any cost," Pawlak responded.

"What about taxes? Can we count on stability in the tax system?" the investors kept asking. "We are eager to see stability. There is the VAT [value-added tax], there are customs duties and income tax, and that should be enough," Pawlak explained.

NBP Says Bank Not Consulted Over 'Strategy'

WS2106095394 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 21 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by KAZ: "No NBP Consultation Over 'Strategy for Poland'; Consolidation Before Privatization"]

[Text] *The Polish National Bank [NBP] was not consulted by the authors of the Strategy for Poland program concerning issues related to reforms in the banking sector. There is talk that one of our departments was apparently contacted, but there was neither any special group formed nor an exchange of official letters on the topic, NBP Chairwoman Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz told NOWA EUROPA.*

In the Program, activities of the NBP were assessed quite critically. It was said that, while issuing money, supervising other banks, and performing ownership functions at the same time, the central bank does not perform any of these functions properly. According to Gronkiewicz-Waltz, there are no reasons to support such an argument. The central bank always forces the government to grant it concessions to decrease the budget deficit. We are the ones who make the reduction of the inflation rate happen. There is already

some progress in the area, even though things could be better. As for supervision, the NBP knows what is happening among other banks, and it has compiled a detailed diagnosis on the topic. Still, if the state budget wants to take over banks being supervised by the NBP, I will gladly give them up, stated the chairwoman.

So, as to taking the NBP's suggestions into account, a provision on separating banking supervision out of the central bank's structure and on organizing the supervision in the form of an independent institution was removed from an initial version of the Strategy program. The independent institution form exists in only four EC countries. When it comes to Belgium and France, the independence of banking supervision is only apparent, while, for instance, in Finland, there is a trend to merge the functions.

The NBP chairwoman also expressed the view that, if one wants to establish several strong banks, one must consolidate them first and privatize them later. Once the banks go onto the stock market, any mergers will be practically impossible. Still, privatization is also needed because state-owned financial institutions are characterized by low efficiency dynamics. Their higher profitability, compared with the average value for the sector as a whole, is not a result of better management but is, instead, a result, for instance, of lower costs for obtaining money.

Positive, Negative Economic Trends in Jan-May

WS2106111994 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 21 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by J.K.K.: "CUP on Economy From January to May; Increased Production, Lower Inflation"]

[Text] *Over the first five months of this year, developmental trends prevailed in the economy, say experts for the Central Planning Administration [CUP].*

Compared with the first five months of last year, industrial output increased by 10.1 percent, including 11.5 percent over May, while, when it comes to the housing industry, output increased by 6.4 and 4.5 percent, respectively.

The financial situation of enterprises is better than a year ago. Gross revenue has been increasing at a faster rate than the cost of obtaining it, which in turn leads to high growth of the gross financial result (by 75.3 percent over four months of this year, compared with the same period last year). The total profit at the disposal of economic units [podmioty gospodarcze] has also been growing (by 13.1 trillion zlotys over the first four months of this year). Nominal monetary reserves of enterprises (zloty-denominated and in foreign currencies calculated in zlotys) were 5.6 percent higher in May than in December, whereas, a year ago, a drop of 2 percent was reported.

Despite the continuing negative foreign trade balance, the situation in exchange with foreign countries has definitely changed. Over the January-April period, the rate of growth of revenue from exports was 16.5 percent, compared with the same period last year, and it exceeded in a major way the growth rate of payments for imports (9.3 percent). A year ago, an over-10-percent drop in exports was reported in the same time period, with an over-18-percent increase in imports.

The state of field crops approximates or even exceeds the average level of recent years, and that is a sign of good crop yields in the future. Price configurations for producers of pigs and cattle have also been beneficial, which is a factor facilitating a reconstruction of the herds of these animals.

Among other positive trends being observed in the economy, CUP experts note the inflation rate, which is lower than last year. Over the January-May period, retail prices rose by 9.9 percent, while, a year ago, they rose by as much as 14.5 percent. Prices increased by 1.7 percent over the month of May.

However, these positive trends in the economy are accompanied by some negative phenomena. A high growth rate in salaries in enterprises operating within the old monopolist structures constitutes a particularly major danger for maintaining the growth trends. The burden on the state budget resulting from the effects of some earlier valorizations of retirement and other types of pensions, as well as pressure coming from the budget sector to have salary differences alleviated compared with the enterprise sector and a high level of debt among budget-sector units, could also have an impact on the inflation process.

As for foreign trade, decreasing trends in trade with countries of Central and East Europe and very minor expansion into markets in developing countries constitute a danger for maintaining the high export dynamism and for improving the foreign trade balance of payments.

A very significant and persistent drop (in the range of 24 to 26 percent) in the size of housing investments has been holding from the beginning of the year. After the first five months, the number of apartments delivered (22,200) is 35 percent lower than a year ago (the drop in the cooperative housing industry is 47 percent).

Negative effects for economic growth also come from social tensions and strikes, which are a result of a lack of sense of social security and of frustrations present among many social groups, the CUP experts say.

Decline in Textile Industry Examined

94EP0066A Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 23 May 94 p 3

[Article by U.K: "Textile Exporters Are Losing the Battle With the Competition: Quotas for the Taking"]

[Text] "The competitiveness of our textile products is falling. Cheaper products from the East Asia—and more and more frequently from Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balkan countries—are pushing our products out of the European Union (EU) markets," Waldemar Markuszewski, deputy director of the department of commodity sales and tariff policy regulation in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, said to NOWA EUROPA.

Some types of textile products are included in the so-called sensitive commodities group. The EC countries, as well as the United States, Canada, and Norway, limit their export by employing quotas.

A large part of the quotas allocated to us in an interim agreement with EC remains unused. The ministry expects that this year will be better than last year.

The annual reduction in duties on Polish textiles should help to make this possible. Furthermore, the size of the quota itself is being increased 2-3 percent.

Our products are no longer as competitive as they were a year or two ago due to increased labor costs, although they are still lower than in the West. They lose out to the still-cheaper textiles from East Asia and the products from the Central and East European countries—e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, and Latvia.

Polish producers do not always know how to meet the requirements of the Western market, and they lack money for promotion. The old foreign trade organizations offices were either bankrupted or underwent transformation, and the companies were not always able to develop new connections with Western traders in time. The competition is great, and our firms find it difficult to meet it, especially because not every company can fill large orders. But there are Polish factories that have an established reputation on the foreign markets and steady customers in the EC countries and the United States.

Textile quotas to the United States, Canada, and Norway are also being only partially used.

Textiles are an important item in our trade and constitute almost 13.5 percent of total exports. Most of our exports are to Germany, indicating that our customers there know the Polish market well. This export makes up 18 percent of our export to the EU. We export the least to Spain and Portugal, whose markets are our competitors in deliveries to EC markets.

Only 18 groups of texile commodities are subject to quotas. We sell the remainder, such as blankets, woolen fabrics, tents, ladies' blouses, and work clothes, without limitations.

Utilization of Quotas on Textiles and Clothing Products to the EU (as of 30 April 1994)

	Unit of Measure	Quota	Utilization	Percent of Utilization
Cotton fabric, raw	Tons	7,140	842	11.79
Cotton fabric, finished	Tons	2,040	325	17.21
Fabric from synthetic fibers	Tons	3,869	530	13.70
Undershirts, T-shirts	Thousands of units	21,840	3,854	17.65
Sweaters	Thousands of units	7,733	2,555	33.04
Trousers	Thousands of units	4,725	2,854	60.40
Men's shirts	Thousands of units	3,933	798	20.29
Towels	Tons	2,625	1,294	49.49
Stockings, socks	Thousands of pairs	21,730	2,845	13.09
Men's coats	Thousands of units	1,590	135	8.49
Ladies' coats	Thousands of units	2,491	667	27.38
Men's suits	Thousands of units	1,829	146	798
Bed linens	Tons	2,730	1,362	49.89
Pajamas	Thousands of units	3,830	412	535
Dresses	Thousands of units	4,770	642	11.26
Cord	Tons	4,200	1,574	37.48
Linen fabric	Tons	2,756	798	28.96
Table linens	Tons	2,120	160	755

Opposition Continues Steps Against Iliescu

AU2006193794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] At the Chamber of Deputies headquarters today the leaders of the parliamentary political parties belonging to the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] held a meeting that was also attended by CDR Chairman University Professor Emil Constantinescu. The communique issued after the conclusion of their meeting points out that considering that until now no direct answer has been received from Romania's president in connection with the request to present his stance in Parliament, the gathering of signatures of CDR parliamentary representatives is progressing to begin the procedure of suspending President Iliescu from his office.

The communique also says that depending on the way debates on the education draft bill and the draft bill on the restitution of nationalized dwellings continue in Parliament, the CDR will decide whether it is opportune to commence a parliamentary strike.

According to our correspondent Ioana Perdichi, during today's meeting they also agreed that a censure motion against the government should be introduced during the current parliament. They also sanctioned the draft of the censure motion text, which is to be submitted for discussion during the bilateral talks to be held with the Democratic Party [PD].

The parliamentary groups of the CDR and the PD held a met this afternoon and elaborated the joint action strategy of the opposition. They decided to continue to gather signatures for the procedure to suspend President Ion Iliescu from his office and agreed—in case the president explicitly rejects the idea of giving explanations in Parliament—to actually begin the aforementioned procedure.

Regarding the censure motion, the leaders of the opposition parliamentary factions agreed that a censure motion should be introduced against the activity of the government, worked out the text of the motion, and agreed that the document is to be forwarded to the competent parliament bodies after the necessary number of signatures is gathered.

PDAR Proposes No-Confidence Motion

AU2006205194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] We have received a communique faxed to us from the headquarters of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania [PDAR] announcing that during an extraordinary session of the PDAR Executive Bureau they decided that the PDAR parliament faction would initiate the procedure of withdrawing the confidence granted to the government by means of a no-confidence motion. The communique is signed by PDAR Chairman Victor Surdu.

Another faxed message, which is signed by the PDAR parliament faction, addresses the following request to members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies:

In accordance with Article 112 of Romania's Constitution, the PDAR parliament faction initiates the procedure of withdrawing the confidence granted to the government by means of a no-confidence motion.

Considering the reasons detailed in the censure motion, which presents the current grave situation in agriculture as a consequence of the government's inadequate activity, we express our conviction that the Senate and Chamber of Deputies members of other parliament factions, who have not forgotten those who voted for them, who are as concerned as we are over this situation, and who wish to solve the problems, will second our motion and sign the signature list initiated by our parliament faction, which, for the time being, is too small to accumulate the number of signatures necessary to meet constitutional stipulations.

Tinca Views Results of Visit to Washington

AU1706202094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 17 Jun 94

[Report by Mircea Podina from Washington]

[Excerpts] The visit paid to Washington by National Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca at the invitation of his U.S. counterpart, Defense Secretary William Perry, concluded today. This morning, according to schedule, the Romanian delegation flew by helicopter to the Quantico Marine Corps base in Virginia. [passage omitted]

Before leaving Washington, I asked him to draw up a balance of his visit in the U.S. capital. This is what he said:

[Begin Tinca recording] I leave with the feeling that the majority of the things I proposed to achieve during this visit have been accomplished.

First, I managed to convey the messages that had to be transmitted to the U.S. party regarding the military ties between Romania and the United States, between the Romanian Armed Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces, principally regarding our cooperation within the Partnership for Peace initiative and regarding security.

Second, I leave with the conclusion that there is certain readiness of the U.S. party, especially at the Pentagon, to further relations with Romania on a number of levels. Now, in the beginning, our cooperation actions might not be too impressive or spectacular, but their evolution is an undoubted and serious one, and this will certainly allow us to attain the goals we set for us.

I also leave with another conclusion, about which I am not very pleased, namely that Romania is far too little known in the United States, in Washington, and, especially among the political and security analysis circles, among the political analysis circles in the U.S. Congress. For this, I am not blaming the U.S. party, heaven forbid, and I am not blaming ourselves either. This is rather meant as an encouragement for us to do more and in a more organized way to make known our way of thinking in our relations, because as I have found, there is certain interest for such relations, so they have to be disseminated among the U.S. political media and among the analysis circles there.

The brightest aspect of my visit was the pleasure of handing over an invitation letter to Defense Secretary William Perry to visit us in Bucharest. In July, he will make a tour of certain Eastern European countries, and it is my conviction that sometime in July he will also come to Bucharest. [end recording]

SRI Chief Magureanu Views Activity, Politics

AU1606203494 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 7-14 Jun 94 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Professor Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, by Ileana Lucaciu in Bucharest on 28 May: "Old Mentalities Are an Obstacle"]

[Text]

The Living Standard Determines the Overall Image of a Regime

[Lucaciu] Law No. 14 of 24 February 1992 on the organization and functioning of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] defines the main role of this institution as follows: A state body specialized in gathering intelligence about Romania's national security. At your last news conference on 29 March, you said that the main threat to national security is the situation of the economy. Would you be so kind as to elaborate on this statement?

[Magureanu] I am not the best authorized person to give you an answer to that question and to corroborate the negative impact that the precarious state of the economy can have on our national security. It is more than obvious that there is no sphere of social life that is not affected by the state of the economy. First of all, the state of a country's economy is at the basis of social stability. In its turn, social stability is linked to the living standard, that is, to the well-being or poverty level of certain social strata, which can lead to discontent and tension. Some of these manifestations of discontent and tension can degenerate into extreme outbursts. I believe that you remember the regrettable phenomena in the life of our young democratic society, which were also caused by economic discontent. I would cite the last miners' incursion as an example of such a phenomenon. These are extreme situations. However, there are also other aspects, less visible at first glance, which are also correlated to the state of the economy. When the economy is in crisis, these aspects—upon which our national security depends to a high degree—cannot be satisfied, such as the national defense and the working out of a system whereby Romania can assert its interests, as a function of the geopolitical context in which we find ourselves. But then, regardless of what I said, the overall image of a regime is usually linked to the people's living standard, which cannot conceivably be ensured at a reasonable level without a dynamic economy boasting positive growth quotas.

[Lucaciu] Within the framework of its obligations, the SRI puts together various assessments and information on certain states of affairs, which it then submits to the authorized bodies: the government, presidency, and the Parliament. Even you confirmed that you have produced such information during certain situations. What was the efficiency of these assessments, as reflected in the concrete actions taken by the respective bodies, which represent the power?

[Magureanu] Indeed, we regularly brief the respective bodies, even on a daily basis. You ask me about the efficiency of this information? Well, it varies somewhat. Anyhow, the majority of our briefings have an impact at the executive level, where measures are taken to counter would-be negative phenomena. There are also moments when we make concrete proposals for various negative situations that arise, situations that require urgent measures to solve the problems.

[Lucaciu] To give a concrete example, I would recall that you notified the relevant bodies in connection with the Petromin-Forum Maritime contract [irregular sale of Romanian vessels to Greek ship owners]. As a matter of fact, the press has published similar revelations, too. Nevertheless, the contract could only be stopped by the justice bodies.

[Magureanu] Generally speaking, we are also concerned, like you are, with the negative situation of our fleet after 1990. We issued various warnings in this respect and, indeed, certain things were subsequently redressed. We cannot judge now whether adequate measures were rapidly taken at the time. However, I believe that our information has had an impact. But what is regrettable is the fact that all the people who could have played a positive role in solving these matters of utmost importance—such as the aforementioned case—have failed to act in a concerted manner. Their efforts were disparate at times. On other occasions, the problems were tackled from a partisan political angle. Several sequences of the Petromin-Forum Maritime affair were turned into political accusations against one another, which somewhat distorted the core of the matter. Thus, it became a political dispute, when it actually was a serious national matter, which should have been coherently tackled from the same position by all sides involved.

[Lucaciu] In such a situation, one must show some understanding for political passions specific to this period and perhaps to the temperament of some people, even though they may harm the final goal.

[Magureanu] In our society's evolution, it is somehow normal that the two of us, for instance, should be situated at different political positions. However, when strategic matters are at stake, which are most important for the national security—the fleet is also such a matter, since it is directly or indirectly linked to our national security—we should give up our partisan political attitudes. Political differences should only account for nuances, if they are properly conceived and brought up in the respective case. On the contrary, if the situation is seen from antagonistic positions by the sides involved—for the sole reason that there are political differences between them—then the solution to the problem will be further delayed. However, the dispute around the Petromin-Forum Maritime acquired an unprecedented virulence, hence the lower

efficiency in solving the case due to the various partisan attitudes that have hampered the solving of a serious affair for our society.

[Lucaciu] Partisan positions are currently manifest in the parliamentary commissions, which examine and then submit reports on various matters. As a rule, two reports are drawn up: one for those in power and the other for the opposition. This is now happening in the Anti-Corruption Commission, which cannot submit its report on time, at the scheduled date of 30 May.

[Magureanu] My opinion is that when the problem of corruption at various levels is raised—unfortunately we are often compelled to acknowledge the existence of this phenomenon—political passions should be set aside and the law should be allowed to have its say. The relevant factors should help the law in this respect. But maybe even we, as an institution, have not been doing a proper job in this respect, to the extent of supplementing the efforts made by others to clarify various cases. Maybe the rather poor correlation between us and the mass-media is also to be blamed for this, since we should really support each other.

Caritas—A Negative Phenomenon of Great Proportions

[Lucaciu] You told the press that you notified the relevant authorities some time ago about the danger posed by Caritas and the other so-called mutual assistance games. However, these schemes unfolded at will, until they went bankrupt, thus hurting thousands of poor and naive people, while enriching a few profiteers.

[Magureanu] From the beginning, Caritas should have been restrained by special legislation, which would have prevented the game from unfolding. I have stated my opinion on this subject in public on several occasions and I also took up the matter with various officials. Caritas was a negative phenomenon of great proportions, which not only swindled some poor people out of large sums of money, but also extracted huge sums of money from the overall economic circuit. At a certain point, the experts even feared a serious economic blockage—there was indeed such a possibility—due to the draining away and piling up of huge sums of money blocked in these games. To all this, one should add the artificial price hikes in the areas whether the Caritas profits had an impact and the dollars taken outside the country, after being bought at absolutely incredible prices, which were three or four times higher than the official rate. All this is the negative and very serious outcome of the Caritas scheme.

[Lucaciu] Therefore, you informed the relevant people. Why did nobody take the necessary steps on time? It seems that there is a crack along the three-stage route of information, the power's analysis forum, and the decisionmaking process. An interested or disinterested crack...

[Magureanu] There was a delay in the decisionmaking process in this particular case. Here, we may both agree on the implications of the problem. There has been much interference, at various levels. There was local pressure from those who could earn money from such schemes. There was pressure from certain people at various levels of power, who were given priority in receiving money from the game. Then, there was also pressure from the public at large. At a time of economic crisis—here we return to the issue of the economic crisis, a problem that burdens us all—people believe in miracles. There is a paradox with regard to miracles, namely that the less likely they are, the more people tend to believe in them and the greater their resonance. We witnessed the functioning of the miracle of general prosperity, at a time of crisis, when hopes in a better life could no longer be perceived in a normal way. To all this, one has to add the slow pace at which the legal bodies moved in this matter. We do not yet have a settled legislative system. In a healthy economy, the games of chance are strictly regulated and are not allowed to acquire such scope and what a newspaper called "such caricature-like proportions," as occurred in our country.

[Lucaciu] I asked you this question about the route of your information and its efficiency, because I could find no stipulation in Law No. 14 that you can legally notify someone—the justice bodies, for instance—to rapidly intervene in such a serious case unearthed by the SRI.

[Magureanu] Indeed, the law does not specify that. However, we are entitled to legally intervene whenever we can perceive a major attempt to undermine our economic life. We not only have the right, but also the specific duty to intervene in such situations.

[Lucaciu] What form does your intervention take?

[Magureanu] We issue warnings about the major danger posed by certain actions.

[Lucaciu] Who are you warning, the justice or the General Magistracy?

[Magureanu] Yes.

[Lucaciu] What if the Magistracy or the law do not take any measures?

[Magureanu] Well, you had better address this question to the respective institutions. However, I believe that we should also be more efficient in issuing appropriate warnings in such cases.

[Lucaciu] The SRI is an institution that is subordinated to Parliament and its activity is organized and coordinated by the Supreme Defense Council of the Country, which is headed by President Ion Iliescu. In what way are you subordinated to the aforementioned council?

[Magureanu] All our principal domains of activity are controlled by Parliament. However, as far as the day-to-day executive aspect of our activity is concerned, as well as the way in which we integrate ourselves within the framework of other institutions that by law are part of our security system, we are subordinated to the Supreme Council. We are to periodically report our activity to the council. Summarizing the whole thing, fundamentally we are under the control of Parliament, but in our current activity we are subordinated to the Supreme Council.

[Lucaciu] Besides the SRI, which other services work parallel to you in Romania?

[Magureanu] There have been a great number of allegations about those services. They have been enumerated and everyone considered that there are too many of them. However, the services operating outside the SRI are actually branch services [servicii sectoriale]. For instance, there is a counterintelligence protection unit functioning within the Ministry of Interior (UM 0215). Or the Guard and Protocol Service of the dignitaries (SPP) [Serviciul de Protectie si Paza], which for its current information has set up a so-called Center for Operational Information. And, as in all countries of the world, the Armed Forces have their own military counterespionage and information protection service. The competence of all these services is limited to their specific field of activity. And as you may know, there is also the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE).

[Lucaciu] Does the SRI cooperate with these services?

[Magureanu] Yes, we do. Our day-to-day activity presupposes our cooperation with those services, in a way that is strictly regulated by law.

[Lucaciu] Under whose control are those services?

[Magureanu] Here there is a special situation. Whereas we are effectively under the control of Parliament, they are subordinated, as stipulated by law and other precise regulations, to the institutions to which they belong: To the respective ministries, or, in other cases, such as the SPP, to the corresponding institution.

[Lucaciu] The law stipulates that one of your duties is to protect state secrets and prevent the leaking of information.

[Magureanu] In every intelligence service the protection of secrets features within the spectrum of its activity. Since our work in this area can be characterized as general, it is only natural that we should also have broad responsibilities regarding the protection of state secrets.

[Lucaciu] You have personally admitted that there have been some cases of information being leaked to the press from the SRI itself. What steps have you taken to curb that phenomenon?

[Magureanu] I did not exclude the possibility of information being leaked to the press. But not just "to a certain part of the press" [reference to alleged leak of information about a number of opposition leaders and other politicians to the Greater Romania Party weekly ROMANIA MARE]. Some leaking of information did occur, it is true, but it was not deliberate in all cases. Sometimes it happened because some of our employees did not act correctly; we immediately took measures against them.

[Lucaciu] I understand that the SRI has reached the third phase in its reorganization, which has been done by restructuring in the name of the professionalism required by the specific exigency in such services. There has been a great deal of speculation in the press on this issue. In some cases even linking the restructuring to the areas where they took place [reference to replacement of SRI heads in various counties].

[Magureanu] Restructuring has not been carried out in special areas. During the third, current, phase, we submitted the command to restructuring. I would define the essence of the current phase as follows: The transfer of the command over to the young generation. To a very significant percentage we have made that transfer to the new generation. In the future that transfer will amplify within our institution so that the command should be, to an ever-increasing extent, in the hands of the young people who joined the SRI after 1990. For the present, this process has just begun, but we made the transfer to put the command in the hands of a generation that, above all, has a better perception of the current role of our institution and of our fundamental goals. Please note that such restructuring did not occur merely in some areas of the territory, but rather over the whole of it. Over one-third of the command of our county branches, as well as in our central units has been revitalized since last autumn.

[Lucaciu] Article 4 of Bill No. 14 stipulates that upon request of the leaders of public institutions, public corporations, and so on, the SRI is allowed to disclose information about persons who are to be appointed in important offices in the said units. Did the presidency contact you in this regard, requesting that you disclose such information about the persons who were to be appointed presidential counselors?

[Magureanu] Yes, they requested it in quite a number of cases. But not in all cases. I would like to emphasize the fact that the law gives us the right to do that solely upon the request of leaders of institutions. This clause has been introduced deliberately. Thus we should offer objective information about the character, about the aptitude of the persons who are to be appointed to certain offices. In some cases they request such information. In certain cases they do not. Actually no institution leader is compelled to request such information, especially if he considers that he already has sufficient information about the person in question. At the time they discussed this law, the aforementioned paragraph was the subject of lengthy negotiations. I always stress this fact. Initially, that paragraph sounded much more imperative, as it stipulated that institution leaders are compelled to consult with us. That is when I also took the floor and I said that I do not wish our institution to mediate or to be responsible in any way for the appointments made in leading offices, as this would resemble the previous practice, generate suspicion, and it would artificially act as arbitration, which is not necessary.

[Lucaciu] Bill No. 14 also stipulates that the SRI organize and carry out the transportation of official mail over the whole territory of Romania, in order to protect the state secrets.

[Magureanu] This refers to secret mail, which it is our duty to transport.

[Lucaciu] You are aware of the fact that recently a top secret document, which had been elaborated by presidential counselor Colonel General Vasile Ionel and confidentially sent to Radu Timofte, the chairman of the Senate Defense Commission, was also published, partially, by the weekly ROMANIA MARE. The information contained in that document, once published, may affect national security. How would you term this situation?

[Magureanu] That was a leaking of information caused by the incorrect conduct of an employee.

[Lucaciu] There are several plausible variants...

[Magureanu] I know the dispute and I do not believe that things are as simple as they seem at first glance. I do not think that one of the persons at the two ends—Messrs. Vasile Ionel and Radu Timofte—are responsible for it, but rather the blame should fall on the incorrect action of the intermediary who transported the mail.

[Lucaciu] Will you ever be able to present the truth about this case to the public?

[Magureanu] If they request that we should interfere in this case, which does not directly refer to us...

[Lucaciu] But is the surveillance of secret correspondence not one of your tasks?

[Magureanu] The leaking did not occur during the transportation of the mail. Owing to the strict transportation regulations we have, such a thing would have been impossible.

[Lucaciu] Does the publishing of that document infringe upon national security?

[Magureanu] Of course it can affect national security.

[Lucaciu] And, under such circumstances, will you intercede?

[Magureanu] Yes, if we are requested to do so, because we were not involved in this matter and I am not sure whether the mail in question was part of the correspondence for which we normally ensure the transportation.

[Lucaciu] During a news conference you asserted that the level of your cooperation with similar bodies in the Republic of Moldova was not very good.

[Magureanu] No, it was not.

[Lucaciu] How is it currently?

[Magureanu] It still isn't.

[Lucaciu] Certain analysts claim that if one were to simplify things, currently there is an underground struggle going on in our country between two wings of the former Securitate. One consists of those who are nostalgic, while the other, those who are pragmatic, who adapted to the market economy, and support the reform. What is your opinion on such allegations?

[Magureanu] I think that such reasoning is a little artificial. I did not really understand your assertion about the former Securitate. These old structures no longer exist in our country.

[Lucaciu] I was not referring to structures, but rather to people.

[Magureanu] Those people retired a long time ago. It is true, some of them went into business, so that remark was correct. However, I would not consider them as champions of the reform. Similarly, I would not consider that the other ones, the structured [structurati] ones—as you termed them—within the former Securitate, exert a genuine, palpable, influence upon our security system. There are no such influences.

[Lucaciu] I did not mean especially the SRI, but rather their influence upon our political life.

[Magureanu] I do not believe there is such an impact, except perhaps to an extent that I would term as marginal; certain employees of the former Securitate have been called upon to carry out certain operations, let us say, professional ones, by certain political parties. However, in my opinion such cases are not very significant.

[Lucaciu] Do you think that those persons have altered their outlook?

[Magureanu] To a varying degree, from case to case.

[Lucaciu] Do you not think that the inability to change certain conceptions is hindering the reform process?

[Magureanu] Of course, old conceptions, regardless of the domain in which they manifest themselves, act as hurdles. However, I do not think that it would be conclusive if one claimed that certain hindering actions could, to a relevant extent, be exerted by former employees of the Securitate. In my opinion, in our case conservatism may be traced back to completely different things. I would like to warn everyone of this potential error that comes of looking at things schematically. It is not a certain part of the former Securitate acting to hinder reform, while another part of the same echelons of the Securitate acts in favor of reform. I think this image is an artificial one. But we could talk in detail about this subject some other time.

[Lucaciu] Many people endorse this idea by the manifold underground ties the former Securitate people had.

[Magureanu] One oversimplifies things if one considers all hindering actions—which are really there, one can feel them in Romanian society—as the work of some former Securitate employees with old conceptions. The image of our current situation is much more complex.

[Lucaciu] Which are the factors, in your opinion, that cause such visible hindering effects?

[Magureanu] There are very many of them. For instance, at the local level and in the central administration there are certain corrupt or corruptible persons, who are interested in keeping their current advantageous positions and therefore their actions cannot be but hindering, going against the tide.

[Lucaciu] If one looks at reality, our current situation, there seems to be quite a number of persons interested in going *against the tide.*

[Magureanu] Again, one has to distinguish among things. Hindering actions cannot be explained solely by the existence of old conceptions and corruption. Such actions may also be the consequence of certain inadequate juridical regulations, loopholes in the organization, the wrong assessment of the steps that ought to be made in certain directions, and the unsuitable nature of the development programs at various levels.

[Lucaciu] I would like to mention the fact that I did not discuss all these issues with the acting director of the SRI, but rather with a person who is interested in political expertise. Do you intend to go into politics when you retire from the SRI?

[Magureanu] That is an issue that will have to be decided in the future, and in any case not in the near future. What I intend to do is go back to my former work, that is, education and research. However, other routes cannot be excluded either. As far as the future is concerned, I consider myself a person who still has sufficient time ahead of him, so there is still some uncertainty about my future options.

[Lucaciu] As a person who is interested in the political domain, do you believe that currently in Romania there are clearly structured political doctrines?

[Magureanu] No. And that is another reason for the continuing stagnation and hesitation. Although various parts of our political spectrum have been claiming their own doctrines, these have still not sufficiently jelled. Some of them have not even been adapted to the general European course either, despite claims that their ideologies stem from broader currents existing in Europe. There is discrepancy between the doctrines they claim to follow and the similar doctrines as practiced in the neighboring countries and, generally, in Europe. Besides, the level of our political culture is quite low. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is quite obvious. I have had the opportunity to see with my own eyes, even during public debates, persons who claimed they were followers of a certain current, a certain doctrine, and yet they were not familiar with its canons. Besides, there is also a kind of a circumstantial behavior, meaning that whenever they find a slogan that is useful for the purpose of their immediate political profit, they will not hesitate to adopt it, without pondering and trying to analyze it deeply first. A great deal of confusion is also generated by the very large number of political parties that currently exist, some of which—and quite a number of which—claim they belong to social- democracy or some other contemporary doctrine, without sufficient knowledge about those currents and without being able to explain either the Romanian tradition in the evolution of those doctrines or the way in which they evolved in Europe and in the world. All this sometimes generates a bleary situation with respect to the relation between those doctrines and reality in our country.

[Lucaciu] The absence of well-established doctrines leads to the personalization of our political life, to the accentuation of the role of the leaders. What importance would you ascribe to leaders in the life and representation of political parties?

[Magureanu] If one thinks in terms of what is specifically Romanian, one sees that this influence is palpably very strong. It is true, the phenomenon of personalization—the personalization of power, one might say—in the life of political parties and even generally in politics, may appear in the initial phase of democracy, but it may continue later on as well. However, in the two aforementioned cases the quality of the personalization is essentially different. In the case of our country, in the initial phase, within many of the political parties the leaders had an overwhelming role in the shaping of those currents, in their gaining credibility and even legitimacy. This is a fact that is valid not only for Romanian society, but for other societies as well. I mean the other societies, which similarly to us, are also in the transition phase. It seems inherent to me that personalities should play such a role in the initial phase of democracy. In some cases it may even have beneficial effects.

[Lucaciu] Under the current circumstances do you believe early elections could be held?

[Magureanu] This is possible.

[Lucaciu] Considering that the various doctrines are not clarified yet, how do you think the electorate could find its way about?

[Magureanu] The electoral options will be significantly reoriented. This is a normal phenomenon during the transition period. Today we have reached a further phase of reform. Let us not forget, Romania has made significant steps on the way of transition, and, although for some people those steps proved to be quite painful, their results are irreversible. This is also acknowledged by certain international bodies. From now on, the crucial issue for us is whether or not we manage economically. Our performance in solving that issue will be decisive for the option of the electorate.

[Lucaciu] Is economic success not the result of strategies?

[Magureanu] Yes, obviously.

[Lucaciu] That strategy is offered by the parties designated by the electorate.

[Magureanu] As far as the shaping of strategies is concerned, responsibility is shared by all those who, at a given time, share the state power.

[Lucaciu] Do you anticipate a positive outcome?

[Magureanu] I refrain from making forecasts. But if I were to do so, I should be moderately optimistic, while, in any case, manifesting restraint. If I were to make an assertion

now, it could be superseded by the dynamic evolution of events and, besides, any clear-cut assertion of mine might be interpreted as an attempt to meddle in the normal course of political life.

[Lucaciu] Before the end of last month you held a meeting with the editors in chief of various dailies intended to better the circulation of information between the SRI and the press. What have you accomplished so far in that sense and what has the press accomplished?

[Magureanu] We are trying to refine our relations with the press through the press office, which we have improved both in structure and function. Moreover, we are trying to make our relations with the press more fluent in the case of issues of general interest. Those are issues that are equally interesting for both parties and which we could make joint efforts in clarifying.

Zubak Presents Report to Herceg-Bosna Chamber

LD2106111494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 21 Jun 94

[Text] At today's session in Mostar, the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna proposed Jadranko Prlic, president of the government of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, as a vice president and minister of defense in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federal Government. The chamber also discussed President Kresimir Zubak's report on the latest round of negotiations with the Serb side and government measures to curb lawlessness in the Herceg- Bosna area. Zdenko Vranjes reports:

[Vranjes] In addition to proposing Jadranko Prlic as a candidate for the post of vice president and minister of defense, the following were also put forward as candidates: Neven Tomic as minister of finance, Mate Tadic as minister of justice, Nikola Grabovac as minister of trade, and Stjepo Andric as minister without portfolio. Two candidates are contesting the post of minister for health care—Vlado Simunovic and Ivan Sarec. The deputies also adopted a list of deputy ministers from the ranks of the Croat people in the federal government.

The constitutional amendments, including certain alterations, relating to the definition of mixed cantons were also adopted. A draft law on ministries and some other documents that will be placed on the agenda for a session of the federal parliament, scheduled to take place on Wednesday in Sarajevo, were also endorsed.

It seems that the big powers have agreed on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they will not relinquish the division of Bosnia at a 51-49 percent ratio, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, said when presenting his report on the latest round of negotiations in Geneva. He also spoke in detail about the contact group's proposals; the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, gray zones, and blue roads. The Croatian side has been short-changed to some degree in the areas of Teslic and Kotor Varos, while Muslim interests have been fundamentally damaged in the area of eastern Bosnia. The Muslim territories around Kljuc and Sanski Most may be reduced as they will be designated as gray zones.

The Serbian side's demand for two power stations near Jajce to be given to the Serbs has not been accepted, Zubak added. Passages [pasaz] are now being mentioned instead of corridors, Zubak said, and added that this Serb passage in Posavina would run through Serb villages, so the whole of Derventa would be included in a Croat canton. Only some Croat villages between Brcko and Modrica would be included in the Serb passage.

The president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation said that a blue road between Modrica and Bosanski Samac, via Jajce, Kljuc, and Sanski Most had been discussed in Geneva as well as a corridor between Livno and Bihac. Of the three draft political solutions for Bosnia-Herzegovina the Croatian side regards the solution that implies a confederation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation with Croatia as the most acceptable, while at the same time the Serb part of Bosnia-Herzegovina might have a similar arrangement with the so-called Yugoslavia. If the Serb side refuses the contact group's plan the federation will demand that the arms embargo be lifted, Zubak added. The deputies also issued an appeal to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and Fikret Abdic's forces to end their clashes in western Bosnia and to seek a solution at the negotiating table. The Croat side offers its services as a mediator in their negotiations.

Tonight the Chamber of Deputies also adopted the government's measures to curb crime in the Herceg-Bosna area. The government is duty-bound to submit to the deputies a report on the implementation of these measures within one month. The deputies demanded that in addition to measures to curb robberies along the road over Mount Vran Planina, steps should also be taken to either prove or dispell rumors circulating among people that the criminal operations in Herceg-Bosna are being covered up by elements within the top ranks of Herceg-Bosna's authorities or that they themselves are involved in these operations. Speaking about the onset of a fierce anticrime campaign, Kresimir Zubak told the deputies that the Presidential Council has set up a headquarters that will spearhead the fight against robberies and crime.

Chamber Accepts Zubak Report

LD2006165194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] The chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna has adopted a report on the latest round of negotiations with the Serb side presented by Kresimir Zubak, president of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] federation. Zdenko Vranjes has more details.

[Vranjes] Kresimir Zubak said that the big powers had agreed on Bosnia and that the contact group would not give up the carve-up of Bosnia at a 51:49 ratio. He also spoke in detail about the contact group's proposals; the division, grey zones, and blue roads. The Croatian side has been short-changed to some degree in the areas of Teslic and Kotor Varos, while Muslim interests have been fundamentally damaged in the area of eastern Bosnia. The Muslim territories around Kljuc and Sanski Most may be reduced as they will be designated as grey zones.

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part of Bosnia-Herzegovina might have a similar arrangement with Serbia and Montenegro, Zubak said.

Following a long debate and a break this afternoon, the chamber of deputies is expected to adopt a list of Croatian Democratic Union candidates for members of the federal government. Jadranko Prlic has been put forward as a vice president performing the duty of minister of defense in the federal government.

'Abdic's Forces' Continue Artillery Attacks

AU2006144694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Text] Abdic's forces have continued to use long-range artillery from well inside the occupied territory of Velika Kladusa, with continuing support by the chetniks from the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina. The intensity of the shelling with tanks, howitzers, and mortars is best illustrated by the fact that over the last two days from [words indistinct] they have fired over 6,000 shells, razing [word indistinct] villages to the ground. There have been many casualties.

Since midday, the members of the Kladusa paramilitary have intensified their attacks along the entire front line, and reliable reports claim that Abdic's (?fascist) headquarters is preparing a new offensive and new attacks to recapture lost ground. However, he still has problems with forceful mobilization, and with generally mobilization, since the population is simply rejecting all calls. It is important to stress that the population's cooperation is [word indistinct] every day.

Heavy Fighting Between Muslim Forces Continues

LD2006162394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1559 GMT 20 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Petrovac, June (TANJUG)—Heavy fighting between forces loyal to Bosnia's Moslem fundamentalist leader Alija Izetbegovic and those of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APZB) continued Monday in the Moslem enclave of Cazin Krajina in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The radio station in Velika Kladusa, the APZB centre, said Izetbegovic's forces had attempted to infiltrate a terrorist group and had opened artillery and small arms fire on APZB troops.

Bihac radio, controlled by Izetbegovic's forces, said the forces of the Sarajevo Moslem government firmly controlled all their positions despite continuing attacks by the APZB army.

APZB leader Fikret Abdic is opposed to Izetbegovic's policy of war and wants Moslems, Serbs and Croats to live peacefully side by side. Immediately after the proclamation of the APZB in autumn last year, Izetbegovic's troops attacked the forces and population of the new autonomy. The conflicts, which have so far claimed hundreds of lives, did not stop after the latest Bosnia ceasefire came into effect on June 10.

Bihac Authorities Said Detaining Civilians

AU2006174994 Paris AFP in English 1644 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Velika Kladusa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 20 (AFP)—With Bosnia's Moslem-led army closing in, authorities in the breakaway Moslem enclave of Bihac have detained up to 700 civilians for opposing the war effort, including women, teenagers and elderly people, relief officials and other sources say.

Many of the male detainees were taken away for refusing to join the vastly outnumbered force defending Bihac against a battle-hardened corps of the Bosnian army advancing from the south of the pocket toward Velika Kladusa, its main town, relatives and members of international relief organizations say. No firm figure on the number of detainees is available, although a variety of independent sources put it at between 400 and 700.

The speaker of Bihac's self-proclaimed parliament, Bozidar Sicel, admitted that 150 people have been arrested. He dismissed them as "spies or agents spreading disinformation" in the intra-Moslem conflict and said searches of their homes had turned up weapons and explosives.

The arrests began on June 10, the day the Bosnian army launched an offensive against Bihac, in the northwest corner of the republic, relief officials say. The detainees are being held at a poultry farm converted into a detention camp near the border with Croatia.

A member of the International Committee of the Red Cross gained access to the camp over the weekend after a week of pressuring authorities for access. "They are men who refused to serve in the military, and political dissidents, but what is worse, their relatives have also been arrested, including women, adolescents and elderly people," a relief official speaking on condition of anonymity said. [passage omitted]

Here in Velika Kladusa, small groups of women gather each day outside the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the Red Cross to ask the organizations to intervene on behalf of their missing loved ones.

"They took away several dozen, in two cars and a truck," the wife of one detainee said on condition she not be named. "My husband didn't want to fight against fellow Moslems, and everybody knew it. They took away 15 of our neighbors, including a 70-year-old."

Another woman said she challenged the officials who came and took away her husband, an engineer, last Monday [13 June]. "I asked them for an official document. They showed me one that said they had the right to search homes. Then they took away my husband." She added: "One of his friends agreed to go to the warfront. They let him go, and

the next day he was on a bus for the front line. As for me, they said they would arrest me if I went back" to the UN refugee agency.

Rumors are circulating around town that the prisoners are being mistreated and deprived of food. Relatives also say some are being forced to dig trenches on the front lines. Over the weekend a group of civilians digging with shovels and picks were seen on the front line near the hamlet of Hasici, with soldiers watching over them. But there was no way to confirm they were prisoners.

Serbian Activity Said Intensified in Brcko

AU2106090894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 21 Jun 94

[Report by Hamiz Deronjic from Brcko]

[Text] Regarding the Brcko front, the latest cease-fire agreement will only remain a piece of paper. Not for one single day has the enemy halted combat activities on the Brcko front. Over the last few evenings he has even intensified them. This was the case last night.

Early in the evening, our fighters resisted several attacks by Chetnik surveillance-saboteur groups in the central part of the front. Along with intensified provocations [word indistinct] antiaircraft machine guns, and antiaircraft guns along the entire front of the Brcko battlefield the Serbian aggressor between 2000 and 2200 hours last night on several occasions from mortars [words indistinct] the positions of defenders and the civilian settlements in the Boderiste are, one can easily say, a constant target of the enemy artillery. [Words indistinct] that the Serbian aggressor on this as well as on all previous [words indistinct] on the Brcko front is using to prepare new attacks on free Brcko territory. In this way in the last 24 hours intense enemy activities [words indistinct]. On two occasions last night—first at 1800 and then 2100—we registered the arrival of large convoys of enemy trucks and combat vehicles from the direction of Rasevi and Potocari in the temporarily occupied Brcko. The fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council on the Brcko front are carefully monitoring the aggressor's every step, [words indistinct] not to allow him to [words indistinct] the free Brcko territory.

New Party Founded in Sarajevo; Kljuic President

AU2106114594 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 94 p 9

[Report by A. Pecanac: "Against the Originators of the Conflict"]

[Text] The first convention of the Republican Party was held in the crowded Congress Hall of the Holiday Inn Hotel in Sarajevo. Explaining the main program aims of the newly-founded, civilian-oriented party, its founder Stjepan Kljuic remarked that the Republican Party would soon join all the patriotic forces in Bosnia- Herzegovina in mobilization and the preparations for the final liberation of the homeland. The engagement of the Republican Party should be viewed in this context; the party does not intend to oppose the current authorities, but it will oppose all those who are against Bosnia-Herzegovina and cooperate with all those who support Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We hope that the West will go back to international law and that it will not allow Europe to be Balkanized and the ethnic occupation rewarded, said Kljuic. The conflict with the Croats, which was a mistake in Croatian policies toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, is also to blame for the tragic fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, according to Kljuic, the Republicans will strongly oppose the attempts to appoint some of the people who participated in the politics that led to the conflict and the victims of war in the new federal authorities.

The Republican Party sees the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina in being oriented toward the West and its fundamental democratic values, as well as toward the Islamic countries.

Remarking that the establishment of an independent, sovereign, and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina is the basis of the future activities of the party, Kljuic said that it is in such Bosnia- Herzegovina that the Republican Party will support the establishment of the economic system on the basis of private ownership, market economy, ethnic and religious freedom, civil freedom, human rights, independent judiciary, and all other democratic achievements contained in the UN Charter. Moreover, Kljuic said that the party would become involved in actualizing the return of the refugees and displaced persons in the country, without which there will be no peace on these territories.

Welcoming the founding of another party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mirsad Ceman, head secretary of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] remarked that the success of the founding of this party would depend on the extent to which the ideas represented by the Republican Party will extend beyond the borders that are at present controlled by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Support for the forming of the Republican Party was expressed by Mirsad Ceman on behalf of the SDA, Nijaz Durakovic, president of the Social Democratic Party, Salih Foco of the LBO [expansion unknown], Ilija Simic on behalf of the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party], Sejfudin Tokic of the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia- Herzegovina, and Dragutin Cicak, president of the Croat Civil Party.

Stjepan Kljuic was elected president of the Republican Party, and the members of the Directorate are: Dr. Adnan Dizdar, Dr. Boris Tihi, Zaim Zeljkovic, Dr. Slobodan Trninic, and Senka Nozica.

In the following six months, the Republican Party will be working on bringing the organization to life, and soon they will promote their program in all the major towns in the Republic.

Valentic Invites Bosnia's Silajdzic for Visit

LD2006213694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic will soon pay an official visit to Croatia, it was announced in Sarajevo. An invitation to Silajdzic was extended by Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic during his talks with Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic in Crans Montana.

I accept the invitation with pleasure, Silajdzic said after a government's session, noting that the visit would be a working one and that they would resume talks on most significant issues relating to the cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Tudjman Talks With Opposition Deputies

LD2106100394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 21 Jun 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received the leaders of the parliamentary opposition parties in the Presidential Palace this morning. The talks are still in progress. Due to interparty consultations the session of the parliament's chamber of deputies scheduled for 1000 has been postponed to 1400. The deputies of the Chamber of Counties have also failed to begin their session even though it has not been postponed officially.

Defection of Tudjman Protege Viewed

94BA0314A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 94 pp 8-9

[Article by Marko Barisic: "Portrait of Mladen Vedris, Politician With Limited Service Life"]

[Text] In a time of democratic change the journalist Slaven Letica, who has a habit of backing up his political research with a private scholarly apparatus, had the computer image of an ideal Croatian president developed on the basis of certain criteria. Afterward, he (un)aggressively offered the picture of the person indicated to all journalists, and he suggested to editors that they invite him to prestigious programs on which his live appearance would give a broader public an insight into his virtues. Those familiar with images from political life up to this point easily deciphered the person from Letica's paper: It was Mladen Vedris, minus mustache, acting deputy [chairman] of the Committee for Land Use Regulation and Municipal Services of the last Zagreb government in the communist system.

Not long afterward, during the election campaign, Vedris, who was supported as an independent candidate by the National Accord Coalition, appealed to supporters and suggested that they elect him to the top position in the future capital of Croatia. In the election in an elite Zagreb district (Tuskanac), he was defeated by an anonymous woman candidate of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], but that seat, against the rules of politics, was the beginning of his great climb. He became the fair-haired boy of Croatian President Tudjman, who on behalf of this native of Zagreb, a technomanager, twice modified decisions of the municipal Assembly (in which the HDZ had 90 percent of the members at that time), and finally, by enforcing party discipline, he did manage to impose him to head the municipal government. In the Greguric government, he was a minister without portfolio for a time, and in the Sarinic government he was deputy prime minister assigned to the economy. Then he suddenly became a member of the HDZ, accompanied by chatter in the corridor that this position was only a springboard to realization of his old ambition of the post of Croatian prime minister. Instead of him, this post went to his friend Valentic, and Tudjman's "joker" was quietly installed as the top man in the Croatian Economic Chamber.

Surprise for the Uninformed

The uninformed had quite a surprise on 15 May, two days before beginning of the session of the Croatian parliament in which Tudjman's party went toe to toe with the opposition, led by Manolic. That was when Vedris announced that he was leaving the HDZ and becoming an independent deputy in the parliament. At a time when Tudjman was seeking support of every deputy to maintain an absolute majority in the parliament, his favorite turned his back on him. Because of what he said was the smothering of democracy, the settling of scores, and the negotiations to normalize relations with Serbia, along the way delivering the judgment that today the HDZ is an "utterly incompetent party."

When Manolic or Mesic presents grounds of that kind for a political parting of the ways with Tudjman, then their most recent political conviction nevertheless commands respect and seems authentic. These are, after all, political "fighters" who entered politics long ago with a passion, sacrificing even periods of their private life to stick to their political convictions. When their words are uttered by Vedris, then they sound more like a well-learned justification than a political position that comes from within. Those who know Vedris say that he did not make that decision hastily. He weighed the possible new balance of power for a long time. With his advisers, he arrived at the judgment that the government and official office, including Tudjman, would be outweighed. Because he could not remain aloof, which he would have been happier to do, by leaving the HDZ he prepared the ground among the independent deputies for his new ascendancy. For a long time, after all, Vedris has not been going to the president's house for lunch, he is not in the government, he has not been involved in the transformation of enterprises and privatization, and the appointment to the Presidency of the Economic Chamber was nevertheless only an elegant way of placing him in the shadows. That is why Vedris' departure from the HDZ (just like his tardy enrollment) is obviously the fruit of political calculation, which up to now has not proved to be all that correct. What is more, when Vedris is involved, one might rather speak about a continuity in his erroneous political judgments.

Wrong Judgments

Vedris came to the National Accord Coalition just before the first election, in which it suffered a complete political defeat. When he made his way to deputy prime minister of Croatia as an independent, with Tudjman's sponsorship, he joined the HDZ just before the last election and entered the parliament on the government slate. And instead of being appointed Croatian prime minister, he was "shunted" to a place where important decisions were not made and where there would be no turnover of money. Now, he has changed his togs again in the expectation that the HDZ will lose its absolute majority in the Sabor. For the present, though, that has not happened. But Vedris expects his patience to be rewarded, because on the team of technomanagers he is the youngest (born in 1950). Unlike him, though, when they were co-opted in the party like him and appointed to the highest posts in the state, they proved to be independent and altogether mature political figures who remain on the scene thanks in part to their own abilities, not merely with the help of political guardians. But Vedris does not seem to be able to do without them.

As a standout in high school and a student of economics at the time of the Croatian Spring, Vedris won the favor of Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, who at the time was a professor in the School of Economics. When she left the political stage after Karadjordjevo, Vedris had no political consequences because of being close to her. Not having been labeled a "Croatian nationalist," he continued to build his successful career, he took his master's degree, he spent some time in the United States, he worked in the Institute for Migration, and he waited for democratic change in the municipal government. Malicious tongues would say that once again this was thanks to a protector who covered his rear. Once again it was a lady, Marina Matulovic-Dropulic, who later was a stumbling block when he became a player on Tudjman's team. He made his own place in the municipal government contingent upon hers, and, to the astonishment of the municipal Assembly, Tudjman again relented. Plump women journalists wrote at the time that this was a "number-one charmer," an eloquent man of indisputable intellect with an appearance "which shows an enviable measure of grooming." Usually they would add that he was a "nimble, persistent, and effective manager," and only the more lucid would observe that in the past he had "trouble identifying himself with any project or undertaking." But Vedris continued on his way. The real troubles cropped up when he had to back up the report on his work before the Assembly. It is strange that the reports were not adopted because of the assumed obviousness of the performance of the municipal government, but always the protector had to pick up the telephone. Boris Buzancic, mayor of Zagreb at the time, has the best knowledge of Vedris' work style.

Returning the Ball

The chilling of relations between Vedris and Tudjman occurred at the moment when he was appointed deputy prime minister. He could not at that time disguise his intention to displace Sarinic from the position of prime minister. Tudjman obviously made the judgment that this was not a man for that place, but he did not eliminate him, but aimed him in the direction of the Chamber, which was supposed to be a waiting room for some more responsible post. Vedris has now returned the ball, probably judging that the period of dominance by the HDZ and Tudjman is now coming to an end. The fact that he did this to him at a decisive moment is a sign that the four-year specific relation between Tudjman and Vedris has come to an end.

Without waiting very long, Vedris has already offered himself to his new partners, Mesic and Manolic, that is, to the remainder of the opposition. It will be difficult for him to travel the same road with them as Tudjman provided him by sponsoring him. And it will be difficult, with this possible development of events, that he will get from them an occasion to build his political image with protection alone. One gets the impression that in those four years Vedris has learned a great deal, but he has also lost a great deal. Heralded as a wonder worker, with a great deal of support from the supreme command and the media, he is now departing without being able to refer to a single project successfully completed except for words which are pleasant to the ear. He has remained what he was at the beginning, a very talented individual with unstable political convictions, a bit in love with himself, that is, with the picture his friends paint of him. As though he believed that that representation was reality and is angry and arrogant toward those who do not see what he sees. That is the only way to explain his deprecating attitude, for example, toward Sarinic when he was prime minister, and his hunger to ascend the highest throne.

"A Good Lad"

Now, in the end he cannot complain of the media. They have mainly photographed him from the side, at his request, and they have always written that he worked from morning to midnight. There have been no drawn-out scandals with the allocation of housing, nor has anyone systematically analyzed the "Stanograd" affair, which a decade ago brought him to a courtroom on a charge of criminal financial activity. Mladen Vedris has mainly been represented as "a good lad," whom those "coarse HDZ-ites" do not understand and do not want to accept, because he differs from them in appearance, in behavior, and in origin. He has now opened up new political space for himself, in part, perhaps, because he has realized that in politics people without passion, without stable convictions, and without visible results, forced to rely solely on their own vision of themselves, do not last long. In spite of the protectors and friends who play computer games projecting the image of the ideal Croatian president.

Seks Comments on 'Stormy' Assembly Session

94BA0314B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
24 May 94 pp 10-12

[Interview with Vladimir Seks, deputy prime minister of Croatia, by Boris Komadina; place and date not given: "Vedris Is Our Most Serious Personnel Error"]

[Text] The stormy days last week in the Croatian Parliament were so dramatic as to overshadow all previous

sessions of Croatia's highest legislative body. For many people, Vladimir Seks, deputy prime minister, was the protagonist in the parliamentary drama. After a good night's sleep, he presented to us his opinion of that session of the parliament.

"The entire course of events in the parliament had two dimensions. One was Messrs. Manolic and Mesic imposing themselves as the leaders of the entire opposition, and the other, the primary one, is the dethroning of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and the president of the republic. A very simple and classic scenario was used. The presidents of the two chambers of the parliament, using and abusing the Operating Procedure, do in fact have the ability to completely block the proceedings of the parliament, and thereby also the work of the government, which is to say, the legislative and executive branches of government. The most obvious example is the session of the Zupanija Chamber. After I withdrew the motions of the government, Chairman Zoric, instead of interpreting what was so obvious—that there could be no more debate on establishing the agenda—nevertheless allowed debate of the agenda and the classification of the various points, which actually no longer existed at all, because the authorized sponsor, the government, had withdrawn them. Accordingly, allowing debate on adoption of the agenda was obviously calculated only to drag things out as long as possible.

"So, the set of instruments afforded by the Operating Procedure is such as to permit the president of either chamber to cause a complete parliamentary crisis. It could only be overcome by political compromise or by the president of the republic seeking a decision from the Constitutional Court, or again by an interim election. Political compromise was logically the most expedient alternative. One reason why it was possible is that the opposition parties in the parliament, above all the HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party], HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], and even the HNS [Croatian People's Party], realized that Manolic's and Mesic's HND [Independent Croatian Democrats] wanted altogether to 'take them for a ride' and use them as a tool. Those parties realized that this blockage of the proceedings of the parliament would be politically harmful to them as well, because the public would perceive them as those who were obstructing the work of the parliament. That is why the pressure of those parties on the HND facilitated a compromise among the political parties."

[Komadina] Was it not possible even earlier to arrive at political consensus in order to avoid a blockade of the parliament?

[Seks] It might have been possible if all the political parties had not overestimated....

[Komadina] And the HDZ?

[Seks] I am referring to the opposition parties which counted on the HDZ losing its relative majority in the parliament and not being able to dismiss either the president of the Zupanija Chamber or the president of the House of Representatives. That was their political assessment. When they found that this was not so, which was evident after the 70 signatures of HDZ deputies, and they knew that there was another grouping in the various opposition parties which would make it possible to pass the decision of the HDZ to dismiss Mesic and Manolic, they put strong pressure on that grouping to achieve this kind of agreement, whereby they refused to be political hostages to them.

[Komadina] The opposition found you to be principally to blame for the storm in the parliament. It is said that you withdrew the government's motion on your own. Some parties, the HNS, for example, are even demanding your resignation. Did you get consent of the government to withdraw the proposal from the agenda or the consent of Prime Minister Valentic, and when did you get it?

[Seks] Before the session of the parliament, the HDZ deputies in the Zupanija Chamber held a special meeting at the Weis Villa. It was decided there that the tactics of the HDZ in the Zupanija Chamber would be to reduce the entire procedure for activity of the HDZ in the parliament to leaving just two points on the agenda: dismissal of President Manolic of the Zupanija Chamber and election of the new president. The judgment was, that is, that Manolic or Zoric would drag things out endlessly. In order to implement that conclusion, on the day before the session of the Zupanija Chamber I had a meeting with the small cabinet of the government. That is, I had full backing in what I did, and aside from that, this government, which was made up by the HDZ, cannot politically behave otherwise than to concur in the decision and will of the HDZ deputies in the Zupanija Chamber. Although the judgment was that the chair would not allow such a serious violation of the Operating Procedure. Thus, all those speculations are false to the effect that I, as deputy prime minister, would act without authority of the government. It is clear that the government as a whole did not debate that, but the small cabinet, in accordance with the Law on the Government, has full legitimacy to act in that way. I had full legitimacy, both legal and political, and that is how I acted.

This was not the most fortunate solution from the standpoint of the government, because it was exceedingly interested in having those bills put into procedure, but there was no other political method. The HDZ made a solid and firm decision, especially after the letter which Manolic and Mesic sent to members of the U.S. Congress, that it was untenable for them to continue on as presidents, because they could continue to use their office to discredit Croatia. Thus, all those rumors are unfounded. The prime minister had suggestions as to the technology for carrying out that decision, and he took the position that there should be better preparations, that is, that the execution should be more subtle, safer, more reliable. That was Valentic's reservation. However, I repeat, the prime minister concurred in the decision about the way to resolve the parliamentary crisis, he gave his consent as did other members of the cabinet. So, four deputy prime ministers and the prime

minister himself made decisions on behalf of the government. The next day, the government met and sanctioned what had been agreed.

[Komadina] Do you know, then, who encouraged those, as you put it, rumors?

[Seks] That assertion was launched by Stjepan Mesic, who wanted to personalize the conflict. Viewed objectively, if the government had been entirely on the outside, that is, if I had not been in the parliament, still the deputy caucus of the HDZ would have insisted that the other point not be included in the agenda. The consequences, then, would have been completely the same. However, Mesic will not attribute that to the HDZ caucus, he does not even want it to be established whether I did this on my own; he prejudices this, because he wants to personalize it, to fix it on me, which is far easier and simpler than to blame it on the entire government, because that goes against his apparent support of the government. So, it had to be shown that one person, i.e., I, had abused his office of deputy prime minister and that this is yet another piece of evidence of the undemocratic behavior of the government in Croatia.

Going further, there is no doubt that Mesic violated the Operating Procedure in the most flagrant way. He appealed to Article 37.1 of the Operating Procedure, which authorizes the president of the House of Representatives to call a meeting and organize a session of the parliament. There is not a single provision to the effect that the president of the parliament, after he has convened a meeting, can independently make a decision to cancel a meeting that has already been called. The Constitution also spells out precisely which laws cannot be debated by the House of Representatives without first obtaining the opinion of the Zupanija Chamber. Most of the items on the agenda were such that they did not require the opinion of the Zupanija Chamber for the House of Representatives to be able to debate them. Mesic frantically looked for an item he could take as the basis for postponing the session of the House of Representatives in which his dismissal was to occur. When he saw that letter with 70 signatures of HDZ deputies, and knowing that there were another dozen—when 70 deputies are enough to convene the session of the parliament—it was immediately clear to him that he would be dismissed, and then he resorted to postponing the meeting. So, he did not have any basis in the Operating Procedure or law to postpone a meeting that had already been called. From the standpoint of the opposition, it is not unnatural to make use of all parliamentary means available to them.

[Komadina] Was not one of Mesic's motives in discrediting you for your statement that you would "chop off the heads" of him and Manolic?

[Seks] I repeat, Mr. Mesic is a new Croatian Muenchhausen. There was a public forum in Vinkovci. Before it there was a meeting of the Zupanija Committee of the HDZ of Vukovar-Srijem Zupanija and chiefs of local branches of the HDZ, which was attended by some 200 people. I have the tape, and there is not a single word about "chopping off heads." Minister Njavro, who was also there, refuted Mesic's assertions, and this will also be done by the Presidium of the Zupanija Committee of the HDZ of Vukovar-Srijem Zupanija. I can give that tape to anyone. This is simply a shameless lie by Mesic and Manolic. I do not know which of those two Muenchhausens invented it, because both of them presented that lie. I said there that there was no possible way he could avoid his dismissal, and if they translate that as "chopping off heads," that is their problem.

[Komadina] Are the stories in the corridor true that Mr. Greguric was not at the Weis Villa and did not sign the statement seeking Mesic's removal?

[Seks] I am unable to answer that for you. There were several meetings in the Weis Villa....

[Komadina] Mr. Vedris left the HDZ on the 15th of this month. He gave as his reasons for that the smothering of democracy, the settling of old scores, and, as he put it, he no longer wanted to be the prisoner of a policy that was increasingly mistaken. Is he the forerunner of an erosion of the so-called technomanagerial faction?

[Seks] I personally think that Mr. Vedris never was formally and really a member of the HDZ. I am not certain whether he was even formally a member of the HDZ, and that should be checked, but I am certain that he was never a real member of the HDZ. He is one of the most serious personnel mistakes of the HDZ. Because of him, the municipal organization of the HDZ was broken up for the first time when he was to be elected chairman of the Executive Council of the city of Zagreb. Then the parliament was also broken up. The first time he was not chosen to be a minister in the government, but the second time he managed it. It was with a heavy heart and a gnashing of teeth that the HDZ-ites accepted his being appointed deputy prime minister. In the government, he worked specifically to destabilize it, to wreck both the authority and all the decisions of Prime Minister Sarinic. Those were tragic meetings of the small cabinet. We were together in the small cabinet until his resignation. It was really tragic the extent to which he insulted and deprecated Prime Minister Sarinic. He managed to win the favor and sympathies of President Tudjman. Unfortunately, he was working from the outset to destroy the HDZ.

[Komadina] It is hard to believe that Mr. Vedris would himself decide on such a step without an agreement with others. Who, in your opinion, stands behind him?

[Seks] I think that he is either the top or a part of the top of that grouping which joined the HDZ after the party's victory. This grouping coolly and rationally judged that they should join the winner and take over key roles in finance and the economy from within. This was a cool and calculated move by the grouping he represents. They are localized in various centers of financial and economic power in the state, and it is not precluded that there might be a series of resignations by that group. For that matter, just before the government of Nikica Valentic was put together, they announced quite openly that that group of managing directors, managers of large firms, large systems,

would leave and turn in their resignations. In other words, they said that they would cause a blockade and paralyze a large portion of the economic system, and in that way they were blackmailing the president of the republic. Vedris is one of those aggressive blackmailers. The HDZ and the president of the state and of the party have continuously had to buy their false loyalty. They constantly had to be bribed to remain at their posts.

[Komadina] Can you name that grouping? Who are those people?

[Seks] For now, I will name only him.

[Komadina] You said that Mr. Vedris is cool and calculating. Does that mean, as he has said, that the time of the HDZ has passed, and does it mean that he will join some other victorious party?

[Seks] That is the way he is, but essentially his judgments and assessments are wrong. The proof of that is 1989 and 1990.

[Komadina] "Why Didn't Vladimir Seks Prosecute the Murderers of the Zec Family?" That was a newspaper headline. Many charge you with lapses in trying the murderers of the Zec family.

[Seks] I am glad you asked me that question. I will immediately answer it for you and make it clear: On 10 April 1992, I was appointed public prosecutor of the Republic of Croatia in the parliament. I took up that post on 16 April of that same year; on 12 August, I was appointed deputy prime minister in the Sarinic cabinet. So, I performed the duty of public prosecutor during that period. Here is the chronology of the measures taken in the criminal case against Munib Suljic and others. You see, on 6 November 1992 the written copy of the verdict in the first instance was received by the competent District Public Prosecutor's Office. Let me be more precise: On 6 July, the court issued the order to release the defendants from custody; on 7 and 8 July, closing arguments were presented by the defense and prosecution; and on 9 July the court announced the acquittal. The District Public Prosecutor's Office in Zagreb could appeal that verdict only on receiving the written copy of that verdict. The Public Prosecutor's Office received that verdict on 6 November 1992. So, the District Court in Zagreb delivered the verdict to the District Public Prosecutor's Office only on 6 November 1992. And I left that post on 12 August. This is obvious proof that the article in GLOBUS is a perfidious lie. I will not react to that article legally or any other way, except to make my statement that this is a big lie.

[Komadina] Let us get back to the parliament. How will political life go on now in the parliament, and can we expect much more interesting sessions of the parliament?

[Seks] The agreement reached can be implemented, but it does not have to be. Assuming that that agreement is implemented, nothing essential would change in the parliament. In political terms, the HDZ continues to have a relative majority, which is essential to adoption of all laws except those embodying the system, but all of those have already been adopted. We only lack a majority for revision of the Constitution, and that, of course, we do not need. The political balance of power, then, would not change at all, but now every deputy becomes a separate political quantity. In the final analysis, from now on no party, not even the HDZ, will dare to allow its deputies to be absent from sessions of the parliament. This means that a number of deputies who are performing duties which are not compatible with that of the deputy must divest themselves of those duties, because decisions will often be made by one or two votes. At the same time, it means that the HDZ will have to devote far greater attention to the parliament. Many HDZ deputies have simply gone to sleep, because they knew that the proposals being made by the government would be adopted because of the mathematical balance of power in the parliament. Now, it will take far more work and documented debate with the opposition deputies. That will strengthen the parliament, but also the position and prestige of the deputies.

HNS Leader Interviewed

94BA0314C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 94 pp 13-15

[Interview with Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, leader of the Croatian People's Party, by Tihomir Dujmovic; place and date not given: "The Parliament Is No Longer a Puppet Theater"]

[Text] As leader of the Croatian People's Party [HNS], Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar is certainly outside the debates being conducted most loudly by the former and present HDZ-ites [members of the Croatian Democratic Union], and certainly could be considerably more objective in her analysis of everything that happened last week in the Croatian parliament. That is why we are devoting this interview mainly to that topic.

[Dujmovic] As soon as they slept on the agreement they signed in the parliament, the signatories began to look on it as a victory or defeat. Who lost and who gained with that agreement?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Yes, sections of the opposition are saying that some new posts in the parliament have been obtained, new places on committees, but the incumbent party has been able to say that dignity has been saved by the fact that the positions heading the chambers of the Assembly belong to the HDZ. I am not looking at that agreement in those terms, but I really think without sentimentality that because of the change in the balance of political power it will finally be possible for the parliament to give the parliament the dignity of the supreme representative and legislative body of the Croatian state, which it is under the Constitution. In the long run that is the most important thing, but it is an equally important fact that now that absolute monopoly of the incumbent party will be broken, and greater independence of the parliament will be achieved thereby. For instance, it now becomes possible to settle issues which the HNS raised last fall, when in a letter to the president of the parliament I raised the question of

independence and responsibility in the work of the parliament, which because of outvoting has been reduced de facto to confirmation of a decision made previously. From the procedure for convening the parliament, decision-making procedure, and then all the preparatory jobs, I am thinking primarily of the work of the committees, it has not been possible in the work of the parliament to express the true, democratic, legislative, and representative will of the parliament, the will of all its deputies, and this has been harmful to Croatia.

There was, of course, no answer whatsoever to my letter, and now this agreement, if it is fully implemented, is the right way for the parliament to become what it should have been long ago. Up to now, we in the opposition in this parliament have frequently felt as though we were in the theater of the absurd, because although we came with hundreds of arguments, and although we expected those arguments to be discussed, we encountered the "argument" of raised hands. At times, it was for all the world like a puppet theater in which someone—by enforcing discipline—was pulling strings according to a set scenario. You see, even now in this crisis (of the supposedly "completely independent parliament"), as Jure Radic said the other day, Mr. Seks, as a member of the executive branch, which by definition and under the Constitution is accountable not only to the president, but also to the Croatian parliament, became involved inappropriately in the mechanism for resolving this crisis.

[Dujmovic] How do you mean when you say "became involved"? Seks said that he had support for his motion whereby the government withdrew the proposed agenda.

[Dabcevic-Kucar] So much the worse! Milas informed us that Seks had an order from the party leadership, not from the government. That means that the relationship clearly defined by the Constitution between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is not being respected.

[Dujmovic] But he did have authority from the government!

[Dabcevic-Kucar] If that is taken as an argument, it turns out that they do not accept the idea that the government is accountable to the parliament, which is a body for oversight of the government. Accordingly, a member of the executive branch cannot become involved in that way in a crisis of parliament, especially because it was clearly evident that the government had not withdrawn the motions because it so desired within the confines of its own work and competency, but because one of its members had received an order to hinder a parliamentary solution within the parliament by what actually were procedure machinations! This means that forces outside the parliament were resolving the problem of the parliament itself which it should have solved on its own if it is really an independent factor. And this was done through the executive branch, which in these proceedings should have been accountable to the parliament. As for the assertion of the HDZ that this method of reacting is set down in their bylaws, that is their affair, but it shows that in and of itself the parliament is not the supreme legislative body at all, but rather the center of power is somewhere else. I have nothing against the HDZ bylaws saying that, it is just that their wishes must be brought into line with the democratic procedure of the representative body and with a procedure that clearly separates the executive branch from the legislative and judicial branches.

[Dujmovic] Is that the reason why you called for Vladimir Seks' dismissal?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] That was the main reason, although we were also thinking of some of his actions in the area of legal and political problems, which resembled slightly more those of Vishinskiy, the prosecutor, than actions that would really strengthen democratic relations within the parliament.

[Dujmovic] What does that agreement do that is so valuable in practical terms? What are those issues, and how are they resolved?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Strengthening the constitutional role of the parliament, replacing orders and outvoting with agreements and negotiations. Adoption of the new operating procedure is the most important thing. The present one was obviously defined exclusively to suit the incumbent party, not to meet the needs of democracy, the Croatian state, and all its citizens. The new operating procedure must make it possible for the state to function regardless of which party is in power. It will have to regulate the new relations between the parliament and the government, between the parliament and its committees, between the parliament and the president of the state, and then the relationship between the parliament and the various councils of the president of the state, as well as the functions and powers of the president of the parliament himself. For example, even up to now the government has been accountable to the parliament, but the failure to put major problem areas that give rise to the tasks of the parliament on the agenda, or the presentation of a number of motions at the last moment for the session of the government, and then according to emergency procedure, actually turned the parliament into a rubber stamp for decisions made previously. Although the government is also accountable to the president of the republic, it is accountable to the parliament as well.

[Dujmovic] That means that you will be inquiring into its moves?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Not only that, but the parliament will be issuing orders to the government concerning its work in certain areas: for example, the economy. The second change that should occur is a change in the work of the parliamentary committees. The incumbent party has had an absolute majority in all committees, and the best thing that could happen was for what you said to be duly recorded in the minutes. Thus, the committees were only the introduction to that same machinery which later raised the hands in the legislative chamber.

[Dujmovic] That means that you will be inquiring into its moves?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Because under the Constitution the parliament oversees the government, preliminary debates on certain areas of life, debates in the parliament, will in future have to be perceived by the government as guidelines of a kind for its work in certain areas: the economy, foreign policy, social welfare issues, and so forth. The second change that should occur is a change in the work of the parliamentary committees. The incumbent party has had an absolute majority in all committees, and the best thing that could happen was for what you said to be duly recorded in the minutes. Thus, the committees were only the introduction to that same machinery which later raised the hands in the legislative chamber.

[Dujmovic] What change will there be now?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Now the incumbent party would have a majority of the members in 11 committees, but in nine there would be parity between the HDZ and the opposition. On the committee where the chairman comes from the HDZ, the vice chairman will be from the opposition. Thus, we finally have a greater opportunity for arguments to be clearly heard, to improve the quality of conclusions. He who governs must have an opportunity to hear what the people think, not just for the people to listen to him. In a democracy, the people do not obey, they take part. This is expressed through the deputies in the parliament. You see, if we +adopt the logic of Mr. Milas, who is constantly saying that all democracies function exclusively by the majority automatically outvoting the minority, then there is no reason for the parliament to meet and spend money, but it is more practical to inform the public what the incumbent party has decided. The majority party is, of course, entitled to its view and to a majority decision, but if the arguments of the other deputies are not taken into account at all, the quality of that decision is in question. If everything can be decided before its consideration in the parliament, what would make this a modern, democratic, and European state, a state with highly developed parliamentary life?

[Dujmovic] Voting is probably the next topic?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Yes, that is a very important question, we have to be clear about when it is secret and when it is open. We requested changes in that sense even earlier, but the notorious majority rejected that. Although the HDZ majority will surely persist for some time yet, relations have nevertheless undergone essential change. That is, it seems to me that the HDZ will erode further and nothing will come of the idea that the so-called left and the so-called right will disappear and the center will remain.

[Dujmovic] When should it be a secret ballot?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] This is mandatory when a vote is taken on personnel matters and there are several candidates. The operating procedure should work out all those possibilities.

[Dujmovic] Will electronic voting perhaps be introduced? The HNS was the first to propose that, and this is almost the last chance for it.

[Dabcevic-Kucar] I do not know whether that will be introduced now. Because the proposals of the HNS first lie in drawers for several months, and then someone offers our original proposal as his own, it would not surprise me for that to happen now.

[Dujmovic] It is also said that the powers of the president of the parliament will be reduced.

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Yes, those we have had up to now are absolutely too broad. They must really be reduced to a normal measure, because under the operating procedure it was not even possible to put a question to the president of the parliament, but only to a minister. He had exclusive jurisdiction to propose the agenda. Changes in the operating procedure will in practical terms regulate differently the relation between the parliament and the president of the state. Without, of course, touching the provisions of the Constitution. For example, it goes against the division into legislative, executive, and judicial branches for the chief of state to appoint the president of the parliament to his advisory body, because he heads a body which has the supreme legislative function.

[Dujmovic] There is constant talk about decisions not being made in the parliament. Where is that center of power which is making the decisions: Is it the Presidium of the HDZ, the president of the HDZ, or other bodies of an advisory nature?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] I think that the main decision, when a judgment has to be made, is made by the president of the state, and the decisionmaking of the parliament is a mere formality. He certainly has his own constitutional powers. Sometimes on matters which ought to be decided with the parliament or which should be left to the parliament for a decision, the president assumes the authority along with his advisory bodies. They often make decisions, and the public receives press releases and views arranged by meeting numbers. If, say, the parliament has taken positions previously on certain matters in foreign policy, peace, and so on, that would give the president of the state greater maneuvering space in his negotiations and greater legitimacy.

[Dujmovic] It has recently been said that the HNS is very close to the HDZ.

[Dabcevic-Kucar] I do not understand those assessments. We are close to the HDZ only in the sense that there is no other conception of the Croatian future except its sovereignty and independence over all the internationally recognized territory. But I think there are few parties in Croatia which do not take those views and display that "closeness." Aside from that, we are clearly against any solution that would include any variant at all of any new Yugoslavia, which are now being cooked up in the world. Within the HNS program, we take a very critical position toward the policy of the incumbent party. First, I think that Croatia is being governed in an authoritarian manner, which is dangerous for it, and in this kind of situation it frequently could lead toward elements of a totalitarian system. I am not saying that we are living in a dictatorial and totalitarian system, but it is an autocratic system—that is true. That is, all decisions concerning Croatia cannot be made by one man, but rather, acting within his authority, so long as the

constitutional arrangement is a semipresidential system, even within those powers, which are excessive, he could conduct a policy which strengthens democracy, which would bring together all the intelligence of Croatia and all the able and honest people so that that policy would have the highest quality possible in the interest of the state and the public.

We have been criticizing the merger of the party and the state, the party and the economy. Instead of toward a democratic and law-governed state based on private ownership, with a modern market economy, this is taking us back, we have found, to the "one-party state," which, while it is Croatian, is a system we have rejected. In political practice, we have been calling attention to the frequent inequality of all citizens before the law, because in the law-governed and just state the law is not applied according to fitness or according to "revolutionary legality" (past service). Back in January 1991, we made a specific proposal of a conception of economic development involving the distribution of shares instead of the system of grabbing and robbery in many cases. We foresaw at that time the corruption, the scandals in the so-called transformation, the danger of nepotism, all of which are emerging today and being covered up. To be sure, we support the fight against hyperinflation and the government's program in that area, but not the lack of instruments for stimulating investments (not as state investments) and for restructuring production. We are completely dissatisfied that the package of social welfare measures, for which we also made a number of proposals long ago, has still not been adopted. Aside from the care for the returnees, there is no justification for not having worked out a program for their return. I will not mention our criticism of the way the main news is laundered by the regime on HTV [Croatian TV] and the proposed changes, because there is no room for that. What should I also mention, our criticism of the policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas]? Our position from the beginning has been that there be no division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It must remain in its borders, but not as a unitary state. The joint struggle of Croats and Muslims must weaken the Serbian aggressor. The Croats in certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be protected as an equal and constituent nationality. We are still against changes of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, against rewards going to the aggressor, against the sanctions being removed from Serbia until the UNPA are brought under Croatian authority. We particularly point to the danger of consenting to the corridor for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After the Washington agreement, which is a constructive step, I would not go back to analyzing the past, but the statements by Messrs. Manolic and Mesic contain certain specific charges which in view of the fact that they were at the very top of the party indicate the duality of the policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and they need to be cleared up. If they have said things which are untrue, they must take responsibility, and if they have been telling the truth, responsibility must be taken by the person they have accused.

[Dujmovic] Although you have harshly criticized the manner of return of the UNPA, it seems to me that you have relented.

[Dabcevic-Kucar] No. I must recall that the HNS was the first party that said clearly back in January 1991 that it wants exclusively an independent and self-sufficient state. Again, we were the first party which said that opening an office in Zagreb and Belgrade is not any kind of "historic act," until the aggressor recognizes Croatia within its borders. We were the first to protest Mr. Knezevic's visit to Zagreb. We were also the first to oppose the possibility of Granic going to Belgrade before the aggressor recognizes Croatia with all the consequences that ensue from that. Now they seem to have listened to us, but this is not the first time that they listened to us several months late, with new negative political points accumulating in the meantime.

Three years ago, we clearly indicated all the major mistakes in the UN plan for the UNPA, while the incumbent party was telling us an altogether different story about that. Three years have passed, and unfortunately the HNS was right, because we should not have accepted the Vance plan. It contained neither instruments nor deadlines nor sanctions. Our three proposals were rejected in the parliament, but they have been adopted in the United Nations: First, that the sanctions against Serbia must not be removed until the occupied area in Croatia is renounced, and then the question of telephone numbers in the UNPA, and the deployment of Russian troops in Slavonia, which was not envisaged by the Vance plan. Those are all things that we spoke about in clear terms, frequently we were the first in Yugoslavia to do so, but the press did not record that as it should have. Unfortunately, I must say that all these things have not been covered appropriately in your newspaper.

[Dujmovic] Why did you call for the resignations of the defense minister and the culture minister?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] While the HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party] in the parliament raised the issue of dismissing Gojko Susak, we demanded that political responsibility be established for the events in Duboki Jarak. Following the news report broadcast even over HTV, which made all the intolerable oversights evident, I think it is quite clear that the responsibility must be attributed to the person who heads that department. As for the minister of culture, I think the very fact that she was on one side and all the teachers on the other side shows, if nothing else, that she was unable to find a common language with them and has lost their confidence. Because she holds that post because of them and that activity, not the other way around, I do not know what additional grounds would be required for her resignation. I think objective difficulties can be explained, but not the bureaucratic approach, and that justified demands must be honored. In the debate with the trade unions, the government shielded itself by saying "we cannot exceed the budget." In principle, the budget must not be touched, I agree, but that is not the real answer. The question is how to divide the most financial resources. My lord, in such a situation you cannot, for example, build an

altar to the homeland and spend all kinds of money on it, and at the same time say to people who are hardly getting by that there is no money for their miserable salaries! I am in favor of building the altar to the homeland, but I do not know why at this point it is smarter to give money for that instead of helping people who have put their lives on that altar, to their children, and to all those who are living desperately.

[Dujmovic] How do you look upon the constant coquetry of your party associate Mika Tripalo, who every day is changing his statements about taking over the left?

[Dabcevic-Kucar] Mr. Tripalo is still a member of the HNS. As to his statements, you must ask him.

Problems at Croatian Radio-TV Discussed

94BA0314D Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 24 May 94 pp 17-19

[Article by Ratko Peter: "Panic on the Banks of the Sava"]

[Text] "I want Croatian television to be a cathedral for the Croatian spirit," Antun Vrdoljak said at his inauguration to the post of the head of Croatian Radio-Television [HRT]. When he made that triumphant promise, Vrdoljak probably did not suspect that his awkward and unfortunate statement would probably be the one most frequently paraphrased when people talk or write about certainly the most attractive public firm in Croatia—government television. Today, three years since the "first bell-ringer" of the cathedral in the comfortable chair of the HRT general director, the promised "cathedral to the Croatian spirit" has more and more become a "little shrine to the spirit of Imotski."

Croatian Radio-Television is today experiencing probably its worst days since it was called Radio-Television Zagreb. One deputy interpellation concerning the situation within HRT and an open letter from Jerko Vukov, former director of that institution, on the same topic set in motion an avalanche of unanswered questions about relations and affairs within the most powerful medium. Viewed chronologically, it all began slightly more than three months ago, when in a meeting of the Board of Directors of HRT, the then director, Jerko Vukov, dissatisfied with the general situation in the organization, presented figures on a number of irregularities in business operation and relations within the organization, proposed certain measures, and in the end asked for establishment of an HRT crisis team that would have the task of overcoming the situation that had come about. It is obvious that this meeting of the board of directors (incidentally, all nine of its members work at HRT, and the chairman is Antun Vrdoljak, although he is also general director) was only a pretext for a total conflict, which, by all appearances, will have to be resolved by the highest leadership of the state. A pilgrimage has already been made to the Presidential Palace in this connection. Following the meeting of the board of directors, Director Jerko Vukov sent a letter on the situation within HRT to the government, to all the ministers, and to President Tudjman. The meeting and letter provided Antun Vrdoljak an occasion to call for the director's resignation, but Vukov went a step further, he sent a second letter, this time exclusively to Pantovcak, to the Presidential Palace. In that letter, which was seven pages "thick," he gave specifics to back up the allegations in the first letter, and this culminated in the head of the Croatian state receiving Vukov for a confidential "one-on-one" conversation. Nothing is known as yet about the content of the conversation. The wall of silence suggests that the confidential conversation was classified as a well-kept secret. Many people from both politics and Television do not know much about the content of the conversation or simply are not supposed to know. Letter "No. 2" is a mystery for the present.

To Suit Vrdoljak

However that may be, after opening the mysterious letter, Antun Vrdoljak "proposed" that Jerko Vukov take his annual vacation, and the latter, while he was absent, appointed to his position Tomislav Marcinko, editor in chief of the news program, which, incidentally, is in keeping with the HRT regulation. Nevertheless, Vrdoljak rescinded that decision and replaced Marinko with Marija Nemcic, a person in his personal confidence. Epilogue: Director Jerko Vukov was dismissed by the Croatian Government and replaced by Niksa Percin, but as acting director. He also is supposed to be according to Vrdoljak's taste. Niksa Percin, who previously was director of Transmitter and Communications, is nevertheless a temporary solution, because it is well-known even to the public that that position is soon to be taken up by Mirko Galic, Paris correspondent of VJESNIK and VECERNJI LIST.

Jerko Vukov, who has been with Television since its very beginning, is one of its rare "pioneers," and, perhaps most essential, the person whom Vrdoljak actually appointed to the post of ravnatelj [director] (in former times, it was called direktor). Vukov said in his first letter that "Vrdoljak had concentrated all the power of Television in himself and had taken power away from all directors of separate components of HRT," and then that the organization's personnel policy was conducted exclusively under the command of Antun Vrdoljak, that the vision of HRT was unclear, while certain financial questions had floated to the surface, putting Television in the hole by 2,841,000 marks, in spite of "business in the black," according to Vrdoljak. According to Vukov, even that sum is "only part of the debt." Throughout the letter, and this incidentally is also true of the entire story of Television, runs the essential question: Is it possible to stop Antun Vrdoljak's "tyranny" in his "systematic destruction of HTV, the people, and professionals in the organization, and thereby halt the damage being inflicted on Croatia"?

Stormy Meeting in the Palace

A recent meeting of the Croatian chief of state with a group from Television made up of Antun Vrdoljak, Marija Nemcic, Tomislav Marcinko, and Mirko Galic, which, the gossip has it, was very stormy, is additional proof that the situation is more than serious. Vrdoljak, whose temper is

said to be well-known, simply did not keep it, and the "president's lightning rod" left the meeting before it was over.

Mirko Galic is supposed (nothing, after all, is still completely certain as yet) to take over the post of Television director. Many people perceive Galic as an experienced newspaper professional, a man who has proven himself in his work, a person whose foreign experiences would be exceedingly welcome to Croatian television. Knowing Galic's previous work and the way he thinks, we must expect that Galic will above all insist on powers that he should have as director, and also full autonomy in managing Television. In some of his statements, he has already made it known that he wants to concern himself entirely with the journalistic part of the job and that he is interested exclusively in the programming. In view of the regulation concerning television that has been in effect up to now, which has been in need of change, and also Antun Vrdoljak's behavior up to now, which had to be changed, some new solution is simply a necessity if Galic, when he comes, is to really have all the powers to do his job without hindrance. In that sense, many people at HRT are supporting Galic's appointment, because they are convinced that his vision of state television would be like those in the West. Even Jerko Vukov has said: "I have a high opinion of Mirko Galic both as a man and as a professional. I am honored that my place will be taken by Mirko, not by one of Vrdoljak's in-house hangers-on whom Vrdoljak would be able to manipulate. In the recent past, I have been only an extra, I saw that nothing could be done.... With him around, nothing can be done."

Marcinko With Galic

It is of interest that Tomislav Marcinko has also had cooler relations with Antun Vrdoljak in the recent past. The ties between "No. 1" and "No. 2" were broken after Marcinko's assessment that the ever greater pressure on Vrdoljak was seriously shaking the position of the "first bell-ringer," and he began to support Mirko Galic's appointment. And that means that Marcinko is also for reducing the powers of the general director, that is, for broadening the powers of the directors. Incidentally, we have learned unofficially that this was Galic's first condition for taking the post of director.

"I have read Jerko Vukov's letter, and I can speak only about what concerns the news programming," Tomislav Marcinko said. "I cannot speak about any financial transactions, because I have nothing to do with finances. I got along extremely well with Mr. Vukov over the two and a half years that he was director of Television. We had no major problems, he did not interfere in the programming, nor did he exert influence for us to cover something or hold something back. As for any 'removal' of programs of which Mr. Vukov speaks, there was only one program of 'Latin Alphabet' to which I reacted fiercely and submitted my resignation. But I had my entire team behind me. My position, that is, is that even the worst program is better than one that has been banned. As for the relationship between Mr. Vrdoljak and Mr. Vukov, I can say that they collaborated very well. Jerko Vukov came to the position of director at the behest of Mr. Vrdoljak, they have come into fierce conflict. I do not want to be a participant or judge in that conflict. It is hard to say to what extent Vrdoljak is responsible for personnel policy, as Vukov alleges. He did not hire anyone, I am speaking exclusively about the news department, except on my nomination, although there were nominations I made which Vrdoljak did not accept, but that is his right. No one in our department was fired, and those who are not scheduled to work are in a waiting mode. Vrdoljak is no more responsible for that waiting than Mr. Vukov, who is responsible for issuing those decisions. I myself have spoken about this in meetings of the board of directors, because I did not like to have those people in a waiting mode instead of involved in daily operations. That is why I called for decisions to be made whereby these people would either work or not work."

Financial Irregularities

Antun Vrdoljak is obviously someone who causes trouble in Croatian television, which, incidentally, was not difficult to figure out. Probably the most unpopular person in Croatia, a man to whom public petitions have been written containing tens of thousands of signatures for him to withdraw from his (countless) posts, is still holding on to many influential positions, certainly the most attractive of which was the one at Television, although it is shakier than ever. In view of Vrdoljak's way of thinking, political and other lack of tact, tactics, and mindset, it is certain that no agreements and assurances will succeed in driving him from Dezmanova Street, not even the interests of Croatia, on whose behalf he was always ready to deliver meters of emotional sentences, to break into thundering song, and even to shed a tear or two.

"Croatian Radio-Television is operating disastrously, I think that this is also the paradigm of the Croatian state," is the belief of Branimir Donat, a member of the HRT Council. "I place the responsibility for this on the council chairman, Dr. Marijan Sunjic, who has done that job disastrously, in the same way as he has managed the university and all the other jobs he does. I think that this HRT Council is a failure from start to finish."

From what Vukov has written, many financial irregularities at HRT, the letting of contracts for capital investment projects to firms whose offers were considerably less favorable than those proposed by the staff services (according to the testimony of one of Vrdoljak's former close associates, the firm given a contract at HRT also renovated Vrdoljak's nationalized house in Lascinska Street), the many expensive official trips (as a rule, Vrdoljak travels with his wife), the taking of "dubious" foreign credits, the unwise expenditure of money, certain questions about the sale of a building in Ilica, personnel policy shaped exclusively by Vrdoljak, arbitrariness, and totally disrupted human relations, give the picture of the present state of the "cathedral to the spirit." But the crowning pearl at Television is the dismissal of Bozo Susec, an experienced sports professional, from the post of chief of the pool for the World Cup in soccer in the United States, and the appointment of

Marija Nemcic (?!). It should be mentioned in this connection—if what Jerko Vukov writes is true—that Vrdoljak's position is that they should not cover the envisaged 40 games of that cup, but only one. Incidentally, Marinko Cubrilo, HTV financial director, was also suspended recently, although there is no written decision to that effect. That is, something of the kind was suggested to Cubrilo, probably because of data presented on the financial operations of Television.

Fight to the Finish

It is quite clear that Antun Vrdoljak broke loose from any control by anyone. Indeed, he even went much further than one might suppose. Today, no one is happy with Croatian Radio-Television, Mirko Galic's arrival is looked forward to, but his signature is conditional upon freedom of operation, and that would be fairly difficult to do with Vrdoljak in place. The situation is more difficult than it appears, and the president of the republic even acted as intermediary. By all appearances, the final judgment is expected from the Presidential Palace. The demands for Vrdoljak's dismissal are fiercer than ever (at one time, the thinking turned to Dr. Ivo Sanader, later to Minister Jurkic-Girardi, and finally to Ante Glibota), but it is certain that Vrdoljak "will go to the end," which, incidentally, he always does. In the light of the most recent political events, Vrdoljak's inevitable conflict with President Tudjman will probably be resolved with some new transposition of personnel. The only question is what new post might satisfy Vrdoljak, when up to now he has had almost all of them. In view of the pretension he had at one time and his convulsive fight for the post of vice president of the state, the personnel officers of the state have a job ahead of them that will not be easy at all.

Ambassador to United Nations Interviewed

AU2106075494 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 94 p 4

[Interview with Dr. Mario Nobilo, Croatian ambassador to the United Nations, by Visnja Gotal; place and date not given: "'The Blue Helmets' at the Make-Up Exam; Only Four More Months"]

[Excerpts]

Parliamentary Crisis

[Gotal] To what extent has the Croatian parliamentary crisis influenced the course of events?

[Nobilo] Parliamentary crises are normal, and they are not a topic of front pages of the daily papers unless they imply a violent overthrow. In the beginning, the crisis in the parliament caused concern because it was not known whether it meant a deviation from the Washington Agreement and thus the victory of a certain faction. However, the parliamentary crisis in Croatia, which I personally believe will be overcome, is not viewed with special concern in diplomatic circles, and the same goes for attempts to internationalize it. It is important that procedure is observed in overcoming the crisis, as it will then be easier for Croatian diplomacy to prove that Croatia is a stable and democratic partner for the West.

The Crucial Year

[Gotal] What outcome of events can we expect in the coming period?

[Nobilo] I think this year will be crucial one way or another, as our crisis has "matured" to absurd dimensions, to the point where it blocks the international community itself. Now we at least have the lowest common denominator of the great powers in resolving the crisis, rather than Europe divided above us, as was the case earlier. However, we must also take into account unpredictable elements such as Serb stubbornness and unreliability. An exclusively military option is also possible, as is some other, unpredictable option. In that case some other options will open too, but they will certainly imply resolution. Croatia can simply not be patient forever and allow itself to become Cyprusized. Croatia is, after all, an internationally reliable and the most stable partner in resolving the conflict, and the great powers are counting on that.

[Gotal] Are you including Russia here too?

[Nobilo] The Americans want to help both the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent to which they are reasonable and inclined to help themselves. However, the United States is not prepared to create a new Vietnam, and that is why it will strive for international consensuses concerning the resolution of the crisis on international and legal grounds, and in accordance with Security Council resolutions. The important thing is that we are entering this resolution with resolutions that benefit us. The United States is in a better position than Russia because ultimately, the United States can, if it wishes to do so, lead the international community toward resolution of the crisis. For Russia, becoming involved in the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is primarily a matter of prestige, as opposed to interest or geopolitics. Although it is certain that Serbia will be in the Russian Orthodox orbit, I can only wish them a safe journey!

RSK President Says Krajina Defense 'Priority'

LD2006195494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1820 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Knin, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], had talks in Knin today with representatives of civilian and military authorities from Northern Dalmatia and Lika. They discussed issues relating to the defense system, the functioning of law and order, and the implementation of measures to stabilize the monetary system.

According to a statement issued by the president's information service, president Martic stressed that, in view of the global, military, and political situation that the RSK is in, measures aimed at strengthening the defense system still had full priority, but that efficiency in other fields that stimulate the revitalization of production and functioning of the law-governed state were directly linked to the stability of the defense system, ISKRA [Krajina Serb news agency] says.

Particular stress was laid on the need to take strong measures to prevent chaos in the functioning of law and order. It was stated that the actions recently taken to arrest a number of perpetrators of serious crimes was extremely well received among fighters and civilians in the RSK. It was also stated that prevention of destructive behavior was the most effective way to strengthen the stability of the state.

Yugoslav Army Said To Occupy Border Areas

AU2006174794 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Strategic Point at Straza Seized"]

[Text] Yesterday a team of NOVA MAKEDONIJA journalists went near a zone that has been occupied by members of the regular Yugoslav Army, 250 meters into Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] territory. They also control a strategic point on Mount Straza near Kriva Palanka, including 50 additional meters of territory, and therefore there is all together 300 meters of territory under their control. Macedonian Army patrols are being turned away from this area with the following words: "Do not approach—this is Serbia." Members of the U.S. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] also took up their positions yesterday. However, it is evident that the Serbian Army does not have any intention of withdrawing.

For the chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, Momcilo Perisic, the events on the Macedonian-Serbian border are nothing but a media lie. Moreover, Perisic stated that Macedonia accepted the UN forces, within which the Americans are the most numerous, not for the sake of protecting the Macedonian people, but for the sake of forming their own base.

Further on Border Violation

AU2006174894 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jun 94 p 2

[Report by Panta Dzambazovski and Z. Cvetanovska: "Serbian Soldiers Are Entrenching"]

[Text] The thick fog around the border region near the village of Cupino Brdo, in the district of Kriva Palanka, prevented us from seeing the Serbian soldiers who, after penetrating 250 meters into Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] territory, now control a strategic height 1703 meters above ground level. If there had not been a strong wind blowing toward the seized zone, we might even have heard their voices. We managed to approach them to within some 120 meters.

This was the farthest point that we could reach, and we were escorted there by Dusko Spasevski, one of the members of the Macedonian Army [ARM] camping near the border—about 40 minutes away on foot. The ARM patrols usually come to 100-200 meters from the strategic point on the Straza mountain, where the Serbian soldiers of the regular Yugoslav Army are being entrenched. They have already dug trenches and positioned machine-gun nests there. When the weather allows, the Macedonian soldiers can see the Serbian patrols changing over. Sometimes they communicate for a whole hour, but the conversations go as follows: "Do not approach, this is Serbia." Sometimes they send invitations for discussions: "Come to negotiate, let us agree." The members of our army do not react. In the vicinity we also met a five-member Macedonian patrol headed by Lieutenant Enver Jakupi.

It seems that this point is of importance for the Serbian army because of its strategic character, and not because it is allegedly on "Serbian territory." Actually, the district real estate registry offices have always worked diligently, and therefore this border belt has never been disputed. The essence is that this point is a good observation point for a large stretch of Macedonian territory. From there it is possible to observe the border posts at Ramna Niva, German, and Kopriva (with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Deve Bair (with Bulgaria), and up to the mountains of Osogovo. The previous position of the Serbian army was behind this elevation, near a settlement in Yugoslavia by the name of Cuka, which did not offer such possibilities.

According to some information, the Serbian soldiers have been here for a whole month. Their patrols are usually composed of eight members. They carry some small arms, but some claim that they have also deployed mortars. At this moment, it is probably the surveillance equipment that is the most important weapon in use, and this is surely also directed at UNPROFOR members.

We have also found out something else that is exclusively revealed in our newspaper. Namely, the Serbian soldiers have not penetrated 250 meters into our territory, but 300 meters. To be more precise, when approached by Macedonian military patrols, the Serbian soldiers descend 50 meters from the elevation and take up a new position more suitable for attacks and for defense. Before taking over this strategic elevation, the Serbian army had deployed some reservists near the villages of Surlica and Prolesje in Yugoslavia.

On the Macedonian side the nearest settlements are the villages of Podrzikonj and Luke, whose inhabitants are deeply worried. A number of them have land just on the border. They cannot go to this now. The Serbian soldiers do not allow them, and the ARM is advising them not to go until the situation is resolved.

Half an hour before the arrival of our team, at some hundred meters from the ARM camp, some dozens of UNPROFOR field vehicles of the "Hammer" type arrived, with U.S. soldiers on board. We could see that their intention was to stay there for a while, because they were setting up tents.

Compared with two days earlier, yesterday there were not a large number of ARM or police there. Actually, that had been a preventive measure because of the traditional rally organized in memory of Cupino Brdo, where Macedonian and Serbian partisans waged a joint battle against the Bulgarian occupier during World War II. This time, however, Serbian war veterans did not show up.

It is obvious that the Serbian Army does not intend to withdraw.

Defense Minister Comments

AU2006121594 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 20 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Dangerously Escalated Serbian Provocation"]

[Text] In regard to information on latest incidents on the Macedonian-Serbian border, Macedonian Defense Minister Vlado Popovski held a press conference last Friday, June 17. Reflecting the border situation in the past year, Minister Popovski said Serbian-caused incidents have occurred often in the last three months. Seven incidents were registered in June, the same number of incidents occurred in May and five such incidents took place during April, which is a high percentage of a total of 19 incidents since January 1991. The minister divided the incidents into two types: First, entering on the Macedonian territory by Serbian troops, and secondly, incidents between UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and Serbian patrol units. The recent Serbian MiG 21 plane violation of the Macedonian air space is also an example of border incidents in this year.

In most cases, the Macedonian border is crossed by Serbian patrols, who enter as deep as up to 300 meters on to Macedonian territory, but they stayed longer then usual near the place called Cupino Brdo and the observing post Straza, Minister Popovski stressed. At the place called Golem Tapan, Serbian troops established a telephone communication with their base in Serbia.

The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has sent a protest note to the Yugoslav authorities on all the incidents, but the reply has always been a denial of such reports.

What really causes concern, the minister said, is the fact that Yugoslavia considers the Macedonian-Serbian border to be only administrative. This border, Popovski reminded, was regulated by the First Constitution of the People's Republic of Macedonia, and upon a conclusion by a joint Macedonian-Serbian committee, back in the period of 1945 to 1948. All peak elevations had been marked even then and the Serbian side never had a dispute over borders with Macedonia. It was the Macedonian side that questioned two points—the place of Serupa and the junction of the three borders of Albania, Macedonia, and Federal Yugoslavia, as well as the Prohor Pcinjski monastery.

The Macedonian Army, evaluating the character and danger of such incidents, undertook measures of forcing Serbian patrols out of Macedonian territory. At this moment, there are eight to 12 Serbian soldiers at the post of Straza and the Macedonian Army troops are only 100 to 150 metres away. The mechanism of peaceful forcing Serbian soldiers out of Macedonian territory has thus far been efficient, although both sides have pointed guns at each other at all times. As for the peak Straza, it is decided to make an effort to resolve the situation through diplomatic means, but if it fails, the Macedonian side will have to take the peak over and will do so. Besides this, authorities in Yugoslavia, as well as the United Nations and CSCE will be informed on the whole situation with a thorough documentation.

In a wider sense, the incidents could also be interpreted as an attempt to activate another political factor in Macedonia, especially before the upcoming census and elections, Popovski stated. This pressure is complemented by the Serbian Church threats to introduce cannon measures against the Macedonian Church. If the old confrontation topic of Serbs being allegedly endangered in Macedonia is added to all this, Popovski said, it could be easily explained as an organized mechanism of political and psychological pressure on Macedonia. Answering reporters' questions, Minister Popovski gave some further information. Firstly, he pointed out these incidents must not be interpreted as an aggression, despite the fact some Serbian troops have stayed longer on Macedonian territory; secondly, the Macedonian side will ask the international community to get involved in defining this border; and thirdly, Macedonia will request, in the context of the newly emerged situation, that the international community lifts the arms embargo.

Commentary on 'Threats to Peace'

AU2006190894 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jun 94 p 3

[Commentary by Georgi Barbarovski: "Dangerous Serbian Threats"]

[Text] The Serbian Army is endangering the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Some 15 soldiers went approximately 250 meters inside our country's territory and seized heights and the most significant strategic points on Cupino Brdo and Podrzikonj near Kriva Palanka. The soldiers of our northern neighbor now control the highest peak on Mount Straza. The information from the field is that for the whole past month there have been some major movements on the Serbian side, that tents have been put up and trenches dug on Macedonian territory. In the absence of official information from the Defense Ministry, the local inhabitants are gripped by fear and anxiety, even though so far no incidents have occurred apart from the seizure of our territory. The Macedonian Army soldiers' task is just to observe the Serbian military "breach."

This is not the first time that regular units of the Serbian Army have violated the territorial integrity of our country. There has been a series of incidents in the last three to four months, which announced what is now actually happening. The border with Yugoslavia has some disputed zones that have been avoided by the Macedonian side and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. These zones were not defined by the border commissions, and now more relaxed times and a calmer atmosphere are expected in order to resolve them. The Serbian side knows this, too. However, it is keeping up the tension by making open threats to peace and security. Serbia has not stopped demonstrating its force on Macedonia's northern border. It does that when its warplanes fly over our territory, when its disguised soldiers capture our border troops, and when they do not allow UNPROFOR units to use the roads along the Macedonian border zone.

It would be naive to believe that this latest serious incident is not part of a strategy that is breaking through on several fronts. The entry of the Serbian soldiers onto our territory just before the beginning of the census coincides with the open threats by the political associations of the Serbs in

Macedonia to boycott the census because of their "not regulated citizenship status" and because allegedly "85 percent of the Serbian population" has not been provided with citizenship documents from the Interior Ministry. At the same time there are claims that "surnames are being changed, particularly of Serbs who have lived in Macedonia for a long time."

On the other hand, the Serbian Orthodox Church and its "administrators for Macedonia" "recommend" that the Macedonian Orthodox Church ultimately return to its "canonic mother," reinforcing its threats with border provocations.

All this, supported by part of the Serbian state press, which uses the strongest symbols, archaic pictures, and mythological formulas ("Serbian country," "autochthonous people," "old homes," "graves of Serbian soldiers") is aimed not only at providing an excuse for the "warmongers" but also at creating a psychosis in Serbia about danger, which is the only possible way to maintain the ruling oligarchy. That is why the comments of the military leadership of Serbia on the incident near Kriva Palanka was so dismissive: "It is something that Macedonian journalists have made up." Just as the Bosnian model was also a "journalist's invention": provocation—incident—military conflict.

Facing this great Serbian military pressure it is strange that the Macedonian Government, the Defense Ministry, and the General Staff of the Macedonian Army are taking such an attitude. It is true that the minister responsible and chief of the military leadership are outside the country, but the public cannot be left without relevant information in such cases. We do not know if the international bodies have been informed about the incident, which could exert pressure on the Serbian state leadership to withdraw their soldiers from Macedonian territory. The issue of the disputed border regions should be resolved as soon as possible, but only through negotiations. No other argument can fill in the "geographical holes." Unless the Bosnian war mania has come down to the south.

Frckovski Denies Interference in Party Affairs

AU2006193494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 16 Jun 94 p 4

[Unattributed report on news conference by FYROM Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski on 15 June: "The Interior Ministry Does Not Break Up Parties"]

[Text] At yesterday's news conference the interior minister briefly reviewed the preelection political situation and fervor, and said that, depending on their profile and internal structures, the parties are using different methods to try to provide excuses for various political situations, but, as he said, the Interior Ministry does not intend to provide such excuses. Some of the attacks that have appeared on the public political scene have accused the Interior Ministry of infiltrating and breaking up various parties with the intention of dispatching them from the political scene. This is a known methodology used by a number of political parties in the past for plotting, and it is usually studied as part of the lesson on promoting global revolution. The general characteristic of revolutionary parties is the syndrome of conspiring and searching for conspirators engaged in breaking up a group and creating a new one. Frckovski emphasized that no police force has ever managed to break up a political movement or political party.

It is neat when party problems can be covered up by such external factors because then we have a victim and an excuse for personal political defeats. However, we must be concerned with the low level on which the political struggle is being waged, making political pornography [as published] the main topic of political discussions. Playing around with confidential documents, trying to create party policies without having accusations investigated through a parliamentary or court procedure, or both, represent political manipulation, because they make serious hearings and serious democratic procedures impossible. There is no way to incorporate all of these into a procedure or to establish who is responsible. The aim is to satanize the authorities and to score cheap political points, Frckovski underlined. We can do nothing other than to offer to open our files and check the results, but that cannot be done in the media. However, I fear that the whole affair will remain within the sphere of political gossip. It causes great trouble when somebody's personal failure is associated with the political interest of a party. There were such manipulations when the Interior Ministry was accused of mass murder, with claims that it organized a traffic accident with five casualties in order to cover up the activities of one of its employees against some politicians. Such manipulations indicate not only mentally and morally disintegrated personalities, but also a situation in which there are no bounds in the political struggle. This is very dangerous for the political climate.

The State Security Service and the Interior Ministry cannot be blamed for a meeting, which might even have been accidental, between a certain lady, an ordinary secretary of the VMRO-SMD [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Organizations, a Bulgarian-based party], and some politicians of a certain political party on 26 and 27 March of this year, who were then given 50,000 German marks in financial assistance. The Interior Ministry cannot be blamed for the meeting in the Rila Hotel [in Sofia] when some well-known politicians of this country met a group from the VMRO-SMD, and were also joined by the Sofia district attorney and chief of the city's Interior Ministry. On that occasion they agreed on a plan for the election campaign, including the placement of a radio station on a historically famous mountain close to our border, all designed to help the party in the elections. Three groups were formed: one for ideological preparations and publishing activities, another for distributing publicity material, and a third for military preparations. The Interior Ministry can present evidence on these matters, but nobody can be blamed for the failure of the party except its own political program.

The claims that there was organized crime made us bring a number of criminal charges that we would not normally have done, in order to vindicate some statements made by

former Interior Ministry officials, but that again is their personal problem. [sentence as published] The claim that we were allegedly not bringing charges so as to protect someone was an evident mistake made by the Interior Ministry to cover up political statements by operational work. [sentence as published] The legal case is closed that dealt with former minister Antoni Pesev, who issued a permit for the construction of a gas station without the permission of the Interior Ministry. I do not wish to make a personal inquiry into this mistake, but there was actually such a permit from the Interior Ministry. After that, the government made a decision, which simply made things ridiculous. The mistake was used politically to cover up the amateurish public statements of that time. There still remains the possibility of slander charges but I do not know what my reactions would be then. What we in the ministry owe is at least an apology for having been used, at least a number of us, to cover up political statements made by some senior officials.

Concerning the events on the Macedonia-Serbian border Frckovski said it was in the domain of the Defense Ministry because it was about the border itself, not a border crossing or zone. He listed the incidents: One illegal crossing of 17 soldiers and two officers occurred on 24 May 150 meters inside our territory, threatening a UNPROFOR unit; the airspace was violated by a Yugoslav warplane on 27 May; two soldiers penetrated 200 meters into Macedonian territory on 30 May; two soldiers went 200 meters inside our territory on 1 June; on 8 June they set up a tent on our territory; they have dug trenches mostly on their own territory, except possibly for one. The situation is similar today. We have our forces positioned a close distance from there, but all of this is "frozen" until a settlement.

Sees Sofia 'Conspiracy'

AU2006102794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16 Jun 94 p 1

[Text] Skopje—Ljubomir Frckovski, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], told correspondents that Macedonian politicians had held a meeting in the Rila Hotel in Sofia with leaders of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies [VMRO-SMD]. They allegedly agreed with them a plan of action during the period preceding the parliamentary elections in Macedonia. It was claimed that three groups were set up, to deal with ideological, propaganda, and military matters, in which the Rakovski Officers Legion was also reportedly involved. The plans of the "conspiracy" included setting up a radio transmitter in the vicinity of the Macedonian border. On the other side of the border, within Macedonia itself, the "groups" were supposedly intending to work to overcome the differences between parties whose stances were close to one another.

PDP Official Comments on 'Failure' of Census

AU2006063694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1815 GMT 19 Jun 94

[Text] On the eve of the census in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], representatives of various political parties and other associations have put forward their statements. Regarding the census, Mendu Thaci, deputy chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity Party [PDP], declared to the Albanian Radio and Television:

[Thaci] The public has been informed that in 1991, the Albanians boycotted the census held at that time. This was an expression of civil disobedience on the part of Albanians, practically the lack of belief toward the administration staff.

The Law on Census, which was approved some time ago by the parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, is in fact more respectful of minorities than that of 1991, but when attaching to it the bad will of the administration staff that applies this law, this means that Albanians will be discriminated from the beginning at this level.

Article 24 of this law states that nationalities here should be represented on the basis of a proportional number. In fact, this law is not respected, because according to the official data in 1991, Albanians were 21 percent and more, while now in the census commissions and registration groups, Albanians in this republic take part with 12.8 percent.

It is known that the Macedonian administration staff particularly creates a terrible confusion with documentation, especially in ensuring the nationality of this republic. At the present level, there are more than 60 percent of Albanians who have not arranged the problem of nationality. Moreover, something that was not in 1991 is included, which is the fact that all the Albanians who work abroad will be considered as a non-resident population and will not be counted. The census is really a very important act, but I would say that it is not an historic act.

The PDP does not bear responsibility for the failure of this census, because it is not this party that participated in drafting the law, various consultations in commissions, and lately it is not the one that voted for the law in the parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The responsibility falls on those who make manipulations and such non-serious projects.

Excommunication of Macedonian Church Sought

AU1706171094 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 17 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Criminal Charges Against Macedonian Church"]

[Text] Pahomije, bishop of Vranje and administrator of the eparchies of the so-called Serbian Orthodox Church in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] stated canon criminal charges would be brought against the Macedonian Church at the Great Church Court, unless the Macedonian Church re-enters the canon union with its sister church in Serbia. This would mean the defrocking of all Macedonian metropolitans and the church excommunication of Macedonian believers. The goal of forming eparchies in Macedonia had been to protect the basic human and religious rights of the Serbs there, which are being violated, Pahomije said in his interview for the Belgrade paper POLITIKA. They also aimed to reveal

the Holy See's intention to place the Macedonian Church under its jurisdiction, he added. The decision to bring criminal charges against the Macedonian Church will be delivered to its head, Father Mihail in person by a Serbian delegation, Pahomije [words indistinct].

Meanwhile, the A1 television reports the Holy Synod of the Macedonian Church claims it has not received any letter or facsimile informing it of such a decision. The Holy Synod will discuss its relations with the Serbian Church at its next Wednesday session.

Agricultural Cooperation Pact Signed With Turkey

LD2006075494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0658 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Skopje, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—Eftim Ancev, minister of agriculture, forestry, and water management for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], speaking on his return from a three-day visit to Turkey, told journalists here that an aid package for about 10,000 tonnes of corn for Macedonia had been agreed.

"We held useful talks with Turkish Agriculture Minister Sahin and we signed a protocol on technical and scientific cooperation in the sphere of agriculture," Ancev said, and added that they had also discussed the possibilities of exchanging experts."

The aid agreement on 5-10,000 metric tons of corn and on the purchase of a certain amount under very favorable conditions at good prices is very important, he said.

The Macedonian minister also stressed the importance of the fact that in the future Macedonia will be able to export its goods to the Turkish market, "and to buy Turkey's products for very good prices and under good conditions."

Federal

Ministry Denies Violating FYROM Border

LD2006154494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1336 GMT 20 Oct 94

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—"The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes with concern an escalation of accusations by The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] against the Yugoslav Army because of alleged violations of its border and actions provoking border incidents. Along the same lines are accusations that the Yugoslav Army is massing its forces in the border area with the FYROM and that 'the Serb army' has occupied the Straza observer post on Cupino Brdo," the statement issued by the ministry says.

"The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs deems all the accusations unacceptable and unjustified, and rejects them entirely.

"The Yugoslav Army was deployed along the border as early as June 1992 and from then on it has been securing Yugoslav territory, along the border with the FYROM, up to the administrative borders of the municipalities belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At that time and for a long period thereafter the FYROM had no objections to the situation on the ground. The Yugoslav Army units deployed along the border with the FYROM fully respect their code of service, performing their duties strictly in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The FYROM's accusations of alleged border violations became frequent when foreign military observers arrived on the Macedonian side of the border.

"The Federal Foreign Ministry believes that the aim of the frequent accusations by the FYROM authorities is to substantiate the theory of the alleged 'threat from the north' launched by certain non-Balkan and non-European players for their own interests. Such accusations should at the same time justify the involvement and strengthening of the deployment of foreign military factors on the territory of the FYROM, as part of the campaign of stepping up pressures on the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

"The FRY's policy toward all neighbors, including the former Yugoslav republics, is well known, and the attempts to portray it in a false light, such as those from the FYROM, are contrary to the mutual interests for the development of good neighborly cooperation, peace, and stability in the Balkans. The FRY's policy is based on mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty and, in relation to the FYROM, also on the interest in normalizing relations and reestablishing broken ties and cooperation. The FRY will fully adhere to the principles of the inviolability of territory and non- use of violence in solving open issues.

"Again describing the Macedonian accusations as illogical, unfounded, and unacceptable the Yugoslav side expects the FYROM Government to stop fabricating such accusations and, in the interest of peace, security, and good relations to put its actions in line with internationally recognized norms and documents," it is said at the end of the statement by the Federal Foreign Ministry.

Kontic Presents New Laws, Views Economy

AU1706162794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 Jun 94

[Text] The main activity of the Federal Government over the past week concentrated on the realization of the program of economic stabilization, the Federal Government stated at a regular news conference. Sporadic cases of currency dealers' cuts are of a passing character and the exchange rate of dinar remains stable, Prime Minister Radoje Kontic assesses. Vladimir Nikolic reports:

[Begin recording] [Nikolic] From 24 January to 11 June, prices have increased by a mere 0.8 percent altogether. However, the structure of increases is not satisfactory because we have noted a (?great) increase in the prices of agricultural produce and the prices of services, Kontic said. For this reason, the Federal Government has pointed to further possibilities to cut prices, especially some of them. The main attention focused on the accomplished level of incomes and its influence on the realization of the program, the strengthening of the overall economic activity and production, and elimination of the budget deficit in the second half-year. In connection with this, at yesterday's session, the Federal Government passed a decree that regulates the salaries of deputy prime ministers, federal ministers, and officials, changes to the law on earnings, compensations, and other incomes of the employees in the federal ministries, federal offices, federal organizations, and federal government services, and changes to the decree on expenses that are being recognized as material expenses for the federal administration offices.

According to Kontic, salaries have increased greatly, especially in May. He assessed this as a negative trend, primarily because of its intensity, which does not match the increase in production and the trends in the economy. An accompanying factor is a disproportion between the incomes in industry and non-industry. However, the federal prime minister believes that the total income mass in May means that we have accomplished equilibrium with the available national product. He said that further increases in salaries could endanger the strategic goals of the program of the economic stabilization:

[Kontic] Departing from these conclusions, the Federal Government, with the decrees that I have just read, passed a decision to reduce all calculation factors at the federal level, better to say, in the federal administration, by 30 percent and to additionally reduce the highest salaries in the Federal Government by an additional 10 to 15 percent. To avoid any misunderstandings in your reports and interpretations of my words, I must draw your attention to the fact that the Federal Government has, even so far, been paying out approximately 30 percent lower salaries in comparison to the established calculation factors. Therefore, nobody should conclude that the earnings in the federal administration will be reduced by this amount.

[Nikolic] The Federal Government is preparing a law that will, in a unique way, regulate all the issues regarding the entire state administration. Regarding general economic activity and the increase in production, they concluded that positive trends are taking place. Statistically speaking, the industrial production in May was lower than the month before, however, according to the federal prime minister, positive trends have continued in industry. The energy supply, which has noted an expected drop, has a considerable share in all this. This primarily refers to electrical energy, whose production is matched with the requirements. Excluding the energy industry, the remainder of industry is nevertheless [words indistinct] than in April, Kontic said.

We expect further cuts in the share with which the public expenditure participates in the national product, which has already been brought below 41 percent. Kontic assessed that the budget deficit will also be eliminated by increasing incomes from real sources.

[Kontic] Departing from this, we have drawn up and already agreed a consolidated balance of public expenditure at the level of the country, which involves a certain amount of deficit financing of the budget in July only, however even then exclusively on the basis of foreign currency coverage. The uncovered balance of the federal budget has been reduced to 100 million dinars altogether, while the republics have practically managed to eliminate their budget deficits.

[Nikolic] Prime Minister Kontic informed the reporters that at yesterday's session the Federal Government passed a proposal on the law banning the construction of nuclear power plants on FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] territory. With this, the existing legal provision has been harmonized with the FRY Constitution. The law envisages a ban on the construction of nuclear power plants and a ban on the construction of installations for manufacture of nuclear fuel and processing of exhausted nuclear fuel on FRY territory. [end recording]

Article Views Newly Appointed Diplomats

AU2006164294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14, 15 Jun 94

[Article in two installments by D. Vukovic and S.P. Stamatovic: "Who Are the New Ambassadors?"]

[14 Jun p 12]

[Text] Yugoslav diplomacy is preparing an offensive. This can be deduced from the fact that, several days ago, a new diplomatic corps, composed of new heads of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] missions in a number of foreign capitals, was inaugurated.

When the Federal Government announced this 20 days ago, in a statement issued in the wake of the meeting, it also pointed out that the new Yugoslav diplomatic corps would also include many businessmen, because economic affairs are unquestionably of primary importance. The weekend before last, while introducing the list of new ambassadors to the public, Federal Prime Minister Kontic made a few critical remarks on the behavior of the press, which, he sais, had speculated a lot about the list and spread the conviction that mainly businessmen would be chosen for diplomatic posts. Whether the prime minister had actually overlooked the statement previously made by the Federal Government, or whether he wanted to say something else when the names had already been specified is not quite clear.

Anyway, the list was presented to the public, together with the request of the representatives of the government to journalists that they should not call it the list of ambassadors. The reason is that ambassadors cannot be appointed as long as the sanctions last, so the press should rather refer to the designated people for the posts of heads of missions, or charge d'affairs, and suchlike. That is to say, the list includes people who are professional diplomats, for whom diplomacy is both a vocation and a profession, as well as those who are coming from the public, political, and, in a broader sense, social life.

Ministers and Writers

In this second group, the man with the best social rating in the current circumstances is certainly Danilo Z. Markovic, 61. He should not need any particular introduction to the public, because he earned his good reputation as the minister of education in all governments under Milosevic so far. He is believed to have been the mentor of Mirjana Markovic [Milosevic's wife] when she was working on her graduation exam, after which he became her protegee. He belonged to [Mirjana] Markovic's ideological group at Belgrade University that, actually, prepared the Eighth Session [of the Serbian communists, which launched Milosevic to power], only to make headway in his political career after that. The scientific career of Markovic rests upon a breakthrough to the East. His book, *Sociological Aspects of Work*—which is his expert field of knowledge—was translated only in Moscow and Sofia, under the communist regimes. Is this what makes him qualified to take up the Moscow office? It is quite unlikely that he still has admirers in the Moscow offices from which the state is run. Or, could it be, perhaps, that they are just temporarily absent?

Djoko Stojicic, 58, also has a ministerial pedigree. He is leaving for Prague to replace Stanja Stojanovic, who was Milosevic's right hand man when he was squaring accounts with rivals from the Yugoslav Communist Parties in the former Central Committee of the Association of Communists of Yugoslavia [CKSKY]. Stojanovic spent four lovely and well-deserved years in Prague, where he was so successful that the president of the state in which he served raised a hue and cry against the Serbs. Whether he, as an ambassador, could do anything about it is questionable, but what we have stated here is definitely unquestionable.

In any case, Stojicic is going to face the same from President Vaclav Havel who is ill-disposed toward the Serbs. Just like Havel, Stojicic is also an author, but his literary status is quite unclear, even in Yugoslavia, let alone abroad. His poetry is not so esteemed, yet he is writing and publishing it persistently. Recently, however, in a review of

one of his volumes of contemporary folk poems, which Stojicic collected and brought to light, academician P. Ivic assessed his opus as being equal to the work of Vuk Karadzic [famous 18th century Serbian philologist and linguist].

In terms of politics, Stojicic is also Milosevic's confidant. Before the Eighth Session, he was in a brief dilemma over whether to stay neutral in the conflict, but shortly thereafter he made a decision and joined the right side. Thereafter he edited NIN, managed the Institute for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, and, until recently, he was a minister in [Serbian prime minister] Nikola Sainovic's cabinet. As a young man, he was a leader of the Youth Association for a long time and was also an internationalist for quite long thereafter. Eventually, he gradually began to lean toward the national line. He is quite good at picking lucrative jobs—for many years he was the chairman of Krsmanac [choir and ensemble performing folk songs and dances], which it made possible for him to travel all over the world. Yet, we have to give him credit for initiating a rather respectable festival—the Mokranjac [famous Serbian composer] Festival traditionally held in Negotin.

Many people believe that Veizovic remained in the office of Krajina's foreign minister for such a (relatively) short time, because the assessment of the then Krajina leadership was that he is too soft a Serb. On the eve of one of many negotiating conferences on the Krajina issue (the London conference), Zecevic decided to replace Veizovic with Slobodan Jarcevic, because the prime minister believed that a Krajina native ought to be the leading man of Krajina's diplomatic corps.

It seems that Veizovic was also rated as a soft Serb because of his platform for negotiations in settling the Krajina issue. According to some opinions, his platform, which found support in Vukovar at the time, promoted the confederal option for Croatia and the RSK, although Veizovic himself says: "My platform meant that one can find a solution only through negotiations, while, actually, all the options were being reconsidered at the time as well as any solution based on the Vance plan and equal rights for all the peoples in the former Yugoslavia."

Veizovic, whose current title is "authorized minister of the Federal Foreign Ministry," is now working in the SMIP, or in other words, he is a diplomat in transfer at the moment.

[15 Jun p 12]

Diplomats and Double-Ministers

Among the 11 heads of Yugoslav diplomatic missions who have been recently appointed, five of them are from Montenegro. Two of them, Miodrag Lekic and Zoran Popovic, have already been Yugoslav ambassadors abroad. Dr. David Dasic has also been to a diplomatic mission, but as consul general to New York City. Gojko Dapcevic has been with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs [SMIP] for several years, but was never sent abroad before. We do not know whether the same applies to Ljubo Djukic, longtime SMIP official. The post of the Yugoslav charge d'affairs (to the Austrian capital) has been given to Dobrosav Veizovic, longtime deputy of the Serbian foreign minister and short-time foreign minister in the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Gojko Dapcevic, 56, newly appointed ambassador of the FRY to Kiev, is a famous poet of the mid-generation. He entered the SSIP [former Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, now SMIP] several years ago, changing from the post of the director of the Marxist Center to the Central Committee of the Association of Communists of Montenegro. Those who know him well say that Dapcevic had an eye out for a diplomatic post for the past 20 years, and only now has he got one. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade.

Dr. David Dasic, 54, is the future chief of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission to Brazil. He is an economist by profession. After studying in Belgrade, Dasic remained in the capital for some time to do some scientific work. The leadership of the Association of Communists of Montenegro [SKCG] offered him a job at the time when the chairman of the Central Committee of SKCG was Vojo Srzentic, so Dasic took up the position of executive secretary of the Central Committee. After that, he worked in the [former] Federal Executive Council as an adviser, then he changed over to the SSIP, only to be thereafter appointed Yugoslav consul general to New York City.

The future Yugoslav ambassador to Syria, Zoran Popovic, 45, started his career as journalist in TANJUG. From Cyprus, where he was TANJUG correspondent, he came to Montenegro as reinforcement for the then Radio Titograd. He was editor in chief of Radio Titograd for four years, after which he atayed an additional four years in the capital of Montenegro as the editor of the only Montenegrin daily, POBJEDA. Even then, people were saying that Popovic was not particularly interested in journalism, but rather considered it as a temporary occupation on his way to a diplomatic post. So it was—Popovic went as Yugoslav ambassador to Jordan. His affinity for Arabic countries is logical, since he has a degree in Oriental studies.

Ljubo Djukic, longtime SMIP official, who is now leaving to take up the ambassador post in North Korea, is not so well-known in Podgorica, since he did not perform any political function in Montenegro. This is understandable, because while he was aide and senior at the ministry [not further specified] in Belgrade he was mainly in charge of relations with the Assembly and the government.

According to BORBA's sources, all the future ambassadors on the Montenegrin list meet one of very important preconditions for working in the diplomatic service—they speak at least one foreign language fluently. Except for Lekic, whom we reliably know that he does not belong to any political party, we could not find out if the other four do.

According to well-informed sources, the future Yugoslav charge d'affairs to Austria, Dobrosav Veizovic, 58, is a professional diplomat with appropriate experience, or as he himself says, he is a career diplomat. Veizovic is a Serb from Serbia (he was born in Bajina Basta), rather than one

from Krajina, as he was believed to be earlier because he was the foreign minister in the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] for several months. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy (German literature and the Italian language), he speaks German and Italian, and has some knowledge of Scandinavian languages.

Veizovic acquired his diplomatic experience in the Yugoslav Embassies in Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Cyprus, where he was the chief adviser, and he was also the secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Bern. Since 1964, he has been with the SMIP. What made people remember Veizovic, however, is the two ministerial offices that he held at the same time for several months. From 1991 to 1993, he was the deputy Serbian foreign minister in Vladislav Jovanovic's cabinet (who was also a double minister for a while, republican and federal), while in the course of 1992 he also happened to be the foreign minister of the RSK in Zdravko Zecevic's cabinet.

A Man of Weight

Darko Tanaskovic, 48, the future head of the mission to Turkey, is not only not a professional diplomat, but he also has no political background, as his predecessor does. However, his weight in the eyes of the public is perhaps the greatest among all the newly appointed ambassadors. He taught Islamic studies at Belgrade University for a long time and earned undisputable respect among his colleagues. The son of a general (his father was the commander of the Territorial Defense of Serbia), even as a student Tanaskovic became quite famous for his high marks and knowledge. However, recently, he became involved in social debates in which his attitude, generally well-balanced, assumed a somewhat stronger national color. Possibly, this might be a good enough recommendation for the authorities in Serbia to put him on the list, although it is not the best reference for the country he has been assigned to. In some of his more recent performances, he has not been considerate toward the Muslim cause at all. Some say that this attitude of his was aimed at gaining entry to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Instead of the Academy, Tanaskovic has entered diplomacy.

Among the freshmen in the diplomatic service, there is also Dragoslav Jovanovic, 57, until recently deputy prime minister in Sainovic's cabinet, who has been appointed head of the mission to Brussels. Jovanovic built his career in the SDK [State Taxation Service], where he was director general. At a certain stage, rumors circulated that he would be appointed governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, until the real messiah appeared; namely Dragoslav Avramovic.

Jovanovic was born in "Serbian Kumrovec" [town in Croatia where Tito was born], that is Pozarevac, where he most probably had an opportunity to see and meet the man who makes the decisions on diplomatic careers. In his youth, Jovanovic was active in athletics, he was a sprinter, while later he became an official of the Athletic Association of Serbia.

Zivorad Igic, 52, the future head of the mission to Tirana, was born in Babin Most, near Pristina. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy. He was a journalist, and editor in chief of the informative-political program of Radio Pristina, responsible editor of KOMUNIST, the Kosovo edition, and also the editor in chief of Pristina's daily JEDINSTVO.

Since 1981, he has been writing for many Yugoslav newspapers. He wrote several studies, as well as two books. In 1988, Igic was appointed deputy chairman of the Association of Journalists of Yugoslavia, while his first political function was that of a member of the Council of the Regional Committee of Association of Communists [OKSK] of Pristina in 1989. A month later he was designated a member of the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the Association of Communists [PKSK] of Kosovo, while in December of the same year he was elected chairman of the Socialist Association of Kosovo.

At the inaugural congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] in July 1990, he was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Main Board of the SPS, while three months later he was elected deputy chairman of the Regional SPS Board for Kosovo. In December 1990, he was appointed a delegate to the Serbian Assembly, while in fall 1992 he rose to the function of chairman of the Regional SPS Board for Kosovo. In the same year, he was appointed a delegate to the Council of Citizens at the Yugoslav Assembly, where he clashed with the radicals.

Until 1988, Igic had little social recognition, while, since then, he has been decorated and awarded several times. Among other recognitions, he was awarded the Medal of Work with Silver Wreath, the Svetozar Markovic award, the Award of the Yugoslav Institute for Journalism, and so forth.

Trained in Montenegro

As for the "Montenegrin list," the greatest attention is being paid to Miroslav Lekic, 47, the current foreign minister of Montenegro and future Yugoslav ambassador to Rome. After he finished studying political science in Belgrade, Lekic started his career in his home town of Bar, where he performed many different functions—he was the secretary of the OKSK of Bar, the director of the local cultural center, and the director of Radio Bar. He made a name for himself as a member of the Executive Council of Montenegro, where he was the secretary of the Committee for Education and Culture at the time when the now deceased Vuko Vukadinovic was chairman of the Executive Council. It was the Executive Council that, after the well-known events in October 1988, collectively resigned. That was the first success of the antibureaucratic revolution in Montenegro. Lekic is one of few people from Vukadinovic's team who, after the "Montenegrin January," remained in the newly elected Executive Council, with Radoje Kontic as its chairman. After that Lekic went to the diplomatic service. He was the Yugoslav ambassador to Mozambique, at the same time being in charge of diplomatic relations with Lesotho. Lekic is a well- mannered diplomat who speaks several foreign languages fluently.

Few people know that he is not a member of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, although in the second cabinet of [Prime Minister] Mile Djukanovic he was given a very important ministerial department.

Commentary on Peace Prospects in Bosnia

AU1906164694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 19 Jun 94

[Commentary by Milika Sundic from the "Sunday at Ten" program]

[Text] The current situation on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is actually neither that of war nor peace. The Muslim-Croat coalition is obviously not adhering to the one-month cease-fire agreement that had been reached with many difficulties. There is also a serious danger of what will happen in the days ahead. It is also uncertain as to whether the one-month cease-fire will ensure further negotiations on the settlement of the crisis on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, the most important thing is to preserve peace at any cost. The second most important thing is to invest additional efforts so that the negotiations on the final solution to the crisis can continue.

The most important thing is what the contact group is going to do with the maps, because it is obvious that the latest meeting in London has not resulted in an accord among the countries that are participating in the meeting. There is even a mention of major differences in the views of West Europe and the United States, while not much is known as to what Vitaliy Churkin was promoting at these talks in the contact group.

If one is to judge this according the results of Radovan Karadzic's visit to Moscow, and what [Russian Foreign] Minister Kozyrev said after that visit, one could expect the Russians this time to insist that some vital interests of the Srpska republic be satisfied. This vital interest does not only amount to percentages, that is, to the 49 percent, but to the integrity of the Serbian territory in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without that territorial integrity, the Srpska republic could obviously not accept any agreement, even if this were to the detriment of an agreement for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At this moment all the factors that protect and defend the interests of the Srpska republic and the interests of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must be extremely careful not to find themselves in the situation that could be abused against the Srpska republic—here I, of course, also refer to the republic of Serbian Krajina—as well as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

At this moment it would not be prudent to discuss anything else but focus on the soonest possible establishment of a lasting and just peace. The Srpska republic has obviously been, is, and will be prepared to accept any just peace. On its part, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is ready to accept any agreement that would satisfy the interests of all three sides in the conflict.

However, one should be wary of those forces in the world who obviously do not care for a lasting and stable peace on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. I primarily refer to some West European quarters and the United States, and especially to the Republic of Croatia. A just settlement of the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is obviously not in its interest as it expects that further complications in the crisis there would help Croatia to achieve some of its aims vis-a-vis the republic of Serbian Krajina.

I do not know whether the international community is sufficiently ready and able to realize the essence of the current crisis, but one thing is clear: If the United States and the European Union cared for a lasting and stable peace, that peace could be established as early as tomorrow. They must exert additional pressure on the Muslim-Croat coalition to accept peace. Contentious issues can be discussed and negotiated until a lasting and stable solution has been found.

Therefore, the situation is extremely uncertain. The greatest danger comes from the uncertainly of what the maps will look like. This time I believe Russia will finally realize all the behind-the-scenes activities of the United States, Germany, and some other member countries of the European Union aimed at granting the Muslim-Croat coalition something that does not belong to them, to the detriment of the Srpska republic and thus to the detriment of the Serbian people and the Serbian lands as a whole.

Serbia

Sanctions Cause Decline in Shipbuilding

LD2006160094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1426 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, June 20 (TANJUG)—Serbia's riverboat shipyards are operating at barely one-fifth capacity because of the two-year-old economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. According to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, work at 10 shipyards in Serbia has ceased, resulting in lost revenues of about 150 million German marks. The chamber said Monday that the 6,000 employees in the shipbuilding sector could build about 300 million German marks worth of ships a year, providing work for another 150,000 workers in industries ranging from the iron and steel to electrical sectors. The chamber group dealing with shipbuilding has announced plans for constructing a new river fleet over the next several years. The government will put up 40 percent of the funds, with rest coming from shipyards, customers and banks.

Before the imposition of the UN sanctions, Yugoslav shipyards spent about 80 percent of their time on production for export, with many Yugoslavs working overseas on such ships. The chamber group said that today, most Yugoslav ships that had been based abroad are moored in dock, where they are steadily decaying and have lost their navigation permits. According to the Jugoregistra register

of shipping, only 360 of a total of 906 Yugoslav vessels still hold valid permits. Serbia previously had one of the largest fleets on the Danube.

Kosovo

Rugova Views Kosovo Issue, Options

AU2006195894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1700 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Interview with Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, by reporter Bujar Muharremi in the Albanian Television studio—live]

[Text] [Muharremi] Dear viewers; I greet you from the studio of the satellite program and invite you to view a conversation with president of the republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, who is our guest tonight.

Mr. Chairman, it has been several months since our last conversation and I think there have been many problems that have given rise to this conversation, considering also the fact that you are continuing contacts at the highest level in Europe regarding the Kosova issue.

I would like to greet our television viewers wherever they may be, in Albania, Kosova, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and in all other countries where they are temporarily working and living.

I would like to inform you, dear viewers, that in our conversation with Chairman Rugova, you will have the possibility to call us directly on numbers 426-08 and 425-01.

Mr. Chairman, I greet you and thank you for taking part in our satellite program.

[Rugova] Allow me to thank you for this invitation to talk again. As you noted, there have been many problems and there still are. However, we should maintain our work consistently, consider the situation first in Kosova and then in Albanian areas and, of course, establish contacts with the world, our friends, and foster contacts and sympathy. This is our every-day job and we should do it.

[Muharremi] Mr. Chairman, I believe we can start our conversation today with your recent visit, your last diplomatic tour to several European countries. As we reported on our satellite program, you recently paid an official visit to Denmark, then stopped over in Norway, and then went again to Germany. Your last stop was in France. Of course, Mr. President, it is observed that your contacts reach top official spheres. For example, in Denmark you met Prime Minister Rasmussen and Foreign Minister Petersen. Are these meetings a sign of the seriousness of the Kosova issue and the increasing interest of European diplomacy?

[Rugova] I can say that it was really a cycle of visits or a small tour in several European countries starting, as you stressed, from Denmark. What was most important was the visit to the North Atlantic Assembly, to which we were invited. The talks we held there and our presentations were very successful and important. I can say that the entire visit in general was very successful and very productive. At the same time, I do agree with you, because this illustrates the seriousness of the issue and raises the Kosova issue to the level of the official and state diplomatic circles of the European countries. I can say that we received not only understanding, but also support from these countries. These countries are very important not only in the European Union, but also in the Atlantic Pact.

After these official contacts, I can say that, fortunately, we have made many friends who, during these years, have visited and helped Kosova—friends who have been to Albania and have helped Albania. I want to say that we have maintained contact with them, as a popular saying goes: It is easy to make friends, but it is difficult to keep them. We should keep these friends and establish regular contacts in the future.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, could you describe some of the main issues you raised during your last European tour?

[Rugova] We discussed the situation in Kosova, which is always dangerous and tense. It is a situation of repression, violence, and discrimination, or apartheid, as is said in Europe nowadays. Secondly, we discussed the question of our political plans—the plan for Kosova, for the political solution of the Kosova question. As you know, our political plan is for an independent and neutral Kosova, open to Serbia and Albania. As a preventive measure, we have requested a larger international presence and protection for Kosova, as well as a protectorate or civil administration as a transitional or temporary stage for Kosova, in which life would be normalized and institutions would function. We could then talk about the status and future of Kosova. I hope that one day the Serbs will change their viewpoints.

[Muharremi] Mr. Chairman, in an interview for Deutsche Welle during your stay in Germany, you stressed that you favor the option of the independence of Kosova. You also stressed that an international civil protectorate would be a transitional stage. How were these alternatives you presented received by your main interlocutors?

[Rugova] I can say that there is understanding for the plan and the viewpoint on the independence of Kosova, because this is a result of the referendum we held in 1991, just like the other peoples in the former Yugoslavia, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosniaks, and so forth. The other question, i.e. of an administration or civil protectorate, is being carefully considered. Of course, contacts and work are needed for this, as well as pressure on the Serbian side to accept such a thing.

I can also say that there are different views on the solution of the situation in Kosova. However, these two topics are very serious and should be carefully examined.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, you mentioned at the beginning of the conversation that you visited Germany. On this occasion, you had contacts with State Minister Helmut Schaefer, Bundestag Foreign Policy Chairman Mr. Stercken, as well as other high-level representatives of the

German Government. To what extent is the question of Kosova known and supported in Germany?

[Rugova] I can say that Germany is one of the first countries to have shown interest in the Kosova situation and it has done so for many years. Traditionally, it knows the Kosova issue quite well and has so far supported it. We hope that Germany will be more active, particularly now that it will be taking over the European Union [EU] Presidency from 1 July. Then after six months, France will assume it. During this stage, the German side promises to be more committed to resolving the Kosova issue.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, I think that another question that would be of interest is this: In all these meetings and political and diplomatic contacts you have had, how much is the role and weight of the Albanian democratic state, and the figure of President Berisha, felt in resolving the Kosova issue and the national question?

[Rugova] I can say that after 50 years, it is our good fortune to have started to have contacts and to cooperate. I can say that the role of the democratic power in Albania, President Berisha, and the government is very great. Today, this role is important as Albania is entering international institutions and organizations and represents and puts forward our demands as well. Albania's support is invaluable and should continue in this direction.

[Muharremi] Do you think that we have reached this stage, i.e. a pan-Albanian global policy?

[Rugova] I think so. We have taken the first steps and now, we are consolidating this policy. It is good that we have managed to start a common policy, an Albanian global policy regarding all topics and problems.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, it is clear that European policy in general, from the lowest levels up to the highest circles, manifests an evident concern and predisposition to resolve the Kosova issue. Of course, in this framework Belgrade's and Athens' positions seem to be out of tune. I would like to stress here the Greek Government's position regarding your participation in the North Atlantic Assembly proceedings. The Greek Government considered it an act that runs counter to the Atlantic Pact goals and impairs stability in the Balkans. Please, Mr. President, what did you say in the meeting in Oslo?

[Rugova] Unfortunately, there was some reaction from Greece, and perhaps Serbia. I would also like to say that a German lady chairing the Committee of Civil Affairs said that even the Greek delegation had agreed on my presence there. Regarding the remarks and accusations that are circulating, they have no basis and justification, as I presented the situation in Kosova, our political plans, and the question of a political solution for Kosova. These met with great understanding both in the Civil and Political Affairs Committees. The success is important. Of course, there will always be rumors and charges.

[Muharremi] What about the position of the Serbian Government, considering the kind of official reaction it maintained toward the German Government? Of course, the German Government gave its answer—Rugova is the highest representative elected by free elections in a region inhabited mainly by the Albanians of Kosova. How do you assess the German Government's reaction in this case?

[Rugova] I consider it remarkably positive. I am used to these reactions by the Serbian Government, with various attacks and threats. That is why this is a sign of the nervousness of that regime, which wants to isolate the Albanians more. That is why the German Government accepts the legitimacy of the Albanian representatives elected by free votes in the elections of two years ago.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, do you think that these stances maintained by the Greek and Serbian Governments in the context of the events occurring in the region and the Balkans, and particularly in the south, toward which Greece is presenting a pretentious policy, are casual combinations or a fruit of old relations in the Belgrade-Athens axis?

[Rugova] Unfortunately, some of our neighbors have always worked in this way. We can consider this as either cooperation or coincidence. However, we request from the Greek Government that it be more tolerant, examine questions calmly, and cultivate good neighborliness with Albania and Albanians in general, as we are one factor in the Balkans.

Regarding the Serbian side, it is known that today it rules Kosova by force. We are making efforts to find a political solution to the Kosova issue.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, the ministerial meeting of nonaligned countries was recently held in Cairo. You sent a letter, a kind of message, to the leaders at the meeting. Of course, foreign policy analysts noted the fact that Serbia had not been invited to this nonaligned meeting, while it is well known that for decades the former Yugoslavia was, as it were, a country that relied on the nonaligned countries. Do you think that this is a strong position, a reaction of the nonaligned toward the current Serbian policy of violence and repression?

[Rugova] As you know, the nonaligned movement flourished in the sixties and seventies. By the eighties it had begun to weaken. The former Yugoslavia was a major country in the movement and one of its founders. Of course, nowadays when new states have emerged and are emerging from the former Yugoslavia, they cannot accept Serbia, which is employing violence and declaring war on other people and former regions. That is why it was a good move that the Kosova issue was included as one of the topics even in this conference. It was a good gesture for the Kosova issue and that of Albanians in general.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, a new element of the Kosova situation is, of course, the demand now being put forward by both political and state figures and the media for a dialogue between Serbia and the legitimate leadership of the Albanian people of Kosova. Do you think that Serbia is ready for a constructive dialogue with Kosovar personalities?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, there is a great effort being made by the international community, many European countries, and the United States to find possibilities for any dialogue in various negotiations. From the start, we have been for dialogue and for holding talks. So far the Serbian side has not shown any sign that it is ready to talk. We request that these talks be held under some supervision or in the presence of a third party. That is why there is the readiness at the international level to start something. As you know, two years ago we held talks in the framework of the Geneva Conference on several specific issues, but they yielded no results. Nevertheless, it is necessary to hold talks.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, there are rumors that Serbia has started a dialogue with separate individuals. Is this true, and do these individuals enjoy the mandate of the Albanian people of Kosova?

[Rugova] As you know, there have been contacts with several parties of the Serbian opposition by some of our small parties. Then, there have been contacts between Albanian and Serbian intellectual groups. Meanwhile, it is known that individuals can contact each other, no one can prevent them from doing so. However, it is also known who has the mandate—the elected organs of Kosova. The various contacts that may have been established are matters that are up to the individuals themselves.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, I have another question for you. Some time ago you spoke about—and it is precisely the topic we are discussing right now—the need for dialogue with Serbia. This is, of course, much spoken about and President Berisha stressed it during his last visit to Romania, about the need for a dialogue with the legitimate leaders of the Albanian people of Kosova in the presence of a third party. Please, who is or could this third party be?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, for the moment, the definition of the third party is still.... As a side, we can say it should be oneof the international or European institutions. As you observe, the European Union, the United States, and Russia have committed themselves to the questions in former Yugoslavia. I think that in this connection a third party will be found for us to supervise the talks under the auspices of the United Nations.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another issue that I think is of interest and worth addressing in this conversation is the fact that much is spoken today, both in the international and Albanian media, about peaceful resistance having always been your political credo. This is and has always been highly valued in the world. Here I would like to remind you that U.S. Vice President Al Gore, who has praised your peaceful policy, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in his last interview with the ZERI newspaper, and Mr. Peter Albright, the U.S. ambassador in Zagreb, considered you the Albanian Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King. Are you convinced that this is the way to avoid conflict and bloodshed in Kosova?

[Rugova] By all means. This is the way to avoid it. So far we have managed, fortunately with the understanding of the entire people, to escape a conflict, because as you know we have no protection in Kosova. Since 1991, we have been left with no protection in Kosova. Then, considerations about our movement and the resistance of the Kosovar people are in fact qualifications that allow the international and the Albanian question to be regarded as a stabilizing and peaceful factor in the Balkans and Europe. We have managed this through this movement, which is both a need and our choice. It is a need because we did not and do not want to move toward a catastrophe and a tragedy. It is our choice because, in this way, we have affirmed ourselves as a nation, as good-tempered people with high human qualities and with a resistance that will unfailingly yield its own results.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, during your visit to the countries we mentioned, you stopped over in France, where you had contacts with several French political figures. You met Michel Rocard, chairman of the French Socialist Party, and Alain Lamassoure, French minister for European Affairs. Can you please tell us what were the problems you discussed with them and what was their position on the Kosova issue?

[Rugova] Regarding these contacts, we have maintained several contacts with other French parties, and now with the Socialist Party at the highest level. As you know, the French Socialist Party has supported our issue many times. We discussed with Mr. Lamassoure the situation in Kosova and possibilities for a dialogue to resolve the Kosova issue. I can say that these are, more or less, regular contacts that we have established with France, the French Government, and French institutions.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, in this case, of course, it would be permissible to mention here in this live conversation your latest book, presented on the occasion of your visit to France, titled: The Kosovo Issue—Ibrahim Rugova—The Kosovo Issue [as heard].

Mr. President, of course, the book embodies a part of your political opinions, a part of your attitudes, and your political and diplomatic activity so far. Can you please tell us how was the presentation of this book, which has political importance for the Kosova issue, assessed by the French intellectuals and the entire public?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, it was a special pleasure to present this book in the framework of my visit there. The book was prepared on the initiative of the Paris-based Committee for Kosova by Mrs. (Marie Francoise Allain and Xavier Galmichte), who compiled this book and worked a lot on it. They insisted that we should work together because, as you know, given the difficulty of movement, it is very difficult to enter and leave Kosova. They really managed to write a very good book, a book with interviews and long conversations, which present the question of Kosova and other historical and judicial problems in Kosova, i.e. what happened with the Albanians in a retrospective way. The book has an introduction by our well-known writer Ismail Kadare. It is important that in Paris, where we are not very well represented with literature, a well-known publisher like Fayard is publishing such a book at this time. It is a readable book, more a story with

a historical, scientific, and political content than a discourse. I think that for the general public, considering the assessments given in Paris, the book would be very acceptable and popular for the Kosova issue and the Albanian cause in general, as I do not have time now to write books.

[Muharremi] Of course. Meanwhile, while we have been talking, we have received many phone calls from our brothers of the diaspora. First, a group of citizens from Switzerland wants to greet you personally on your productive work in the interest of the Albanian people and Kosova.

[Rugova] Thank you and we greet them together from your studio.

[Muharremi] Eva Konini, a citizen from Tirana, asks: What prospects lie in store for Kosova?

[Rugova] Everyone is aware of the situation there and you know that it is grave. However, I think that Kosova has very good prospects, as it possesses economic potential, rich natural resources, as well as, like all Albanian areas, a human potential, a new, active, and cultured population, 90 percent of which is educated. We also have an economy, though it is presently not functioning—Kosova's economy was destroyed by the Serbian regime—and this is a good basis for future development.

[Muharremi] Mr. President....

[Rugova] And of course, an open and not a closed Kosova. I always say this.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, here is another question: What is your opinion on the chances of parallel power in Kosova?

[Rugova] Ours is a legal power and the only power, but we are presently occupied. There is an installed Serb power, which is rudimentary. Our power there functions, as you know, in the school system, a system of solidarity to survive and organize our life, and this has surprised the world. That is why people are supporting us in this organized and very rational resistance.

[Muharremi] Another question, Mr. President, comes from Switzerland this time. Will the government be completed?

[Rugova] I have warned for a completion of the government and it will be done, but carefully and it will take time. As you know, a part of the government we had and we still have is in Kosova and a part abroad, for reasons that are known, as the government was not able to act several years ago. The government has performed and is performing many important tasks and, of course, through the strong cooperation we have with each other, with all Kosovar institutions, the government, and outside organizations.

[Muharremi] Another question comes from a viewer from Switzerland, who poses this question. Of course, he has in mind problems that have to do with Kosovar youths who are refugees in Switzerland and the efforts to prolong the stay of the youths there. This viewer asks: How do you foresee the solution to the question of the youths after their return from Sweden?

[Rugova] This depends whether he is talking about the people living there or not. Sweden has made efforts to return all our citizens there, but it has run into obstacles on the part of Serbia. We have asked that these youths be granted temporary residence. Many European countries have agreed to grant this status to these youths. In this situation, we can provide the youths with some vacancies, find some positions in our present system, such as in the university, the small private economy that the Albanians have. And of course, under these grave circumstances, we will leave no one to die of hunger.

[Muharremi] Another question....

[Rugova] Of course, if we think of tomorrow, that's another question.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another question for you is this: What is your comment on the visit of an Albanian Socialist Party leader to Greece?

[Rugova] It is true that parties and groups have the right to establish contacts. However, it should of course be known, direct information is needed, or a report by the state where the political parties or various associations are acting, because we often talk about the national question, but the national question is very concrete. We have a consensus, an Albanian global policy. That is why it would be better if all parties and groups were to remain loyal to this consensus, not to put it in stronger words, to be loyal to an official policy. However, contacts with good intentions, without inferiority, are important and should be developed.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another question comes from Tirana: What are your relations as president with the intellectual Rexhep Qosja?

[Rugova] They are very good. As you know, Rexhep Qosja is one of our renowned intellectuals. He has not entered any political organizations or parties. He is the leader of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals. He has contributed with his writings and presentations and there are no misunderstandings or disagreement. He performs his job, and of course; I, as president, carry out my job, too.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another question seems to be related to Belgrade preparations to appoint a new ambassador in Tirana. It looks as if it is going to be Zivorad Igic. The question is: What is president Rugova's opinion about the appointment of this Belgrade ambassador in Tirana?

[Rugova] I heard recently that he will be appointed here as ambassador. As you know, for years he has been the chief of the Socialist Party for Kosova, as there is not one of Kosova, but for Kosova. Unfortunately, he has largely contributed to the repressive situation prevailing in Kosova now. I think that this option should be reconsidered, whether Belgrade has decided to send him or not. Of course, Kosova has its own representation in Tirana and other countries. However, such people do not deserve to represent anyone.

[Muharremi] Our pan-Albanian public has continuously shown interest in the contribution and role of Kosovar

intellectuals in the present processes in Kosova. Precisely that is the content of another question addressed to you.

[Rugova] To tell the truth, Kosovar intellectuals have shown great commitment and, with the foundation of our parallel institutions and political parties, many of them have become members of political parties, elected deputies of the Kosova Assembly, members of various associations and the university. Their role is very great, of course including here the youngest intellectuals, as they keep the university and various institutions going. Under this grave and difficult situation, they, nevertheless, contribute a lot.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, the next question comes from Germany. Islam Kamberi puts this question to you: When is the Kosova parliament expected to convene?

[Rugova] We have so far postponed the meeting of the parliament, so as not to provoke any conflict. We can hold this meeting, I am not giving any time here, but we should be careful. It is important that parliamentarians are in Kosova, elections have been held, and several parliamentary groups are working. Some commissions of the parliament have started to work on the basis of the present situation. As you know, under such conditions, a parliament finds it difficult to conduct normal activity. Anyway, we will see our way to performing this job. However, a part of the parliament is working and functioning.

[Muharremi] A question from Zurich, Mr. President. Now, this question has to do with the present situation of the political parties and the Albanians in Macedonia. How do you see this situation developing?

[Rugova] You know what happened with the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] there. I think that there is now a kind of lull and we should make efforts so that all parties can consolidate, be they large or small. However, a means of cooperation, a council, or something should be found for the PDP, as they should definitely be more individual. In the case of the present census, all the Albanian forces there should be organized. Elections in Macedonia will be held in the future, too. That is why we should make common efforts to consolidate the political organization of the Albanians there.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, recently as well as before, Serbia has concocted several trumped-up political trials in various main cities in Kosova. With these trials, Serbia attempts to accuse the Albanians of Kosova that they are being prepared for terrorism, to bear arms, up to the point of charging them with being trained in special camps in Albania, and so forth. Are these activities of the present Serbian policy an aggravation and an escalation of the violence and terror against the Albanians in Kosova, as well as an attempt to attribute to the personalities and the political leadership of the Albanians in Kosova the role of a destructive force, and not of a force that aspires for dialogue and agrees to discuss at the table of bilateral negotiations?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, this is an old song being sung to us. Thus, always with charges against Albanians, they have created that myth on the armed Albanians, and so forth. For a year now, as you know, there has been widespread imprisonment of various groups and the majority have been convicted from one to 15 years of jail. These are simply trumped-up political trials to discredit our present policy, weaken the political position of the Kosova leadership, and of course, increase the degree of violence and repression. This is their main aim. As you know, no weapons or anything else have been found on those people who were imprisoned. They have taken people from their homes. Anyway, these are all fabrications so as to intensify the violence and repression and politically discredit the Albanian policy and leadership in general.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, we mentioned before....

[Rugova] When Germany wanted to repatriate refugees, the Serbs said that they were trained there and they continued training. These are fabrications aimed at discrediting the Albanian policy.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, I would like to pick out a part of the interview that German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel gave to the ZERI newspaper. Mr. Kinkel stresses that the Serbs cannot refuse to the Albanians of Kosova what they request themselves for the Serbian communities in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia. How do you assess this statement from the chief of the German diplomacy?

[Rugova] This is an interesting opinion. However, as you know the Serbs and their regime have always acted with double standards. In Bosnia and Croatia they have requested their ethnic rights, as they have people there. Then they brought this about through violence and force. Meanwhile, the Serb regime refuses the Albanians the right to self-determination, the right of independence. Regarding Kosova, they always call upon a certain historic right, which no longer holds water in the modern, contemporary world. Of course, much would depend on the solutions in Bosnia.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, the next question comes from Germany from Nazif Bilalli. He addresses this question to you: Do you assess as positive the last visit of the delegation of the Republic of Montenegro in Tirana?

[Rugova] These are normal contacts that Albania maintains and will maintain with neighboring countries. As you know, last year the president of Montenegro paid a visit, then the foreign minister, and now the prime minister. These are positive steps of contacts, recognition, and cooperation. Thus, nothing bad comes out of these contacts. It is known that Albania has its own positions and policy and should cooperate with the others.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, in continuation of our conversation, regarding your visit to Denmark, the Danish newspaper DETFRI ACTUELLE cites you stating that "President Rugova declared: We have asked that the question of Kosova be treated in the framework of the global examination of problems in former Yugoslavia." What is the stance of the European diplomatic circles regarding this fair demand of yours?

[Rugova] Besides what I said and we discussed at the beginning, we have always requested that the question of Kosova be put forward in the global solution to former Yugoslavia, so that Kosova would be a direct representative in any possible conference that will be held. Then comes the question of sanctions, and I can say that there is understanding and promises that Kosova will anyway be included as a partner in possible talks on the global solutions for former Yugoslavia. I can affirm that there exist such a disposition not only in the countries we visited, but in other countries as well.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, in a conversation such as this, it is routine to ask you about the activity carried out by the government of Kosova. Of course, it is known that the Kosova government is regularly active in educational and health matters, in economic organization, as well as in slowly creating state structures. How do you assess this activity bearing in mind that it has to work under all these extremely difficult conditions?

[Rugova] They pertain to our entire organization and the government, that is, the part that is abroad and that at home, and to political parties, as we are in a situation in which our organs are functioning in Kosova under difficult conditions. For example, I can mention here the Democratic Alliance, which has a very good organization, various associations, other parties, institutions or local governments that we have, which are being strengthened every day. We can also point out the creation of several economic institutions, such as the Chamber of Commerce set up some time ago, then the organization of the economic and everyday life in Kosova.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, there is a question from Sweden from Haxhi Osmanaj. In this framework, he would like to ask you for a certain assessment of the mass media. He says: How does president Rugova assess the work of the RILINDJA newspaper?

[Rugova] RILINDJA is for the moment published in Tirana and Switzerland. There is a RILINDJA in Kosova, as well as BUJKU. We assess this very positively and RILINDJA has contributed a lot in informing the public at home and abroad. It is a serious newspaper and has contributed a lot. Its publication in Switzerland was an important step in keeping RILINDJA alive and preventing it from being extinguished. At the same time, it informed our public and people abroad that stability in information and in the information culture is being created in the West.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, Kadri Berisha from Switzerland asks you: What contacts does president Rugova have with Mr. Adem Demaci?

[Rugova] We have good contacts. As you know, Mr. Demaci is chairman of the Human Rights Council in Kosova, a very important association that is performing a great job. Then, the authority of Mr. Demaci helps us all, particularly his work during the recent years in Kosova. I can say he is not only a symbol of resistance, but he works and is in the framework of our resistance.

[Muharremi] Let us come to a question I addressed to you before through a viewer regarding the movements of young Kosovars from Kosova. This viewer from Germany asks: Is this movement, this departure of the youth from Kosova, proper?

[Rugova] It is not that we are trying to find arguments, but we should understand this on the basis of the entire situation in the former Yugoslavia. You know what happened with the refugees from the war front in Bosnia and Croatia. Then from the front of violence present in Kosova, which started first in 1981, and particularly in 1989-90, young people have left, particularly for refusing to join the Serbian military service, deserters starting from Slovenia up to Bosnia. Regarding this exodus, the situation is such that we have requested their temporary asylum and have been trying to help them as much as we can. Meanwhile, I can say that recently there has been less movement, because many European countries have established their system of visas and various actions. However, on the basis of the present situation, this is important as people are alive and they will move and come back.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another question comes from Ejup Gashi in Norway. He asks you: How does president Rugova assess the Norwegian foreign policy on the option of a peaceful solution in Kosova?

[Rugova] Very positively. We have had contacts with Norway before. Like all other Scandinavian countries, this has always been the case in Kosova. We have had contacts with various delegations, associations, and the government. Even this time, we reached a very good understanding on the question of Kosova and its solution. We also consider the assistance that Norway is granting us through various aid and with the temporary shelter of our refugees, who were settled in many places there and have began to be integrated, in the positive sense, until possibilities are created in Kosovo.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another question for you: A television viewer from Korce asks: Do you see the fight of the Albanian people in Kosova as a peaceful passive resistance or as a peaceful active stand?

[Rugova] To be frank, this is not as completely passive as is thought, because the people there are sacrificing their work and their lives. As you know, all this violence and repression goes as far as murder. That is why this is an active resistance and a resistance praised by the world. If other demonstrations may be called active resistance, we have also tried them several times, as you know. However, there is great danger as the large troop presence there presents a potential threat, because things may take another direction, which we would not want.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, a student from Tirana wants to know your opinion: Is it possible that the question of Kosova can be won through diplomatic contacts alone?

[Rugova] This cannot be done through diplomatic contacts, because as you know, there has been... Of course, we are a state and we have a policy. There are criticisms, opinions,

and different viewpoints. The diplomatic contacts are necessary and important. We are on the road to success through the organization we have established in Kosova, through the resistance of the people, because the people are not asleep there, as sometimes may be thought in a simplistic way. However, we, and Albania too, should strengthen contacts and friendships. As I said before, the contacts that Albania, President Berisha, and the government have established today, as well as those of Kosova, are very important; as the saying of our people goes: A house cannot be kept without friends. Then there are international factors that have often supported us. That is why we should be ready and cooperate with them.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, a viewer from Shkoder comes back to the idea of dialogue. He asks: Do the conditions and possibilities exist for the development and start of an unconditioned dialogue between the two sides at the present moment?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, we have not set many conditions, because you know that such a dialogue would be unequal given the violence and total insecurity in Kosova. However, we should talk and, I repeat again, there have been no official indications of talks so far, but, anyway, we should talk.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, a viewer from Switzerland has posed this question: Which international factors, so to say, are supporting and assisting the solution to the Kosova issue?

[Rugova] Now, how to consider what these international factors are? There are special places and factors—such as the international community, the European Union, the United States—that have reached understanding and address and assist the question of Kosova. This is the international factor and, of course, depends... as well as certain countries that we have mentioned during our talk that assist the question of Kosova.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, Hysni Sopaj from Split asks: Does president Rugova foresee paying a working visit to Croatia and Slovenia to discuss the position of Albanians in these two countries?

[Rugova] I went to Slovenia some time ago. Now we will see with Croatia, as we have better relations, more or less. As you know, Albania has made contact with these two countries and has established good relations. This helps, but we will do our utmost in Kosova to organize a visit to Croatia soon. The predisposition exists, but you know the difficulty of these contacts, which were interrupted a year ago.

[Muharremi] A viewer from Switzerland wants to know your opinion: How does president Rugova comment on the threats of Arkan [Zeljko Raznjatovic, leader of the Serb Unity Party, SSJ; head of the Serbian Volunteer Guards, SDG] and Seselj [Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement, SPO] regarding the eviction of Albanians from their ancient territories in Kosova?

[Rugova] These are continuous threats. We have become used to them. However, their ill-omened dream of evicting Albanians, suspending political parties, and exterminating Albanian leaders will not come true. In short, their dreams and demands will not be realized. As you know, this is a bad myth that has been inherited over several years or decades.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another television viewer, this time from Tirana, wants to know whether all the political factors in Kosova are in accord with president Rugova's stances or not?

[Rugova] All the political factors are of the same opinion. As you know, we have five parties in the parliament of Kosova, as well as the Coordinating Council of the Albanian Political Parties. We have reached consensus on the independence of Kosova on the basis of a referendum, the people's will, and of course, the demands put forward in our political project on the situation and organization in Kosova. Of course, the president consults these parties and is obliged, even by the Constitution, to listen to the parties, groups, parliament, and so forth.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, Nazmi Ramadani from Berlin has posed this question: Will our Berlin Wall be removed without war, as was the original wall in Berlin?

[Rugova] I hope yes and, not to answer so shortly, I can say we are working on it, the Albanian people in general are working.

[Muharremi] Ferit Ejupi from Switzerland asks: Why does a part of the government of the republic of Kosova act in Kosova while the other part acts outside Kosova?

[Rugova] In short, it is because of the current conditions. In 1991, when we founded this provisional coalition government, it was necessary for some government members to go abroad as they may have been arrested and their activity suspended. As you know, before this government, we had another government that emerged from the other parliament. We have also accepted the legitimacy of that government, while this is a coalition government. There is nothing bad here if opinions are expressed, whether it should be in Kosova, or wherever. However, we should be prudent regarding this.

After the 1992 elections, the situation changed. The president is in Kosova, as well as a part of the government. It is important that they function where, and how, we can see it.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, we have another question from Germany, which, I think, is seemingly related with the statement of Douglas Hogg in Prishtina. The viewer has posed this question: What is president Rugova's opinion on Bosnia's division and the problem of Kosova, as part of the former Yugoslav Federation?

[Rugova] Now, regarding the question of Bosnia, this has been accepted as a state, but the situation in the field has urged immediate efforts, such as the ethnic division, and so forth. This situation will depend a lot on the efforts to

create a Muslim-Croat federation, headed by a confederation or something else. The Serbian side is abstaining from this.

Regarding the question of Kosova, it is known that we are committed to its independence and neutrality. We have also said that all the Albanian political parties in Kosova have reached consensus, and if there are changes to the internal borders of the former Yugoslavia, they will naturally be valid for the Albanians, too.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, another question comes from Switzerland: Do you think that the discriminating policy against the Albanians in Macedonia will change?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, the Albanians there have contributed a lot to the stability of that republic by being members of the parliament, participating in the government, and having a political organization. The Macedonian Government and the other institutions should be more active in fulfilling the demands of the Albanians, incorporating their institutions, schools, and faculties, and following a more active policy. I hope that this policy will be more active in the future and, of course, the Albanians will be better organized on the political, administrative, and judicial levels in Macedonia, because there is the potential, but we should be ready to find agreement and understanding.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, it seems from the telephone calls that there are many questions from the television viewers. Anyway, because of the limited time, of course, I would like to ask you two more questions before closing our live conversation on our satellite program.

Several months ago, the television started satellite broadcasting. Considering the contacts you have had and your assessments of the pan-Albanian general opinion, is the value of this satellite program appreciated properly—not only in the sense of moral support, but also regarding the material and financial support to continue this program and particularly to expand it, so that this program reaches new dimensions of pan-national importance?

[Rugova] To tell the truth, several months ago, when we talked together, it was the start of this program, which is something very important and a great achievement. Of course, we should now make all possible efforts, with a better organization of the diaspora and with our people, be it with the government, the Democratic Alliance—which is very well organized abroad—with clubs, and with various associations, so that the launch of this television is assisted, because without such a studio today, our people, our nation would be more divided. We should do our utmost to keep it. I am not making any appeal to our citizens abroad, but we should work to realize this and keep this studio. And God willing, tomorrow we will have more. Anyway, we should be organized and carry out these obligations and duties, because we need it, above all, as it is in Albanian.

[Muharremi] Mr. President, the last question, in closing this conversation. As is known, we are on the eve of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the June democratic revolution. Do you see parallels today with this important event in our national history?

[Rugova] I stayed here for these days in order to be present at this great, important celebration of our renowned figure, Fan Noli, who, throughout his life, worked in politics and fought for the realization of the national rights of Albanians. I can say that a parallel can be drawn regarding the democratic ideas and the democratic progress. Albanians today are different from the Albanians of the Twenties, fortunately, and it is easier to accomplish the mechanism of democracy and the national interests. Once again I want to show my great respect and great thanks to our great Noli, as they say. At the same time, this is a good opportunity for Albania to celebrate this important moment.

[Muharremi] Mr. President....

[Rugova] And we should continue this.

[Muharremi] In closing, I want to thank you for this very friendly conversation, hoping that through this talk we provided the pan-national broad public with ample information on the main problems that worry us today. I would also like to send thanks to all the television viewers who watched our broadcast and greetings from the staff of the Radio Television and the Satellite Program, hoping that you will come to our studio again. Thank you once again.

[Rugova] Thank you. Warm greetings to all. You are welcome to come to Prishtina soon.

Serbs Accused of Monitoring Albanian Birth Rate

AU1906201194 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT Nr 380 in English 17 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Natality in Kosova Under the Target of Serbian Regime"—issued by the Democratic League of Kosovo]

[Text] In spite of continued discrimination exercised by Serbian regime in the Kosova health system in order to reach "demographic equilibrium" Serbian doctors have recently publicly declared that they were not satisfied with the last three years achievements.

In order to gain in political life, Serb doctors call on Milosevic administration to radicalize their policy towards preventing the natality of Albanians.

Alexander Andrijevic, installed director of the maternity ward in the Clinic in Prishtina, told Serb-run Prishtina Television, that besides the measures taken up to date, "births for the Republic of Kosova continue and there is no sign that the rate of birth among the primitive world of Albanians will drop."

Recent public declarations of Andrijevic finally reveal their clear political intentions. He was determined to "stop this flow of babies," even if he must commit crimes. The project in which Andrijevic is engaged intends to control the birth rate by deciding how many babies should live and how many should die, how many Albanian women should undergo surgery in order to eliminate their uterus, etc. Yet,

in order to reach some results, Andrijevic requires the assistance of Serbian administration, ends an article published by today's Prishtina-based BUJKU.

Trial of Ethnic Albanians Opens in Prishtina

LD2006164094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 20 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Pristina, 20 Jun (TANJUG)—The trial of 14 ethnic Albanians charged with setting up "the defense ministry of the Kosovo republic" and municipal "military headquarters in Kosovo and Metohija," which has been adjourned several times, began in Pristina today.

Hazer Hajzeraj, who, according to the indictment, was "the minister" in "the ministry," was heard first before the court council. Hajzeraj, who had for a long time been deputy defense secretary and the commander of the civil defense in the Kosovo province, did not admit to being the minister, claiming that he had never organized "a defense ministry" or any similar association. He confirmed that he had had contacts with Fehmi Agani and Anton Koljaj, the leaders of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], but he justified this by saying that the meetings had been "informal and not specially organized" and that they had simply exchanged opinions on the situation in Kosovo.

He also said that he had not advocated the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia, explaining that the "autonomy of Kosovo" was his position.

"I am aware that there is already one army in Kosovo and that there is no room for two armies here", Hajzeraj said.

Asked by the prosecutor to explain his contacts and meetings with the self-declared Kosovo prime minister in exile, Bujar Bukosi, Hajzeraj admitted that they had met three times in Albania and Germany. They discussed, as he said, "only how to protect the population and property."

He gave a similar explanation of his meetings with DSK deputy president Anton Koljaj, who is in charge of defense issues in Rugova's party, and admitted that his "expert assistance" had been required.

However, he did admit to having received certain amounts of money in German marks, but explained that this was "help for the Albanians sacked from work." [passage omitted] The trial resumes tomorrow, when the other accused are expected to be heard.

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